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1 Introduction
Language cannot be explained ontologically or by referring to some kind of 
peculiar organ or device, as linguist Noam Chomsky assumes. Rather, it can 
only be explained ontogenetically. Language isn’t, it happens.
– Heinz von Foerster, Understanding Systems
Our son Leo is almost six months old. Although he shows a keen interest in 
producing vocalisations, he cannot speak yet. Over the next couple of years, his 
vocalisations will gradually turn into words, and he will start to do all kinds of 
things  with  these  words.  In  doing  so,  he  will  become  a  participant  in  the 
linguistic  activities  of  his  community.  This  remarkable  transformation  raises 
two important questions: how is it possible for children to learn language? And 
what is it that they learn? How you answer these questions depends on what you 
think language is, and on what you think cognition is. Cognition roughly means 
thinking,  but  how cognition should be defined and explained is  a  matter  of 
fierce debate, as we will see in this introduction.
This thesis proposes a perspective on language and its development by 
starting from two approaches. The first is the  ecological-enactive approach to 
cognition. In opposition to the widespread idea that cognition is information-
processing in the brain, the ecological-enactive approach explains human cogni­
tion in relational terms, as skilful interactions with a sociomaterial environment 
shaped by practices.  A practice is  a recurrent  activity where participants are 
accountable to rules or criteria, e.g. making promises, playing chess, congratu­
lating someone on their new job, and so on.1 The second is the metalinguistic  
1 I define a recurrent activity as a practice ‘iff (1) there are public criteria or rules involved to  
which participants’ behaviour is accountable, (2) there is a point to the activity, (3) and the  
participants understand the point of the activity and put the activity to use in furthering their 
own purposes.’ (p. 112).
1
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approach to language, which holds that reflexive or metalinguistic language use 
– talking about talking – is crucial for understanding language and its develop­
ment. In particular, I defend two theses:
1. A child’s initial communicative behaviour can be explained in terms of 
attentional  actions:  social  actions that  function by directing someone 
else’s attention.
2. In order for the child’s communicative behaviour to be sensitive to key 
properties of language, such as semantic content and normativity, she 
needs to learn metalinguistic skills.
The  development  of  this  ecological-enactive  perspective  on  language 
serves two functions. First, the ecological-enactive approach started by consid­
ering basic behaviour, such as locomotion and grasping.  An approach in the 
cognitive sciences, however, should be able to account for the full  gamut of 
human cognition. If the perspective developed in this thesis is viable, this is a 
contribution to extending the ecological-enactive approach to typically human 
forms of cognition. Second, this perspective throws new light on philosophical 
problems concerning language. In the different chapters, I deal with questions 
concerning the nature of linguistic knowledge, explanations of communicative 
behaviour, and the origins of semantic content and linguistic normativity.
This introduction serves to contextualise the perspective developed in this 
thesis. In the first part of this introduction, I introduce the pragmatic turn in the 
study of cognition. This turn marks the current shift from classical cognitivism, 
according to which all cognition consists essentially in brain-bound computa­
tions of mental representations, to an action-oriented paradigm, which redefines 
cognition as perceptually guided action. I first introduce classical cognitivism 
and  some  arguments  against  this  approach,  after  which  I  introduce  the
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ecological-enactive approach on which this thesis builds. In the second part of 
the introduction, I introduce a widespread assumption in theoretical reflections 
on language, which is to take language to be an abstract system of codes. On 
this code-view, a language encodes thought and thereby allows for the transfer­
ence of thoughts from one person to another. I show why this view of language 
goes hand in hand with a classical cognitivist account of cognition. I then intro­
duce  the  metalinguistic  approach,  according  to  which  language  should  be 
explained in terms of normative metalinguistic practices. In the third and final  
part of this introduction, I provide a short summary of each chapter.
1.1 Cognition: from representation to action
The cognitive  sciences  are  currently making a  pragmatic  turn  (Engel  et  al.  
2013).  In  this  paradigm shift  (Stewart,  Gapenne,  Di  Paolo  2010),  the  very 
concept of cognition is redefined. Classical cognitivism, the dominant approach 
since the middle of the twentieth century,  defined cognition as computations 
over mental representations, a process that is tucked away inside the skull and is 
only instrumentally related to perceptual inputs and motor outputs. Gradually, 
this conception is making way for a radical embodied concept of cognition, in 
which action takes centre stage. Echoing Ryle, intelligence is not located in the  
causes of behaviour; instead, behaviour itself is performed intelligently. Human 
behaviour is explained in relational terms, as emerging from a history of skilful  
interactions with a sociomaterial environment.
In  what  follows,  I  briefly  introduce  classical  cognitivism  and  some 
reasons  for  abandoning  it.  An  alternative  to  classical  cognitivism  are
E-approaches  to  cognition,  according  to  which  cognition  is  embodied, 
embedded,  extended,  enacted,  and  ecological.  There  are,  however,  many 
different E-approaches to cognition. Some of these are conservative, in that they 
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are best understood as variants of classical cognitivism. I introduce two of these 
conservative  E-approaches.  I  end  this  section  by introducing  the  ecological-
enactive approach, the radical embodied approach on which this thesis builds, 
which is not a variant of classical cognitivism but opposed to it.
1.1.1 Classical cognitivism: the classical sandwich model of mind
Classical cognitivism was a response to the behaviourism of the first half of the  
twentieth century.  The aim of  classical  cognitivism was  to  provide  a  realist 
understanding of mentalistic terms in the cognitive sciences. Without a doubt, 
one of the most ardent proponents of classical cognitivism was Fodor. He uses 
the term representational theory of mind (RTM) to designate this approach to 
the study of mind. He describes its commitments as follows: 
1.  The  only  psychological  models  of  cognitive  processes  that  seem even 
remotely plausible represent such processes as computational.
2.  Computation  presupposes  a  medium of  computation:  a  representational 
system. (Fodor 1975, p. 27)
RTM  is  a  claim  about  the  metaphysics  of  cognitive  mental  states  and 
processes: Tokens of cognitive mental states are tokens of relations between 
creatures  and their  mental  representations.  Tokens of mental  processes  are 
‘computations’; that is, causal chains of (typically inferential) operations on 
mental representations. (Fodor 2008, p. 5)
This  definition  of  cognitive  states  and  processes  exemplifies  the  two 
pillars  of  classical  cognitivism:  computation  and  representation.  Cognition 
consists essentially in constructing mental representations of the world ‘outside’ 
the cognitive system and to perform computational operations on them. Tradi­
tionally, all computational systems were taken to be representational systems, as 
epitomised by the slogan ‘no computation without representation’ (Fodor 1981, 
p. 122). The guiding idea was that computations are, at least in part, individu­
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ated by semantic properties of the representations they are computations on. 2 
Recently, however, people have proposed non-semantic accounts of computa­
tion (e.g. Piccinini 2008; Villalobos & Dewhurst 2017). If these accounts are 
viable, a non-representationalist account of cognition could be computationalist. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will not further discuss the notion of computa­
tion, but focus instead on the representational pillar.
In  classical  cognitivism,  mental  representations  are  defined as  amodal 
symbols: symbols that have a non-perceptual representational format, and that 
therefore bear no systematic similarity to what is represented. Mental represent­
ations were taken to be sentences in a language of thought called  mentalese, 
which  means  that  mental  representations  are  propositionally  structured  and 
descriptive in nature (Fodor 1975, 2008; Devitt 2006; Pinker 1994, 2007).
The argument for representationalism is given by Marr (1982/2010, p. 3) 
as follows: 
if we are capable of knowing what is where in the world, our brains must 
somehow be capable of representing this information – in all its profusion of  
color and form, beauty, motion, and detail. The study of vision must therefore 
include not only the study of how to extract from images the various aspects  
of the world that are useful to us, but also an inquiry into the nature of the 
internal representations by which we capture this information and thus make it 
available as a basis for decisions about our thoughts and actions.
One important implication of cognitivism’s representationalism is that a 
clear distinction can be made between those processes that are cognitive and 
those that are not. Perception and action are merely the inputs and outputs to a 
cognitive system, but are not part of it. In Marr’s quote, this can be gleaned 
2 Fodor (personal correspondence cited in Piccinini 2008, p. 235), explains why computation 
must be individuated by semantic properties: ‘What distinguishes […] causal sequences that  
constitute  computations from  those  that  don’t?  Answer,  the  former  preserve  semantic 
properties of the strings (paradigmatically, they take one from true inputs to true outputs). 
This requires that the tokened states have semantic interpretations (since, of course, only what 
is semantically interpreted can be evaluated for truth). So, in that sense, the representations in  
question are individuated by their semantic properties inter alia.’
6 Chapter 1
from the idea that vision consists essentially in  extracting  from  images  those 
aspects of the world that are useful for planning a course of action. The idea that 
what is available to vision is images, not a world, comes from starting from the 
light  projected  on  the  retina  and  calling  this  projection  the  retinal  image. 
Importantly, the information that reaches the retina is thought to be ambiguous 
and impoverished. For example, the retinal image is two-dimensional, yet we 
perceive a three-dimensional world. Cognitive processes are therefore thought 
‘to infer’ representations of the world, based on this ambiguous information.
Hurley (2001) describes this view of cognition as the classical sandwich 
model  of  cognition.  Cognitive  processes  are  sandwiched  between  peripheral 
processes of perception and action (see figure 1). Sensory input is processed and 
transformed  into  mental  representations,  which  are  then  sent  to  the  central  
cognitive core in the brain. Based on these representations, the central cognitive 
core decides on a course of action and sends instructions for performing these 
actions to the motor system. This view implies a one-way causal flow: informa­
tion enters the system through the senses, gets processed, and this in turn results 
in certain actions.  Moreover,  the process is  modular:  sensory,  cognitive,  and 
action processes are distinct from one another. The sandwich is classical when 
cognitive  processes  are  thought  to  consist  in  performing  computations  over 
mental representations.
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Figure 1: The classical sandwich model of cognition.
1.1.2 Against sandwiches
Two main  lines  of  criticism have  been  levelled  against  the  modularity that 
follows from a classical sandwich model of cognition. The first stems from a 
wealth  of  empirical  evidence  that  shows  that  the  brain  cannot  be  neatly 
compartmentalised  into  distinct  perception,  cognition,  and  action  modules. 
Perhaps  the  most  well-known  example  is  given  by  mirror  neurons.  These 
neurons, as first described in monkeys by Di Pellegrino et al. (1992), are part of 
the ‘premotor’ cortex. They are activated in the performance of particular hand 
movements but are also activated when monkeys observe the same hand move­
ment  without  doing  anything.  What  were  initially  thought  to  be  regions 
dedicated to motor processes thus turn out to play a role in perception as well. 
Moreover, there is now a wealth of evidence that the actions one is currently 
engaged in modulate and bias sensory activations (for an overview, see Engel et 
al. 2013). Acquiring new behaviours and performing certain actions can have 
modulatory effects on sensory areas in the brain. For example, in monkeys that 
learned to use a rake to gather food that  would have otherwise been out  of 
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reach, bimodal neurons that initially responded to somatosensory stimulation of 
the hand and visual stimulation near the hand extended their receptive fields to 
include the tool (Maravita & Iriki 2004). The action of using a tool thus changes 
perceptual processes. This has been argued to show that perceptual processes 
cannot  be  described  without  reference  to  the  action  context,  and  therefore 
cannot be thought to be isolated from action in the way suggested by the clas­
sical sandwich model.
The second line  of  criticism is more  fundamental.  Marr  describes  the 
explanatory problem posed by vision in terms of the extraction of useful aspects 
of the world from images, where the image is understood as arising from the 
projection of light on the retina. Here the perceiver is characterised as a passive 
recipient  of  sensory information from the environment.  This passivity of the 
perceiver  is  not  only  assumed,  but  also  enforced  in  experiments,  in  which 
subjects typically look at two-dimensional computer monitors (not three-dimen­
sional objects)3 while their heads are restrained. In the real world, however, we 
are not typically passive in this way. Instead, we actively explore our environ­
ments  in  order  to  be  able  to  see  what  we  need  to  see.  Noë  (2012,  p.  40) 
describes this as follows:
perceptual  experience  is  an  activity whereby we  bring things  near  us  into 
focus for perceptual consciousness. We peer, and squint, and move, and adjust 
ourselves, nearly continuously, in order to come near to, achieve access to and 
stabilize our contact with the world around us.
Another example is given for haptic perception of a sponge by Myin (2003, p. 
42):
3 Snow et al.  (2011) show that a ‘repetition suppression’, i.e., reduced firing rates in certain 
brain areas when an object is repeatedly shown to a person,  only holds for watching 2D  
images. They could not find this effect when people are repeatedly shown the same 3D object. 
What had been assumed to be a property of perception simpliciter, following the idea that we 
perceive images anyway, turns out to be a property of 2D image perception.
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the experience of softness comes about through a specific pattern encountered 
in a sensorimotor exploration, including such facts as that if one pushes on a 
soft object, it yields.
Perceiving  the  softness  of  the  sponge  relies  constitutively on  acting  on  the 
sponge by pressing or squeezing it. If you take away the exploratory action in 
the perception of softness you are not left with ‘pure perception’; rather, you  
would not be able to perceive the softness of the sponge at all. 
What these examples show, is that action is a constitutive part of percep­
tion, and not merely a consequence of it. Action and perception are inextricably 
intertwined,  not  only at  the  level  of  the  brain  but  also  at  the  level  of  the 
organism in  its  environment.  However,  what  this  conclusion  entails  for  the 
study of cognition is a matter of debate.
1.1.3 Conservative E-approaches
Over the last thirty years, a group of approaches to the study of cognition has 
gained  in  popularity  according  to  which  cognition  is  embodied,  embedded, 
extended, enactive, ecological. These E-approaches have very different theoret­
ical  commitments.  Some E-approaches,  for  example,  are  best  understood as 
variants of the cognitivist framework, whereas others propose a radical break.4
On the conservative end of the spectrum, we find a concept of ‘embodied 
cognition’ that is nevertheless brain-bound. On these accounts, an ‘embodied 
concept [i.e., a mental representation] is a neural structure that is actually part  
of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of our brains’ (Lakoff & Johnson,  
1999, p. 104). The idea is that cognition does not consist in the manipulation of 
amodal symbols, as proposed by classical cognitivism, but rather that modality 
specific  systems  underlie  cognition.  For  example,  some  cognitive  scientists 
argue that besides descriptive amodal symbols, mental representations can also 
4 In a trivial sense, all cognition is embodied. Nobody in the cognitive sciences proposes a  
substance dualism in which cognition exists independent of any physical realisation.
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be  depictive  and  have  a  pictorial  format  (e.g.  Pearson  &  Kosslyn  2015).
Barsalou’s (1999, p. 578) Perceptual Symbol System is a good example of this 
idea: ‘Subsets of perceptual states in sensory-motor systems are extracted and 
stored in long-term memory to function as symbols.’ In other words, on these 
views ‘cognition is embodied in the sense that the mechanisms for perception 
and action are the same as the mechanisms for concept manipulation and reas­
oning’ (Aizawa 2015, p. 758).
These approaches deviate from classical cognitivism in that they deny the 
fact that perception and action are peripheral processes that can be understood 
in separation of the central  cognitive  core.  In this  way,  they aim to accom­
modate the empirical evidence that shows that,  on the level of the brain, no 
clear  distinction  between  perception,  cognition,  and  action  can  be  made. 
However,  they  do  not  break  with  the  cognitivist  assumption  that  cognition 
should be understood as involving mental representations. These approaches are 
therefore best understood as slight modifications of classical cognitivism, in that 
they  allow  for  other  representational  formats  besides  the  amodal  symbols 
originally envisaged.
Another E-approach that is best understood as a slight modification on 
the  classical  cognitivist  framework  is  the  idea  that  cognition  is  sometimes 
extended beyond the brain. This idea, known as the extended mind hypothesis,  
was first defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), who introduced the scenario 
of Otto and Inga who both wanted to visit  a museum. Where Inga uses her 
biological  memory  to  remember  where  the  museum  is,  Otto  suffers  from 
Alzheimer’s and therefore cannot remember the location. In order to counteract 
this, he carries a notebook with him in which he records information he would 
otherwise forget. In order to ‘remember’ the location of the museum, he must 
consult  his  notebook.  Clark  and  Chalmers  (1998,  p.  13)  think  that  in  this 
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example, we have good reason to assume that Otto’s notebook is a genuine part 
of his cognitive system:
For in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays 
for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga. The information in the  
notebook functions just like the information constituting an ordinary non-oc­
current belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the skin.
Besides the idea that cognitive processes sometimes extend beyond the 
brain, the extended mind hypothesis is perfectly in line with cognitivist assump­
tions. This does not mean that all cognitivists agree to the conclusions of Clark 
and Chalmers. One important argument against the extended mind is to argue 
that whereas it is indeed the case that cognition is causally dependent on all 
kinds of things, this does not show that cognition is constitutively dependent on 
it.  Adams and Aizawa (2010)  call  this  the  coupling-constitution fallacy:  not 
everything that is causally coupled to a cognitive system thereby becomes part 
that cognitive system. In their view, the sandwich model of mind can be saved 
because of its classical fillings:
a principled basis for thinking that today, cognitive processes typically occur 
only within the brain, or central nervous system, is in plain view. It lies in the  
familiar cognitivist view that cognition involves certain sorts of manipulations 
of non-derived representations. (Adams & Aizawa 2010, p. 579).
1.1.4 Against classical fillings: the hard problem of content
Whether mental representations exist is a hotly debated issue with a long pedi­
gree in the philosophy of mind and cognition (see e.g. Brooks 1991; Varela, 
Thompson,  &  Rosch  1991;  Keijzer  2001;  Ramsey  2007;  Chemero  2009; 
Rowlands 2015). Here I want to present a recent argument against representa­
tionalism put  forward  by  Hutto  &  Myin  (2013),  which  they  call  the  hard 
problem of content. 
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In order to understand this problem, it is important to realise that a philo­
sophically robust  notion  of  representation  requires  that  representations  have 
semantic properties (Pitt 2018).5 The idea is that a mental representation repres­
ents something as being a particular  way,  where that  thing need not  be that  
particular way. This idea is captured in the concept of  content (Hutto & Myin 
2017; Neander 2017; Rescorla 2016). Having content means having correctness 
conditions of some kind. Imagine for example that an object is mentally repres­
ented as red. This mental representation is correct when the represented thing is 
indeed red, and is incorrect otherwise. Traditionally, following the propositional 
nature of mental representations, these correctness conditions were taken to be 
truth  conditions, or, in the case of desires or goals,  satisfaction  conditions.  In 
the case of other representational formats, such as the sensorimotor representa­
tions of conservative embodied cognition, these correctness conditions can also 
be accuracy conditions. 
A representational theory of cognition is only viable if an account can be 
given of how mental representations get their content. Content is essentially a 
normative concept (Cash 2008). Rowlands (2017, p. 4217) explains:
cognitive  states—thoughts,  beliefs,  etc.—make  a  normative claim  on  the 
world. If I have a belief with the content that p, then the world should be p. If 
the world is not p then something has gone wrong.
To give a naturalistic account of content is thus to give an account of the place  
of semantic normativity in the natural world.
According to Hutto and Myin (2013), proponents of a representational 
theory of cognition must face up to the hard problem of content. They start from 
the observation that the prime candidate for naturalising content in the contem­
5 It is a matter of some debate whether cognitive scientist’s use of the word  representation 
requires  this  philosophically  robust  notion  of  representation.  In  particular,  it  is  unclear 
whether the explanatory success of cognitive science theories that use the word representation 
hinges on a robust notion of representation (e.g. Hutto & Myin 2013, pp.  113ff.;  Ramsey 
2007).
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porary debate is the concept of information. However, the only scientifically 
credible form of information depends on the notion of covariance.6 This is also 
the notion of information that philosophers rely on: when a perceived state of 
affairs, or signal, correlates to a distal state of affairs, it is thought that the signal 
carries information about the state of affairs. 
A concept of information-as-covariance can explain what actually caused 
a particular behaviour in an organism. But, by itself, this covariance relation is 
not the right kind of relation to constitute content. For one, whereas covariance 
relations are symmetric, contentful relations are not (Hutto 2008, p. 48). A map 
represents the territory, but the territory does not represent the map. Moreover, 
the  failure  of  covariation  does  not  imply  inaccuracy,  falsity,  or  unsatisfied 
conditions  of  satisfaction.  Although  smoke  usually  co-varies  with  fire,  the 
smoke that emanates from a smoke machine doesn’t falsely indicate the pres­
ence of fire. This means that the concept of information, by itself, is not going 
to be able to do the heavy lifting in giving a naturalistic account of content (cf.  
Van den Herik 2013). Crucially, for the constitution of content we need some­
thing more: we do not need a descriptive account of what actually caused the 
tokening  of  a  mental  representation,  we  need  a  normative  account  of  what 
should cause the tokening such that in some cases a representation is caused by 
something it should not have been caused by. In other words, to explain repres­
entational properties is to explain the possibility of misrepresentation.
Over the years, many explanations of mental content have been proposed 
(e.g. Harman 1973; Dretske 1981; Block 1986; Fodor 1990; Papineau 1984). 
The most promising of these is generally taken to be teleosemantics, as initially 
proposed by Millikan (1984). Teleosemantics tries to extract the normativity of 
representations from evolved biological functions. It goes beyond covariance 
because it assumes that ‘the content of a representation is determined, in a very 
6 See  Miłkowski  (2015)  for  a  critique  of  the  assumption  that  covariance  is  the  only 
naturalistically respectable notion of information. 
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important part,  by the systems that interpret it’ (Millikan 2005, p. 100). The 
general idea is that sensory mechanisms produce mental representations that are 
‘consumed’, as Millikan calls it, by other parts of the cognitive system. The 
content is fixed by the evolved biological function that a representation fulfils in 
enabling the consumer mechanism to direct the behaviour of the organism. For 
example, a mental representation of a fox will cause a rabbit to flee. In normal 
conditions, the mental representation of the fox will be caused by the presence 
of a fox. However, it can also be caused by other things in the environment, for  
example, something that looks remarkably like a fox, and will then also cause 
the rabbit to flee. In these cases, the teleosemanticist argues, there is a misrep­
resentation,  because  the  mental  representation  and  consumer  mechanism’s 
evolved function is fleeing from foxes, not fleeing from things-that-look-like-
foxes. In other words, ‘the content is that condition under which the resulting 
behaviour  would  be appropriate, whether or not the actual circumstances that 
caused the representation are of that type’ (MacDonald & Papineau 2006, p. 6).
As Hutto and Myin (2013) point out, it is commonly assumed that these 
teleosemantic theories fail. The root problem, Fodor (1990) argues, is that selec­
tionist  explanations,  i.e.,  explanations  in  terms  of  natural  selection,  are 
extensional. In the example of the rabbit fleeing from a fox, the fleeing behavi­
our’s function is to escape from the fox. And so a selectionist explanation can 
show that the function of the mental representation causing the fleeing beha­
viour is to flee from this fox. But for explaining representational content, this is  
not enough. The reason is that the object of the evolved biological function can 
be described in many different ways: as a fox, as a predator, as dangerous, and 
so on.  For the purposes of fulfilling the biological  function,  determining the 
description of the fox is irrelevant. As long as the rabbit flees from foxes, the 
function is fulfilled. However, the description is very relevant to determining 
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representational  content,  for  each  of  the  different  descriptions  has  different 
correctness conditions.
In other words, in order to be able to talk of representational content, the 
biological function must not only determine in response to what, extensionally 
speaking, the mental representation evolved, it must also determine an inten­
sional description of that thing. Hutto and Myin (2013, p. 80) summarise: ‘Even 
if we can specify what is meant to be targeted that would give us exactly no 
reason to think that the targeted item is represented in a truth-conditional, refer­
ential, or otherwise semantic way’.
Biological functions can fail to fulfil their function. The rabbit might flee 
from something that is not a fox, or fail to flee from a fox. In these cases, some  
of the internal states of the rabbit might be the same as when it was fleeing from 
a fox. However, none of this shows that the rabbit represents anything, correctly 
or incorrectly.  In the words of Burge (2010, p. 301), there simply is ‘a root  
mismatch between representational error and failure of biological function.’
The hard problem of content is particularly hard when a cognitivist has to 
solve it. The reason for this is that the cognitivist holds that all cognition has to 
be explained in  terms of  content-bearing mental  states.  This  means  that  the 
normativity of content cannot be explained in terms of cognitive processes, and 
therefore must be explained in purely biological or physical terms. The hard 
problem of content, however, looks very different when approached from a non-
representational approach, e.g. the ecological enactive-approach. By providing a 
contentless account of some forms of cognition, including those forms under­
lying basic social interaction, the theoretical resources available for solving the 
hard problem are much more suited to the task at hand. In chapter 4, I call this  
the  ecological-enactive  explanatory  reversal:  on  the  ecological-enactive 
approach, content is not needed to explain cognition, but instead, content can be 
explained by cognition, including social forms of cognition.
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Others, including an earlier time-slice of myself (Van den Herik 2014), 
assumed that Hutto and Myin’s hard problem of content entails that the concept 
of content should be eliminated from our theoretical reflections on human beha­
viour  altogether  (e.g.  Harvey  2015,  Rosenberg  2015,  Alksnis  2015).  This 
conclusion is warranted given the assumption that the only viable understanding 
of content is a realism where contents are understood as abstract objects such as 
propositions.7 On such a realist view, allowing for content in one’s explanations 
would amount to adopting a non-naturalist position. Rosenberg (2015) explains: 
‘Naturalism cannot help itself to causal contact with abstract objects, and that’s 
the only kind of contact there is.’ However, a semantic nihilism of this kind 
does not seem to be able to do justice to our use of language. As Lance (2017, p.  
163) says, ‘Even the most semantically nihilistic philosopher must admit that 
there is something pragmatically significant to the question of whether a given 
pair of sentences “share content.”’ For example, in everyday situations, we can 
judge two different utterances to be ‘saying the same thing’. While the word 
‘content’ might not be used in these interactions, the everyday concepts of ‘what 
someone  said’,  or  the  ‘what  someone  means’ express  the  relevant  notion. 
Viewed in this way, content is a phenomenon that needs to be explained.
Finally,  it  should be noted that  not  everybody shares Hutto & Myin’s 
(2013; 2017) pessimism with respect to solving the hard problem of content 
(see for example Shea 2013; Miłkowski 2015; Mollo 2015). For the purposes of 
this thesis, I will not further engage this debate. Instead, I will focus on building 
on the ecological-enactive approach.
7 Pitt (2018, §6) describes this standard position as follows: ‘the issue is not how to naturalize 
content (abstract objects can't be naturalized), but, rather, how to specify naturalistic content-
determining relations between mental representations and the abstract objects they express.’
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1.1.5 Radical embodied cognition
Radical embodied approaches to cognition propose a root and branch reconcep­
tualisation  of  cognition.  In  contradistinction  to  the  conservative  approaches 
discussed earlier, that modify the cognitivist notion of mental representations, 
radical embodied approaches aim to explain cognition without invoking mental 
representations.  Clark (1997, p. 147), who coined the term  radical embodied 
cognition, describes it as follows: ‘Structured, symbolic, representational, and 
computational  views  of  cognition  are  mistaken.  Embodied  cognition  is  best 
studied  by  means  of  non-computational  and  non-representational  ideas  and 
explanatory schemes’. Wilson and Golonka (2013, p. 1) explain:
Embodiment is the surprisingly radical hypothesis that the brain is not the sole  
cognitive resource we have available to us to solve problems. Our bodies and 
their perceptually guided motions through the world do much of the work 
required to achieve our goals, replacing the need for complex internal mental 
representations.
In  this  thesis,  I  build  on  one  radical  embodied  approach,  namely the 
ecological-enactive approach. This approach combines insights from enactivism 
and ecological psychology into a unified post-cognitivist framework. In what 
follows, I first introduce enactivism and ecological psychology. I then sketch 
the contours of the ecological-enactive approach.
1.1.6 Enactivism
Enactivism is an approach to cognition first introduced by Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch (1991, p. 173), who characterise the approach as follows:
In a nutshell, the enactive approach consists of two points:
(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and
(2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that 
enable action to be perceptually guided.
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Instead  of  the  classical  sandwich  model  of  mind,  the  enactive  approach 
conceives of cognition in terms of sensorimotor loops: perception and action 
form two sides  of  the  same  process.  This  focus  on  sensorimotor  loops  has 
another implication to which enactivism owes its name. Perceptual processes 
are constitutively dependent on the possibility to act. This implies, as Stewart 
(2010, p. 3) puts it:
what the world ‘is’ for the organism amounts to neither more nor less than the 
consequences of its actions for its sensory inputs; this in turn clearly depends 
on the repertoire of possible actions. Without action, there is no ‘world’ and no 
perception.
The world of the organism is thus not pre-given but enacted (co-constructed, or 
brought  forth (Maturana  &  Varela  1987))  by  its  own  activity.  There  are 
currently three main approaches that fly under the banner of enactivism (for a 
recent overview see Ward, Silverman, & Villalobos 2017).
Firstly,  there  is  autopoietic  enactivism,  also  known  as  the  enactive  
approach (Thompson  2007;  Di  Paolo  2005;  Di  Paolo  et  al.  2010).  This 
approach  aims  to  understand  how  organisms  qua  biological  being  enact  a 
domain of significance. Its main assumption is that life and mind are continuous 
in the sense that the processes that underlie life are the same processes that 
underlie cognition. In order to continue to exist, an organism has continuously 
create the possibilities for its own survival.  Organisms thus essentially make 
themselves,  i.e.,  they are  autopoietic.  In  the  words  of  Maturana  and Varela 
(1980, p. 79), an autopoietic system ‘generates and specifies its own organiza­
tion through its operation as a system of production of its own components’. In 
order to maintain its organisation, the organism has certain requirements. As a 
result of these requirements, otherwise meaningless aspects of the environment 
become meaningful for the organism. In this way, it enacts a domain of signific­
ance. For example, Thompson (2007) describes how, for a bacterium, sucrose 
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has significance as a nutrient. This significance is a relational property, as it is  
dependent on properties of the sucrose but also on the metabolism that underlies 
the bacterium’s autopoiesis.  Therefore,  ‘Sucrose has significance or value as 
food, but only in the milieu that the organism itself brings into existence’ (Ibid., 
p. 258). 
The second approach is sensorimotor enactivism (Hurley 1998; O’Regan 
&  Noë  2001;  Noë  2004,  O’Regan  2011).  This  approach  limits  itself  to 
explaining  the  phenomenal  properties  of  perception.  The  main  idea  is  that 
perception does not happen in the brain, but is rather something we do (Noë 
2004; Myin 2016) based on a particular kind of knowledge: ‘vision is a mode of 
exploration of the world that is mediated by knowledge of what we call sensor­
imotor  contingencies’  (O’Regan  &  Noë  2001,  p.  940).  Sensorimotor 
contingencies  are  ‘the  structure  of  the  rules  governing  the  sensory changes 
produced by various motor actions’ (Ibid., p. 941). In other words, perception 
consists in exploring the environment, which is made possible by an implicit 
knowledge of how our actions affect our sensory states. What we perceive then,  
is not limited to the stimulation of the retina, nor does it consist in building 
representations. To take a favourite example of this approach, when we see a 
tomato,  we  see  a  three-dimensional  object.  This  phenomenal  experience  is 
explained in terms of the practical knowledge we have of what would happen if 
we were to walk around the tomato, or rotate it, and so on.
The third approach is  radical enactivism, or  REC (Hutto & Myin 2013; 
2017). Hutto (2015, p. 1) describes the task REC sets itself as follows: 
The main work of radical enactivism is to RECtify existing varieties of enact­
ivism and other cognate approaches so as to strengthen and unify them into a  
single  collective  that  can rival  classical  ways  of  thinking  about  mind  and 
cognition.
20 Chapter 1
The primary arguments put forward by REC are thus negative, as evidenced for 
example by the formulation of the hard problem of content. Rather than offer an 
alternative to other variants of enactivism and enactivism-friendly approaches, 
REC aims to RECtify other  approaches,  i.e.,  to rid  them of  any inadvertent  
vestiges  of  representationalism.  For  example,  Hutto  and  Myin  (2013)  have 
argued that  sensorimotor  enactivism’s  claim that  that  vision  is  mediated  by  
knowledge of  sensorimotor  contingencies  could  lead  to  a  representational 
reading.  Another  example  of  RECtification  is  REC’s  recreation  of  teleose­
mantics  without  the  semantics.  According to  what  REC calls  teleosemiotics, 
Fodor’s worry that selectionist explanations are extensional can be accommod­
ated by showing how evolved biological functions can account for a basic kind 
of intentionality, called  Ur-intentionality, which is non-representational (Hutto 
& Myin 2017). 
1.1.7 Ecological psychology
Like enactivism, ecological psychology starts from the idea that cognition and 
perception need to be understood in action-oriented terms.8 E.J. Gibson (1988, 
p. 5) explains:
We don’t simply see, we look. The visual system is a motor system as well as 
a sensory one. When we seek information in an optic array, the head turns, the 
eyes turn to fixate, the lens accommodates to focus, and spectacles may be 
applied and even adjusted by head position for far or near looking.
To look is to act. Organisms do not passively wait for useful information to be  
brought  in  through  sensory  channels.  Instead,  ecological  psychology  fore­
grounds the fact  that  organisms engage in exploratory activity,  and that  this 
activity is a constitutive part of the perceptual system. Perceptual systems are 
described in terms of perception-action cycles.
8 Lobo, Heras-Escribano, and Travieso (2018) provide a good introduction to the history and 
philosophy of Ecological Psychology.
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A key insight of ecological psychology is that once you factor in explor­
atory activity, the information that is available to the organism is very different 
than cognitivists assume. According to cognitivism, information about the world 
is ambiguous and therefore needs to be enriched by cognitive processes. The 
example we discussed was the information projected on the retina, which leads 
to  the  idea  of  the  retinal  image.  On  the  ecological  approach,  however,  the 
assumption is that all the information the organism needs to guide its action is 
there already. Ecological information is described as invariant patterns in energy 
arrays. For example, while an object’s shape might be ambiguous when visually 
perceived  under  a  certain  angle,  this  ambiguity can  be  resolved  by  further 
sampling the optical array, that is, by moving around the object. In this way, the 
activity of the organism resolves potential ambiguity.
Learning about  the world is  conceived as a process of ‘differentiating 
previously  vague  impressions’,  not  of  ‘enriching  meagre  sensations’  (J.J. 
Gibson & E.J. Gibson, 1955, p. 34). Adolph and Kretch (2015, p. 131) give an 
example:
A good, intuitive example of increased specificity through differentiation is 
wine tasting; […] Over years of practice, small differences – differences that  
truly exist in the chemical signatures of different wines – become more easily 
distinguished; an expert taster can identify a Bordeaux from France and distin­
guish  it  from a similar  mix of  Cabernet  Sauvignon,  Merlot,  and Cabernet 
Franc grapes from California.
Learning wine tasting does not consist in becoming able to add some­
thing to  the  information  available,  that  is,  in  inferring characteristics  of  the 
world based on incomplete and ambiguous information;  rather  it  consists  in 
becoming able to differentiate between different sources of information that are 
out there. If there was no chemical difference between different sort of wines, 
wine tasters would not be able to differentiate between them.
22 Chapter 1
This perceptual learning is conceptualised as  fine-tuning an organism to 
the relevant  information (E.J.  Gibson & Spelke,  1983).  Through exploratory 
activity, the organism can pick up on these differences that are out there, and 
gradually attune to them. In the case of the human, perceptual learning often 
occurs under the guidance of somebody who is already attuned to the environ­
ment. Here we speak of the education of attention, which can be thought of as a 
process of guided rediscovery (Ingold, 2001; Zukow-Goldring & Ferko, 1994). 
In the case of learning to taste wine, for example, an expert wine taster can  
direct  a  novice’s  attention to  differences  in  taste  between different  kinds of 
wine, differences that the expert already notices.
The main innovation of ecological psychology is a redescription of the 
environment that an organism can perceive. The environment of an animal does 
not coincide with the world as described by physics. It differs from the physical  
world because it consists on the ecological scale and is determined by character­
istics of the animal. In line with the interconnection of perception and action, 
the environment does not show up for the organism as a collection of objects,  
but rather as possibilities for action called  affordances. J.J.  Gibson (1979, p. 
127) describes this as follows: ‘The affordances of the environment are what it  
offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill’.
For example, when we approach a ladder we perceive that we can climb 
it. Whether a person can climb it is determined  both by the properties of the 
ladder, e.g. the distance between the steps, and by their action capabilities and 
physical characteristics. For an adult, different ladders are climbable than for a 
small child, and for a person who has broken both their legs, no ladders are 
climbable.
There  is  a  debate  in  ecological  psychology regarding  the  ontological 
status of affordances. Turvey  et al. (1981) define affordances as dispositional 
properties of the environment that are complemented by dispositional properties 
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on the part of animals (a class which includes humans), which they call effectiv­
ities. Chemero (2009, p. 145), however, argues that dispositions do not fail to 
actualise  under  the  right  circumstances.  A sugar  cube  has  a  disposition  to 
dissolve, and if we put it in water it will dissolve. On the other hand, although I 
have the ability to climb ladders, I will not always do so when I encounter a 
ladder. Moreover, my ability to climb ladders does not mean that I will never 
slip and fall in my ladder climbing abilities. So the exercise of abilities can fail  
in a sense not easily accommodated by a dispositional account.
Chemero (2009) proposes  a relational  concept  of  affordances.  On this 
view, affordances are relations between animals and their environment. More 
particularly,  affordances  are  relations  between  abilities  and  features9 of  the 
environment. A potential problem of such a relational account of affordances is 
that defining affordances in relation to individual animals violates the realism 
espoused by ecological  psychology.  For  example,  the  education of  attention 
model of learning relies on the affordances being there in advance of an indi­
viduals  ability  to  act  on  that  affordance.  More  generally,  ecological 
psychologists  are interested in defining affordances as resources available to 
animals. The solution to this possible objection is to make a distinction between 
two different senses of environment, which I discuss in the next section. 
1.1.8 The ecological-enactive approach
Ecological psychology and enactivism were initially developed in relative isola­
tion from one another. This isolation can be explained because proponents of 
both  approaches  have  stressed  their  incompatibility.  Varela,  Thompson,  and 
Rosch (1991, p. 204), for example, claim that:
9 Chemero  (2009)  uses  the  word  feature  instead  of  property to  foreground  the  fact  that 
affordances are features of situations, not properties of things, because, according to Chemero  
(2009, p. 140), ‘the situation as a whole supports (perhaps demands) a certain kind of action.’
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In  a  nutshell,  then,  whereas  Gibson  claims  that  the  environment  is  inde­
pendent [from the perceptually guided activity of the animal], we claim that it  
is enacted (by histories of coupling). Whereas Gibson claims that perception is 
direct detection, we claim that it is sensorimotor enactment. Thus the resulting 
research strategies are also fundamentally different: Gibsonians treat percep­
tion in largely optical (albeit ecological) terms and so attempt to build up the  
theory of perception almost entirely from the environment.
At  the  same  time,  ecological  psychologists  have  argued  that  the  enactive 
approach’s idea that an organism enacts a world entails a ‘solipsistic epistemo­
logy with abhorrent social consequences’ (Swenson 1992, p. 207).
However, the approaches are closely related. Both are radical embodied 
approaches,  in  that  they explain  cognition  without  invoking representations. 
Besides this negative commitment, they also share positive commitments, that 
can be understood against their shared influence from the pragmatism of Dewey 
and  James.  Heras-Escribano  (2019,  §5.1)  describes  these  commitments  as 
follows: 
perception and action are not separated processes, but two sides of the same 
continuous and dynamic process; the environment is a constitutive aspect of 
cognition; cognition is the set of skills that are the product of the history of 
interactions between an organism and its environment.
Moreover, both approaches take an essentially phenomenological approach by 
relying on Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012). Cognition should not be understood in 
the Cartesian way, in terms of a subject that is epistemically separated from the 
world and therefore has to represent that world in thought, but instead as an 
active body-subject that can interact with her environment directly. 
At the same time, each approach foregrounds a different aspect: where 
enactivism starts  from the  organism,  ecological  psychology starts  from the 
environment (Baggs & Chemero 2018). Recently, it has been argued that the 
two  approaches  can  be  reconciled,  and  thereby  provide  a  unified  post-
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cognitivist  approach to  cognition (Heras-Escribano 2019; Baggs & Chemero 
2018; Kiverstein & Rietveld 2018). 
Fully integrating these approaches a task that goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, I have relied on one aspect of this 
synthesis. This is the idea that we have to do justice both to the fact that afford­
ances exist independent of individuals, such that they can be resources available 
to individuals,  and  to the fact that individuals enact their world (Rietveld & 
Kiverstein 2014; Baggs & Chemero 2008). Moreover, in order to understand 
language from an ecological-enactive perspective, a definition of affordances 
has  to  take  into  account  that  the  environment  of  humans  is  structured  in 
important ways by our practices, i.e., the regular ways we have of doing things 
in which we are accountable to rules or criteria.
Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) follow Chemero in espousing a relational 
account of affordances. However, in order to countenance the objection that a 
relational account undermines the objective reality of affordances, and therefore 
the fact that they are available to individuals as resources, Rietveld and Kiver­
stein (2014, p. 335) propose a distinction between two levels of description:
1. The form of life and the patterns of behavior that make it up (a form of life 
in which individuals have the potential to engage with affordances skilfully); 
and
2. A particular individual’s actual skilled engagement with an affordance.
Their proposal is to define affordances in relation to the form of life, namely as 
‘relations between aspects of a material environment and abilities available in a 
form of life’ (p. 335). Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014, p. 337) explain: 
We suggest then that affordances are not relative to the abilities of a particular 
individual  who actually perceives  or  detects  the affordance.  They have  an 
existence that is relative to the skills available in the practice, or to use our 
preferred way of formulating this, to abilities available in the form of life.
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The notion of  form of  life  that  is  in  play here,  at  least  in  the  human case, 
‘comprises a multiplicity of sociocultural practices’ (p. 330). The sum total of 
all affordances so defined is called the landscape of affordances. 
Every particular individual, based on a history of education of attention, 
is selectively open to a subset of the landscape of affordances, called the field of  
(relevant) affordances. The notion of a field captures the fact that at any given 
time, a person is selectively open to a number of different affordances at the  
same time. What stands out as relevant for an individual in a given situation 
depends on the concerns of that individual. For example, a water bottle always 
affords drinking, but this affordance will stand out as relevant when a person is  
thirsty. But other factors also influence the field of relevant affordances, think 
for example of emotions (when a person is happy other affordances are relevant 
than when a person is sad), social setting (a statue in a museum does not afford 
lifting), and so on.
To replace the notion of representation, J.J. Gibson (1966) proposed to 
see the nervous system as resonating to information in the environment. On the 
ecological-enactive approach, the internal states of the organism and its brain 
are taken to be states of action-readiness (Frijda 2007; Bruineberg, Kiverstein,  
& Rietveld 2016). A state of action-readiness is somewhere in-between an overt 
action and an ability.  The general  idea is  thus that  perceiving an affordance 
requires abilities. Actually perceiving an affordance leads to a state of action-
readiness, which in turn may lead the organism to act on that affordance, if no 
other states of action-readiness take precedence (see Bruineberg 2018 for an 
account along these lines).
Foregrounding the fact that affordances in the human form of life should 
be defined in terms of practices also entails that the skilful acting on affordances 
of  an  individual  is  subject  to  normative  assessment  (Rietveld  &  Kiverstein 
2014, p. 333), for the ‘normative standards in terms of which an agent’s engage­
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ment with affordances is assessed as better or worse come from practices or  
customs belonging to a form of life’ (Ibid., p. 335). In particular, Rietveld and 
Kiverstein argue that ‘language opens up the possibility to be held to account by 
other people in our community for what we say and do’.10 In this way, acting on 
affordances can thus be used to explain ‘higher forms’ of cognition, in partic­
ular, typical human forms of cognition such as language.
1.2 Language: from codes to metalanguage
Classical cognitivism is most straightforwardly combined with a particular view 
of language and linguistic communication called the  code view  (Harris 1990; 
Love 2004).  The code view is not  a theory of language,  but  rather a set  of 
assumptions  that  have  been  very  influential  in  theoretical  reflections  on 
language in the Western world over the past two and a half millennia. In this 
second part of the introduction, I introduce the code view and provide some 
arguments  against  it.  I  then  introduce  an  alternative,  the  metalinguistic 
approach, according to which language is constitutively dependent on metalan­
guage, i.e., our ways of talking about it.
1.2.1 The code view
In  English,  we  can  say things  like  he  struggled  to  get  his  thoughts  across, 
putting a concept into words, his words conveyed a sense of urgency, the paper  
contained some good ideas, and so on. Based on a large number of examples 
like these, Reddy (1993, p. 170) distils a conceptual framework for how English 
people in general talk about communication, which he calls the  conduit meta­
phor: 
10 Besides the kind of normativity that is made possible by language, Rietveld and Kiverstein 
(2014, p. 326) argue that ‘a very basic kind of normativity belongs to the engagement with 
affordances in particular situations more generally’. In this thesis I only take up the question  
of the normativity in linguistic practices (see also footnote 24, p. 61)
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(1) language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one 
person to another; (2) in writing and speaking people insert their thoughts or 
feelings in the words; (3) words accomplish the transfer by containing the 
thoughts  or  feelings and conveying them to others;  and (4) in  listening or 
reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from the words.
This lay understanding of the function of language has been hugely influential 
in theories of the function of language. The linguist Harris (1990) claims that 
this lay understanding lies at the basis of virtually all Western theoretical reflec­
tions on language. He calls this the language myth (Harris 1998), which consists 
of two theses:
1. the telementation thesis: linguistic communication consists in transfer­
ring thoughts from one person to another person or persons
2. the  determinacy  thesis:  languages  are  synchronic  systems  of  fixed 
codes, that function by correlating public words with private thoughts
These two theses are interrelated. In particular, the determinacy thesis is implied 
by the telementation thesis. This can be understood once we realise that the tele­
mentation thesis starts from the assumption that thoughts are essentially private, 
tucked away in the mind, and therefore inaccessible to others. Language enables 
us to encode thoughts into physical objects, namely sound-waves in the case of 
spoken language or marks in the case of written language, and these physical 
objects can be made known to others. If, however, these physical words are to 
do their job of transferring thoughts, we need a system that makes sure that  
when one person encodes their thoughts into words, another person will be able 
to decode them. In other words, linguistic communication as telementation is 
only possible when people use the same fixed codes for encoding and decoding 
their private thoughts into public words. For it is only when people share these 
codes that the hearer will end up with the same thought the speaker intended to 
convey.
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Throughout Western history we find explicit statements of the code view 
in theories of language.11 Here is Hobbes (1651/1989, p. 18):
The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into verbal; or 
the train of thoughts, into a train of words.
And Locke (1690/2004, p. 363):
Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such, from which others,  
as well as himself, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his 
own breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made 
appear. The comfort and advantage of society,  not being to be had without 
communication of thoughts, it was necessary, that man should find out some 
external sensible sign, whereby those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are 
made up of, might be made known to others. […] Thus we may conceive how 
words,  which were by nature so well  adapted tot  hat purpose,  come to be 
made use of by men, as the signs of their ideas. […] The use then of words, is 
to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for, are their proper and 
immediate signification.
More recently, this idea finds expression in the work of De Saussure, the father 
of modern linguistics (1922/2011, pp. 11–12):
In  order  to  separate  from  the  whole  of  speech  the  part  that  belongs  to 
language, we must examine the individual act from which the speaking-circuit  
can be reconstructed. The act requires the presence of at least two persons; 
that is the minimum number necessary to complete the circuit. Suppose that 
two people, A and B, are conversing with each other:
Suppose that the opening of the circuit is in A's  brain,  where mental facts 
(concepts) are associated with representations of the linguistic sounds (sound-
images) that are used for their expression. A given concept unlocks a corres­
ponding sound-image in the brain; this purely psychological phenomenon is 
followed in turn by a  physiological process: the brain transmits an impulse 
corresponding to the image to the organs used in producing sounds. Then the 
sound waves travel from the mouth of A to the ear of B: a purely  physical  
11 In §3.1.1 (p. 76), I give some more examples (see also Harris 2003, pp. 26–28).
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process. Next, the circuit continues in B, but the order is reversed: from the 
ear to the brain,  the physiological  transmission of the sound-image; in the  
brain,  the  psychological  association  of  the  image  with  the  corresponding 
concept. If B then speaks, the new act will follow – from his brain to A's – 
exactly the same course as the first act and pass through the same successive 
phases
The code view has important implications for the study of language. It 
entails that linguistic behaviour can only be explained with reference to know­
ledge of a language, understood as an abstract and synchronic system of codes, 
that is by its very nature invariant across all contexts. The study of language, 
then, can readily ignore the messy nature of concrete linguistic interaction: what 
matters is the abstract system. This also means that a clean distinction can be 
made between those aspects of behaviour that are linguistic, and those that are 
not. In De Saussure’s quote, this is even given as a motivation for describing the 
speech circuit. Harris (1998) calls this tendency to dissociate language from the 
behaviour of people segregationism.
While it  may be intuitively attractive,  the code view runs into serious 
problems when used as an explanation of linguistic behaviour. Harris (2003, pp. 
32–36) argues that the code view embodies an essential tension. On the one 
hand,  it  starts  from the  idea  that  linguistic  communication  is  by  and  large 
successful, while at the other hand, it entails a crippling scepticism with respect 
to this success. This scepticism originates in the idea that successful linguistic 
communication relies on shared knowledge of fixed codes. As is made evident 
by Locke, words are required as external signs of internal ideas  because  the 
thoughts of one person are not available to another. However, the same holds for 
the alleged knowledge of fixed codes. As the Saussure argues, the encoding and 
decoding processes are also psychological  process.  This means that  they are 
also unavailable to others. In other words, we have no way to infer, based on the 
linguistic behaviour itself,  what code another person is using; they might be 
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using a code that is very different from the one we use. For example, although 
someone might open the window when I ask him to, this does not show that his 
mental representation associated with the word ‘window’ is identical to the one 
I have in mind. Given the code view and the privacy of thought for which it is a 
solution, people can never verify that they indeed share the same codes, and 
therefore, they can not know whether communication is ever successful. In the 
words of Harris (2003, p. 24), ‘there is something manifestly awkward about an 
explanation of any human social activity which leaves the participants theoretic­
ally unable to grasp what it is they are doing.’ 
Besides the scepticism with respect to successful communication, there is 
a more fundamental problem for the code view. According to the code view, a 
language is an abstract system consisting of fixed codes that associate forms 
and meanings. In order for this to be a viable theory, there must be some way of  
identifying these forms and meanings in a context-invariant way. This, however, 
turns out to be a complicated affair. 
First, let us look at the possibility of identifying linguistic forms. In one 
sense, this identification seems straightforward: it is undeniable that we experi­
ence language as consisting of words that are repeated across contexts. Love 
(2004, pp. 538–539) explains:
Somewhere near the root of the language-as-code notion is the idea that when 
I produce an utterance there is some definite linguistic entity over and above 
my utterance itself, or which the utterance is a repeatable instance. This idea  
ultimately  derives  from  the  ease  with  which  the  possibility  of  repetition 
conduces to reifying a repetitum. So an utterance comes to be seen as an utter­
ance of an abstract linguistic unit of some kind; and it is this abstract linguistic 
unit, not the concrete utterance itself, that constitutes the relevant item in the 
linguistic code.
The idea is  straightforward:  when we speak,  listen,  write,  or  read,  we 
often have no problem identifying the words that  are used. Every once in a 
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while we might come across a word we don’t know, but in the majority of cases 
we will have a strong sense of recognition based on a history in which we have 
came across the very same words already. However, if we want to use (know­
ledge of) linguistic units  in order to  explain  linguistic behaviour, we need a 
principled way of identifying them. And here purely formal characteristics will 
not do. Take the example of homonyms: the word  bank, for example, can be 
used to talk about a financial institution and about the side of a river, and there­
fore constitutes at least two distinct linguistic forms that encode two different 
meanings. A proponent of the code view can remedy this initial observation by 
saying that the codes are of course not one to one mappings between forms and 
meanings, but rather many to many mappings (Cruse 2017, p. 253). This means 
that a given form can express more than one meaning. But this solution has an 
important  implication:  it  makes the identification of form-meaning mappings 
dependent on the identification of meanings. We can only know that the form 
bank is part of at least two form-meaning codes because we know it can be used 
with at least two distinct meanings. This in turn means that, in order to ground a 
code view of language, we need a principled way of identifying meanings.
The fact that linguistic forms, such as words, are easily recognisable as 
being the same, originates ‘the nominalistic illusion that any word does revolve 
around a firm conceptual core’ (Bottineau 2010, p. 283). A far-reaching argu­
ment against the possibility of identifying context-invariant meanings, however, 
is  the  systematic  ambiguity of  words  and  expressions  as  discussed  by Ryle 
(1945b/2009, p. 215). The general idea is that words and expressions have a 
certain ‘elasticity of significance’. In different contexts, words and expressions 
will  express  different  meanings.  i.e.,  are  polysemous.  In  contradistinction to 
homonyms, such as the example of bank discussed above, these different mean­
ings of a systematically ambiguous word are not unconnected, but can be seen 
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as ‘inflections of the same root’, which can be understood in terms of family 
resemblances (Tanney 2009). Take the following three sentences:
[1] His arrival was punctual.
[2] He was punctual when he arrived.
[3] He is a punctual person.
It  is  clear  that  the  meanings  of  the  different  recurrences  of  the  form 
‘punctual’ in these sentences have something in common. At the same time, 
however, the word punctual is used in different ways. It is something different 
for a person’s character to be punctual that it is for his arrival to be punctual on 
a given time. Ryle (1945b/2009, p. 216) concludes:
It would be absurd to compare the punctuality of a man on a particular occa­
sion with that of his arrival on that occasion; it would be absurd to compare 
the punctuality of his character with that of his arrival on a particular occa­
sion.  […]  These  and  similar  absurdities  show  that  the  word  ‘punctual’ 
undergoes  inflections  of  significance  when  applied  to  different  types  of 
subject.
From this,  Ryle  (Ibid.)  draws  the conclusion that,  ‘where precision is 
wanted, it is wrong to speak of “the idea” of punctuality’, although this does not 
imply that ‘punctuality’ thereby becomes a homonym. For Ryle, the unnoticed 
systematic ambiguities lead to philosophical problems. In our present discus­
sion, however, they form a inextricable dilemma for the code view. For would 
we now say that the form punctual is a code for three distinct meanings?
One might object that this is at best an epistemic problem: although it 
will be hard to determine in how many ways a particular form is used, there is a 
fact of the matter, e.g., patterns of historical usage, that enables one to answer 
this question. However, Ryle gives us good reasons for not accepting this line of 
reasoning: if it were not for the systematic ambiguity of natural language, our 
linguistic abilities would not admit of novelty. This conclusion is also reached 
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by Davidson (1986), who argues that we often have no trouble working out 
what somebody means when they use a word in a novel way, or even when they 
use  a  novel  word.  What  this  shows,  according  to  Davidson,  is  that  under­
standing what somebody says, in any concrete instance, cannot be explained in 
terms of what we bring to the table, but instead, has to be understood as an 
ability to converge on a mutual understanding in a given situation.12 From this, 
Davidson (1986, p. 265) concludes: 
there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what 
many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such 
thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a 
clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply 
to cases.
In response to this, a proponent of the code view could argue that while 
these arguments might be persuasive, they simply do not conform to our best 
theories  of  cognition  that  do  assume  stable  mental  meanings.  For  example, 
Ryle’s systematic ambiguity could just be a property of mental meanings. And 
while Davidson shows that  we can often work out  what  others mean in the  
absence  of  fixed  codes,  this  can  be accommodated  by the code view as  an 
ability to work out the relevant code on the fly in a given instance.
Here we can see how the code view of language hangs together with a 
classical cognitivist view of cognition. A classical cognitivist view of thought 
can be used to argue in favour of the code view: if it is indeed the case that our 
non-linguistic thought consists of meaningful mental representations, the code 
view is the most straightforward approach to the cognition of language. At the 
same time, the code view requires a theory of cognition that conceives of non-
linguistic thought in meaningful terms. The reason for this is that, on a code 
view, the meaningfulness of language is explained in terms of the meaningful­
ness of thought, for, in the words of Locke, ideas are the proper signification of 
12 I discuss this point in more detail in §2.5.3, pp. 67ff.
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words. The code view thus explains language in terms of a semantic triangle 
(see figure 1). Linguistic symbols are codes for mental representations, which in 
turn represent objects in the world.
Figure 2: The semantic triangle.
This in turn means that,  if  we have a different definition of cognition, 
such as the ecological-enactive concept of cognition, the code view simply will 
not do. Arguments against the possibility of mental representations, such as the 
hard problem of content, will therefore also be arguments against the code view 
of  language.  For  if  there  were  no  mental  representations,  words  could  not 
encode them.
The idea that the meaningfulness of language must be explained in terms 
of the meaningfulness of thought is often taken to be the only  viable explana­
tion. This is expressed for example by Shapiro (2014, p. 5), who, in a review of 
Hutto and Myin (2013), claims that without contentful mental states, we would 
be unable to explain language:
External  symbols  acquire  their  meaning  from  meaningful  thoughts—how 
could  it  be  otherwise?  We  use  words  and  other  symbols  to  convey  our 
thoughts to others, and sometimes ourselves. Research in embodied cognition 
36 Chapter 1
indicates that these external symbols might be more thoroughly integrated into 
the thinking process itself, but none of this is to say that these symbols can be 
meaningful independently of the thoughts they have been designed to express.  
So, if the Hard Problem spells doom for contentful thinking, it ought to spell 
doom as well for our abilities to understand and use language.
The conclusion thus reached by Shapiro seems to pose a dilemma for the 
ecological-enactive approach: either the quintessential properties of language, 
such as meaning, content, and linguistic normativity, can be explained in terms 
of the very same properties that exist at the level of thought, or they cannot be 
explained at all and thus need to be eliminated from our theories. 
1.2.2 The metalinguistic approach
Both horns of the dilemma just identified are problematic for the ecological 
enactive  approach.  The  dilemma  originates  in  the  idea  that  our  theories  of 
human behaviour, including linguistic behaviour, have only two ways of dealing 
with folk theories: realism and eliminativism. Both of these positions start from 
treating a folk theory as a proto-scientific theory with ontological commitments 
(Taylor 1992). This results from the social-linguistic process of  reification. In 
the formulation of Van Dijk (2016, p. 994), reification amounts to turning ‘a 
characteristic  of  an  ongoing  process  into  the  pre-existing  source  of  that 
process’. For example, we notice that across different contexts people use the 
same word, which enables us to make an abstraction, namely the word in ques­
tion. In a second step, the abstraction is taken to be more basic than the concrete 
instances that enabled the abstraction. Here it is assumed that each instance of  
people using the same word needs to be explained in terms of an underlying 
abstraction. Finally, the abstraction is concretised by retrojecting it onto indi­
viduals as a cause of their behaviour (Love 2017). The code view is a prime 
example of this process. Another good example is the self-proclaimed ‘hyper­
realist’ interpretation  of  folk  psychology by Fodor  (1975;  2008),  who  takes 
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beliefs and desires to be sentences in a Language of Thought, tokened in the 
heads of people. Eliminativists agree with the realist framing of the problem. 
They merely disagree with the realist in that they think these abstractions in fact 
don’t exist, and that the folk theories are radically mistaken.
There  is,  however,  a  middle  way between  realism and  eliminativism, 
which I refer to as the metalinguistic approach (Taylor 1990; 2000; 2010; 2013; 
Harris 1998; Love 1990; 2017). The key insight is to see that metalinguistic 
practices that attribute properties to language and linguistic behaviour, are not 
theoretical practices in which we describe a reality independent of those prac­
tices;  rather,  they serve  as  normative  practices  that,  through  regulation  and 
enforcement, create the linguistic reality they describe.
Here is a thought experiment that enables us to grasp this middle way in 
an intuitive way. Suppose we come across a Martian scientist who is investig­
ating the curious practice that consists in people following a ball across a piece 
of  grassland,  only  to  kick  the  ball  away the  moment  they  finally  reach  it. 
Baffled by this form of behaviour, the Martian asks us what the function is of  
the large numerals on the side of the grassland. They keep track of the score, we 
tell him. The display currently reads 0 – 2, which means one team has no points, 
whereas the other has two. Now what should we tell the Martian when he asks 
us where the points are? Here we would have to tell them to he is making a  
category mistake: points are not things in the world. So, the Martian asks us, 
does that  mean that the players are mistaken in thinking that they have two 
points, given the fact that there is no such thing as a point? Here it is obvious 
that this conclusion does not follow. The points are real, they are just not things. 
The practice of keeping score does not describe pre-existing points that were 
there all along; rather, points are created in the practice of keeping score.
According to the metalinguistic approach, our language exists in the same 
way that the score in a game of football exists. In a way, things like meanings,  
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rules, promises, and stories only exist because we talk about them. They are not  
things that exist independent of our everyday ways of talking about them. But 
this  conclusion  does  not  lead  to  an  eliminativist  position,  for  without  these 
metalinguistic practices we are unable to make sense of what we do when we 
talk to one another.  Take the example we discussed earlier:  if  I  ask another 
person to open the window, and he indeed opens the window, he has understood 
me. It would be nonsensical for a scientist to say that she discovered that in 
actual fact this person has not understood me, because he lacks the appropriate 
mental state of understanding. Similarly, no scientific discovery could show that 
in actual fact, nobody has ever made a promise, or that, on closer inspection, all 
nouns turn out to be verbs. The reason is that metalinguistic practices in which 
we attribute  understanding and make  promises  play a normative rather than a 
descriptive role. By using these metalinguistic practices, we normatively struc­
ture our linguistic behaviour. Taylor (1990, p. 135) explains:
What we need to examine are our ordinary practices of attributing and justi­
fying attributions of shared knowledge, mutual understanding, and the like. 
These are normative practices with which we forge the conformity, regularity, 
and multi-individuality of verbal interaction: i.e., by which we give the indi­
vidual acts of verbal expression a social instrumentality. But in refocusing our 
attention on such normative practices, we turn away from speculation about 
abstract objects and mental states ‘underlying’ verbal interaction, and concen­
trate once again on language as a voluntary activity performed by individuals.
Taylor’s solution to the problem of the reality of language is metalinguistic, 
rather than metaphysical: the proper object of study for theoretical reflections 
on language are concrete and situated normative metalinguistic practices, not 
abstract objects or underlying mental states. Language has reflexive properties, 
as expressed in metalinguistic activities, by means of which we attribute proper­
ties  to  language,  people  using  language,  and  the  activities  that  we  can 
accomplish by using language (Agha 2007). Examples of these kinds of norm­
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ative regulation of linguistic behaviour by metalinguistic means include utter­
ances like:
• What I said was hat, not bat.
• The word kiwi can refer both to a fruit and to a bird.
• A noun is a word that indicates people, places, or things.
• English does not have grammatical gender, as opposed to French.
• Read is pronounced like reed
• She doesn’t speak a word of Spanish
• The past tense of bid is bid, not bidded.
This makes language into a special kind of communicative behaviour. For 
not  all  forms of communicative behaviour are reflexive in this sense. Harris  
(1998, p. 27) gives the example of traffic lights: 
Red, amber and green signals play a contrastive communicational role which 
motorists and other road-users recognize. But the system of lights does not 
include any 'meta-signals' which mean 'red', 'amber' or 'green'. This is hardly 
surprising, since directing traffic at intersections is a very restricted commu­
nicational function and it is difficult to see what purpose such sophistications 
would serve.
If we want to explain to someone what the traffic lights mean, we can, 
and must, resort to language. However, in the case of language, we cannot step 
outside it to describe on it. A question about questions is itself a question, and 
an assertion about assertions is itself an assertion. From this, Love (2003, p. 88) 
concludes,  ‘language,  being  language,  is  on  its  own.  It  is  interpretatively 
terminal.’
The metalinguistic approach holds that without metalanguage, ‘language 
as we know it would not be possible’ (Harris 1998, p. 28). One particularly 
insightful  example  Taylor  (2010,  p.  19)  gives  of  how  this  metalinguistic 
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construction of linguistic practices works, is how a child learns her name (I also 
discuss this example at p. 65). A child starts out by responding to her name by 
turning her head when she hears it. Somewhere between 12 and 18 months, the 
child also learns to utter her own name. This by itself, however, does not mean 
that the child has learned her name. Dogs can respond to their name, and parrots 
can be taught to say their own name. However, none of these behaviours show 
that the child, dog, or parrot, conceives of that particular sound as their name. 
For, knowing what your name is requires you to know what a name is, and this 
understanding cannot be reduced to the mere association between a sound and 
yourself. 
In order to learn what a name is, a child must learn to engage in all kinds  
of metalinguistic activities. For example, the child must learn to produce her 
name in response to a question of the form ‘What is your name?’, she must be 
able to introduce herself, and so on. If the child is not capable of participating in 
these reflexive exchanges, then we have no reason to say that she learned her 
name. If she is capable of participating in these reflexive exchanges, than we 
must conclude that she knows her name.
A crucial implication of taking metalinguistic practices seriously is that 
there is no sudden lightbulb moment where a child suddenly grasps a particular 
concept. Instead, she gradually learns about names by learning to engage in her 
community’s metalinguistic practices. Although ‘a child’s name does not enter 
her verbal repertoire as a name’ (Taylor 2010, p. 25), the child gradually attunes 
to the metalinguistic practices that constitute our practice of using names, and 
thus she gradually begins to use her name as a name.
A second implication is a radical denial of the ethnocentric fallacy, which 
is to think that properties of our language use must be universal properties of all 
language use. Learning what language is amounts to learning what language is 
for us. Taylor (2010, p. 20) explains this in the case of names:
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In Anglophone languaculture this means knowing, for instance, that everyone 
has a name, that names often have more than one part, that your name identi ­
fies you (it declares ‘who you are’), that a name cannot be easily changed, that 
typically when someone calls out your name they are seeking your attention, 
that putting your name on things is a means of identifying them as your own, 
and  so  on.  In  other  languacultures  knowing what  a  name is  may involve 
knowing that saying an adult’s name in public is impolite, or that you are not  
supposed to utter the name of a dead person, or that a name can only be given  
(or changed) in a special kind of ceremony, or that people have two names 
each  of  which  is  to  be  used  exclusively  in  particular  contexts,  or  that  a 
person’s name tells something about them (such as who their parents are or  
who their husband is), and so on. In other words, knowing what a name is is 
knowing what a name is for us. If you know what a name is, then you have 
learned what, in our languaculture, names are ‘good for’: what functions their 
use serves in our community, and how we value, choose, change, and gener­
ally treat them.
On the metalinguistic approach, there is thus no such thing as a name, 
independent of what we take a name to be.
1.3 Summary of chapters
Besides this introduction, this thesis consists of four chapters that are written as 
independent research papers, and can thus be read separately. This means that 
there is occasional repetition, in particular in the introduction of concepts from 
the ecological-enactive approach.  This thesis ends with a general  conclusion 
that also identifies some directions for future research.
In Chapter 2, I propose an account of linguistic knowledge in terms of 
Rylean know-how.  I  discuss  Nigel  Love’s  seminal  distinction  between first-
order linguistic behaviour and second-order or metalinguistic constructs that we 
use  to  describe this  first-order  linguistic  behaviour,  such as  word,  sentence,  
meaning,  and  understanding.  Based on Taylor’s  notion of  criterial  relations, 
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linguistic  knowledge  is  defined  as  knowing-how  to  provide  and  recognise 
criterial support. To be a competent linguistic communicator one has to be sens­
itive  to  the  criterial  relations  that  originate  in  metalinguistic  practices.  I 
conclude that all first-order linguistic activity has a second-order dimension to 
it, in the sense that it is directly perceived in terms of the metalinguistic prac­
tices that constitute it.
Chapter  2  was  previously  published  as:  Van  den  Herik,  J.C.  (2017). 
Linguistic know-how and the orders of language.  Language Sciences, 61, 17–
27. doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2016.09.009
In Chapter 3, I develop an ecological-enactive account of utterances of 
concrete words – words used to indicate observable situations, events, objects,  
or  characteristics.  Building on  the  education  of  attention  model  of  learning, 
utterances of concrete words are defined as  attentional  actions:  a  repeatable 
form of behaviour performed by a person to indicate (i.e. point out) a particular 
aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. Recent 
empirical  studies  show  that  the  attention-directing  effects  of  linguistically 
constituted  categories  affect  cognitive  processes  in  the  absence  of  overt 
language use. I argue that this can be understood by relying on the idea that 
humans continuously self-organise into task specific devices, a form of pheno­
typic reorganisation. The unfolding of this process is constrained by a history of 
learning, the actions of oneself, others, as well as aspects of the environment. In 
this  way  this  chapter  proposes  a  novel  explanation  for  the  empirical 
phenomenon of category effects. 
Chapter  3  was  previously  published  as:  Van  den  Herik,  J.C.  (2018). 
Attentional  Actions  –  An  Ecological-Enactive  Account  of  Utterances  of 
Concrete Words, Psychology of Language and Communication, 22(1), 90–123. 
doi.org/10.2478/plc-2018-0005
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In Chapter 4, I propose a way of solving the hard problem of content by 
showing how children can become competent participants in content-involving 
practices.  I develop an account of the  skills  a child has to learn in order to 
develop a sensitivity to the contents of speech acts. In particular, I argue that a  
child has  to  be ‘calibrated’ to  measure her  world in terms  of the  normative 
similarity judgments of her community, a process that can be explained in terms 
of the education of attention. The calibrated child still has to learn to put her  
‘measurements’ to use in producing and understanding contentful speech acts. 
The child learns to do so by acquiring reflexive linguistic skills that enable her 
to participate in the negotiation of correctness conditions.
Chapter 4 is currently under review.
In  Chapter  5,  I  defend  the  thesis  that  metalinguistic  reflexivity  is 
constitutive  of  linguistic  normativity.  A potential  defeating  counterargument 
against the constitutivity of metalinguistic reflexivity is the regress objection. 
By discussing the work of Searle, I show that this regress objection originates in 
the idea that learning language requires learning to follow the constitutive rules 
of linguistic practices. On this view, learning language is like learning chess: we 
first  learn the rules and then put them in practice. I propose an ecological-en­
active alternative, according to which learning language can be understood as 
first  learning  regular  communication  behaviour,  which  can  be  explained  in 
terms of attentional actions. On this view, it is only because a child first behaves 
in regular ways, that she can then retrospectively interpret her own behaviour in 
normative metalinguistic terms, that is, as being guided by rules. Metalinguistic 
reflexivity thus  enables  regulation  of  communicative behaviour,  and thereby 
constitutes linguistic normativity. I argue that linguistic rules are resources: they 
are available to participants in order to (re)negotiate properties of language and 
linguistic behaviour. The account developed in this chapter thus enables us to 
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understand the constitutive role of metalinguistic reflexivity for linguistic norm­
ativity without falling prey to the regress objection.
Chapter 5 is currently under review.
2 Linguistic know-how and the orders of 
language
Humans exhibit linguistic behaviour: we speak, listen, write, and read.1 Philo­
sophers and linguists typically assume that this behaviour has to be explained 
with  reference  to  linguistic  knowledge.  This  knowledge  is  traditionally 
considered to be theoretical knowledge of a language, which in turn is under­
stood as  a  complex  system of  rules  and principles  (Barber  2003).  On what 
Matthews (2003, p. 189) calls the received view, linguistic knowledge consists 
of ‘an explicit internal representation of these rules and principles.’ However, 
proponents of a radical embodied approach to cognition have recently mounted 
a thorough attack on the idea that cognitive processes, which include those in 
linguistic communication, should be explained in terms of internal representa­
tions.2 If  there  are  indeed  no  internal  representations,  the  received  view of 
linguistic  knowledge  cannot  be  correct.  However,  as  of  yet,  no  alternative 
account of linguistic knowledge has been proposed by these philosophers. 
Integrational  linguists3 have  similarly  argued  that  linguistic  behaviour 
should  not  be explained in  terms  of  knowledge  of  a language.  Instead,  the 
integrationist ‘starts from the premise that communication proceeds by means 
of signs which are created at and for the moment of communicational exchange’ 
(Wolf and Love 1993,  p.  313).  This  implies that  every episode of linguistic 
1 Spoken  and  written  language  are  different  phenomena,  that  constitute  different  cognitive 
domains (Kravchenko 2009). A more detailed investigation into the cognitive dynamics of  
speech and writing would require a separate treatment of these domains. For the purposes of 
this paper however this is not relevant.
2 See Hutto and Myin (2013) for the most thorough attack on representationalism and Chemero 
(2009) for a positive account of what a nonrepresentational cognitive science could look like.  
These accounts can be traced to Enactivism as proposed by Varela et al. (1991) and Ecological 
Psychology as proposed by J.J. Gibson (1979).
3 Although sometimes distinguished (e.g.  Harris 1998,  p.  1),  I  shall  use  integrationism and 
integrational linguistics interchangeably.
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communication is unique and cannot be explained in terms of (knowledge of) 
decontextualised rules and principles. However, in explaining linguistic beha­
viour as context-sensitive language-making,  the integrationist does not turn a 
blind eye to our experience4 of recurrent linguistic units and the stability of their 
usage.  Here  Love’s  (1990)  seminal  distinction  between  first-order  linguistic 
activity and second-order constructs comes into play: because we can reflect on 
first-order linguistic activity and perceive it to be repeatable,5 we can produce 
second-order  constructs  (e.g.,  word,  sentence,  noun,  verb,  hashtag,  meaning, 
understanding, Dutch, English, &c) by means of which we engage in second-
order practices (spelling, glossing, defining, writing grammars, explaining the 
meaning of a word, teaching philosophical  writing,  &c).  A few words about 
terminology: I consider  second-order practices to be those linguistic practices 
that feature second-order constructs, which I take to be words that can be used 
to  talk  about  first-order  linguistic  activity.  Because  these  practices  and 
constructs are  about language, I also refer to them as  metalinguistic practices 
and metalinguistic constructs. I follow Love (1990, pp. 99ff) in using the mass 
noun language to refer to first-order linguistic activity. This differs from its use 
as a count-noun – that is, used in conjunction with an article or in its plural 
form: a language is a second-order construct.  These second-order constructs,  
according to the integrationist, are not merely descriptive, but play a normative 
role in shaping the production and understanding of language which in turn can 
explain the experience of linguistic units and stability of first-order practices 
(Harris 1998). However, in thus redefining the science of linguistics (Davis and 
Taylor 1990), integrational linguists have paid little attention to what constitutes 
linguistic knowledge (Taylor 2011).
4 I  use  experience  in  the  sense  of  perceptual  experience,  which  can  be  explained  in  non-
representational  terms  (e.g.  Degenaar  and  Myin  2014).  By  linguistic  experience  I  mean 
perceptual experience of language.
5 To perceive first-order linguistic activity to be repeatable is to ‘embrace the possibility of  
“saying the same thing”’ (Love 1990, p. 99).
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In this paper I propose an account of linguistic knowledge. As opposed to 
the received view, which conceives of linguistic knowledge as theoretical know­
ledge of a language, I propose an account of linguistic knowledge in terms of 
Rylean knowhow. Based on Taylor’s (1990) notion of criterial relations, I argue 
that  the  normative  character  of  second-order  practices  is  crucial  for  under­
standing linguistic know-how. In doing so I also argue against the possibility of 
making  a  clean  distinction  between  ‘pure’ first-order  linguistic  activity  and 
linguistic  activity  informed  by  second-order  practices,  thereby providing  an 
argument for Pablé and Hutton’s (2015, p. 29) claim that ‘first and second-order 
practices are inextricably intertwined’.
This paper is laid out as follows. First, I briefly introduce the integra­
tionist approach to language (Section 2.1) and Love’s distinction (Section 2.2). 
Following  this,  I  distinguish  two  possible  views  of  Love’s  distinction:  the 
optional  extension  view  and  the  constitutive  view,  and  argue  for  the  latter 
(Section 2.3).  I  then propose an account of linguistic knowledge in terms of 
Rylean knowing-how, paying special attention to how the skilful exercise of this 
know-how is subject to correction based on criteria. I rely on Taylor’s notion of 
criterial relations to show the necessity of second-order practices for linguistic 
knowledge (Section 2.4). In the concluding section I argue that, if my account 
of linguistic knowledge is correct, first- and second-order practices cannot be 
cleanly distinguished.
2.1 The integrationist account of language
According to Harris, the founding father of integrationism, all Western theor­
izing about language is under the spell of the language myth6: ‘a sedimented 
6 The  integrationist  unmasking  of  the  language  myth  resulted  in  fundamentally  Redefining 
Linguistics (Davis  and Taylor  1990) and  Rethinking Linguistics (Davis  and Taylor  2003). 
Integrationists assert that the object of study of orthodox linguistics is created by a particular, 
culturally  determined  point  of  view that  necessarily  arises  out  of  immersion  in  Western 
48 Chapter 2
form of thinking that has gone unchallenged for so long that it has hardened into 
a kind of intellectual concrete’ (Harris 2001, p. 1). To fall prey to the language 
myth  is  to  assume:  (i)  the existence of languages,  understood as  synchronic 
systems  of  fixed  codes  linking  words  to  private  meanings  (the  determinacy 
thesis); and (ii) that the sharing of these fixed codes is necessary for linguistic 
communication, which is then thought to consist in the transference of private 
meanings from one person to the other by encoding and decoding private mean­
ings into words (the telementation thesis) (Harris 1998, p. 32). In this paper, I  
do  not  rehearse  the  arguments  that  integrationists  have  levelled  against  the 
language myth, but instead start from the assumption that the integrationists are 
correct in rejecting the language myth. 
What I want to emphasise is the integrationist conclusion that the positing 
of a language turns any explanation of linguistic behaviour on its  head.  For 
‘what requires explanation is misrepresented from the outset by a priori theoret­
ical fiat’ (Love 1990, p. 75). The language that an orthodox linguist assumes 
and then employs as an explicans, is treated as an explicandum by the integra­
tionist (Harris 2003, p. 50; 1998 p. 55).7 This integrationist insight is articulated 
by Harris (1998 p. 5) when he states that ‘the right theoretical priority is exactly 
the reverse: languages presuppose communication.’
Whilst opposing the idea that a language can explain linguistic behaviour, 
the integrationist thus does not turn a blind eye to our experience of linguistic 
units  (words,  sentences,  common expressions,  &c)  and the  stability of  their 
usage. In doing so, the integrationist walks a fine line between the Scylla of 
eliminativism and the Charybdis of naïve realism (Cowley 2011a) or linguistic 
metalinguistic practices (Love 1995, p. 337; 2007). Orthodox linguistics, then, is dismissed as 
an extension of lay metalinguistic practices (Davis 2003, p. 3) resulting from the language 
theorist  taking  everyday  metalinguistic  questions  as  intellectual  challenges  (Taylor  1992; 
Harris  1996,  p.  149).  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper  however,  I  will  not  delve  into  the  
questions regarding the scientific status or proper object of linguistics.
7 According to Love (1990, p. 107), this means that languages must be naturalised, a project  
that sits well with the radical embodied project of naturalising all forms of cognition (e.g. 
Hutto and Myin, 2013).
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immanence (Taylor 2010). The immanent realist position results from taking the 
lay  perception  of  language  at  face  value  (Harris  1998,  p.  53).  Linguistic 
communicators obviously perceive language as consisting of recurring units and 
the integrationist is not in the business of convincing anyone that this perception 
is illusionary or that the accompanying metalinguistic practices are mistaken. 
That is,  the integrationist is not an eliminativist  with regards to lay people’s 
metalinguistic practices, but aims to prevent these practices from giving rise to 
metalinguistic illusions in theorising about language (Taylor 1992; Harris 1996, 
p.  148).  Accordingly,  instead  of  explaining  linguistic  behaviour  in  terms  of 
objectively existing underlying invariants, the integrationist turns to the experi­
ence of language to explain the emergence of apparent invariants.
This tension with regards to the ontological status of languages in partic­
ular and metalinguistic constructs in general is diagnosed by Love (1990) as 
follows:  we – humans exhibiting linguistic behaviour – experience linguistic 
activity as if it consists of repeatable linguistic units, that is, as if it consists of  
tokens, or instantiations, of more abstract types.8 At the same time, Love states 
that these linguistic units are radically indeterminate because  saying the same 
thing – that is, repeating a linguistic unit – depends on ‘the kind of sameness 
required’ (Ibid., p. 100). For instance, saying  Schnee ist Weiss,  snow is white, 
and  sneeuw  is  wit amounts  to  saying  the  same  thing  for  some  purposes, 
whereas, in other contexts, we can legitimately claim that different pronunci­
ations of the ‘same’ word do not constitute saying the same thing.9 What counts 
as a repetition thus cannot  be determined in a decontextualised way,  but  ‘is 
something for speakers themselves to decide in particular contexts’ (Ibid.,  p. 
8 Interestingly, we do not have this reificatory tendency with other aspects of human behaviour. 
Harris (1998, p. 83) likens ‘saying the same thing’ to ‘scoring the same goal in football’. It is 
obvious that the latter is impossible. No matter how closely the second goal approximates the  
first,  it  will  be  a  new goal.  Similarly,  Harris  argues,  no matter  how closely an utterance 
resembles a previous one, something new will be said.
9 Cf.  Love  (2003;  2004)  for  many more  examples  that  problematise  the  immanent  realist 
position.
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98).  So,  on the one hand we experience language as consisting of linguistic 
units, whilst we know at the same time that these units are radically indeterm­
inate from an objective point of view (Ibid., p. 106). 
However, this way of describing the experience of linguistic units – as 
instantiations of abstract  types  – runs the danger of overintellectualising our 
experience of first-order linguistic activity. As Harris (2003, p. 57) points out,  
recognising the ‘same’ linguistic unit is like recognising the same face or the 
same shape.10 I  shall  therefore  refer  to  these  experienced linguistic  units  as 
(linguistic) repeatables – also to stress the action required to accomplish repeti­
tion.11 Moreover,  the  radical  indeterminacy  of  these  repeatables  from  an 
objective point of view does not entail that linguistic communicators can always 
decide whether or not something is repeated, in particular because they cannot 
decide how to experience linguistic activity.  I return to this point in Section 
2.4.3 when I discuss novelty in linguistic activity.
We should therefore not understand repeatables in terms of (experienced) 
identity relations, but as the ‘perception of relatedness, similarity, and recyclab­
ility’ (Toolan 1996, p. 267, emphasis added). In contrast to identity relations or 
type–token relations, the notion of repeatability presupposes a temporal order. 
For when an earlier utterance is identical to a later utterance, the later utterance 
is also identical to the earlier utterance – or, alternatively, both are tokens of the 
same type. If a later utterance is a repetition of an earlier one, however, the 
10 One might object that these recognitional capacities require mental representations, and that 
therefore this approach to linguistic knowledge in this paper turns out to be representational  
after  all.  Hutto  (2006),  however,  gives  a  non-representational  account  of  recognitional 
abilities. Degenaar and Myin (2014) argue that even in the case of absent or abstract features  
representations need not be invoked.
11 Note that there are two things what we should be careful not to conflate: on the one hand, we 
have an individual’s experience of linguistic activity as it unfolds. To describe this experience, 
we need not invoke abstractions, for what we experience is not an abstraction but a familiar  
concrete event, although these concrete events can be described by lay people in terms of 
linguistic  units  such  as  words  and  languages.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  the  language 
theorist’s  explanation of this fact of experience, which can – and in the case of orthodox 
linguistics, does – invoke abstracta.
Linguistic know-how and the orders of language 51
earlier utterance is not a repetition of the later one. By definition, you can only 
repeat  what  has  already happened.  This  entails  that  the  repeatability  under 
consideration here is itself time-bound (Harris 1998) and therefore cannot be 
determined in a decontextualised way. 
As Toolan (1996, p. 238) reminds us, what we are concerned with is ‘the 
ontological level at which repetition exists’. For whereas we are undoubtedly 
capable of repeating ‘bits of language’ we hear someone else speak or we see in 
writing,  the  brute  fact  of  this  repeatability  does  not  conjure  into  existence 
decontextualised linguistic objects that provide objective standards of correct­
ness for determining when repeatables are really repeated. Whether a repetition 
is taken to be a repetition by participants is therefore always a contextual matter.  
For the integrationists, to insist on one true analysis, ‘which “really” reflects the 
structure of “the language used” is a metalinguistic illusion’ (Harris 1996, p. 
160).
2.2 Love’s distinction
In understanding repetition in terms of underlying abstractions, the utterance – 
which is  a spatio-temporally extended and context-determined event  brought 
forth by a linguistic communicator – gets reified by treating it as an instantiation 
of  underlying  linguistic  objects  (words,  sentences,  &c).  To  understand  the 
origins of this metalinguistic illusion, Love (1990, p. 101) introduces a seminal 
distinction: 
A language12 is a second-order construct arising from an idea about first-order 
utterances: namely, that they are repeatable. Such a construct may be institu­
tionalized  and  treated  as  the  language  of  a  community.  But  it  remains  a 
12 Love  (1990,  p.  100)  conceives  of  a  language  ‘as  an  individual’s  system  of  repeatable  
abstractions underlying language-use’. Of course, the abstracta themselves are not repeated  
but repeatedly tokened.
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construct based on an idea: at no point does it become a first-order reality for  
individuals.  (Although  in  a  society  which  teaches  its  institutionalized 
construct to its members it may be expected to have a large effect on their  
first-order behaviour, and may perhaps give rise to linguistic theories which 
project the construct on to them as the basis for their first-order behaviour.)
First-order  linguistic  activity  is  understood  as  the  ‘making  and  inter­
preting of linguistic signs, which in turn is a real-time, contextually determined 
process of investing behaviour or the products of behaviour (vocal, gestural or 
other) with semiotic significance’ (Love 2004, p. 530). This is an expression of 
the integrationist  idea that as time-bound agents,  we cannot step outside the 
‘time-track  of  communication’,  and,  therefore,  linguistic  signs  ‘cannot  exist 
except in some temporally circumscribed context’ (Harris 1998, p. 81). Instead 
of selecting ready-mades from a (mental) depository of signs, we make and re-
make  linguistic  signs.  Competent  linguistic  communicators  directly  perceive 
this first-order linguistic activity as consisting of repeatables, i.e., as affording 
repetition – akin to how we directly recognise a familiar face. I shall refer to  
this experienced stability (as opposed to material stability (Harvey 2015)) as 
metalinguistic  experience.13 What  metalinguistic  experience  amounts  to  is 
accentuated when one is confronted by unfamiliar first-order linguistic activity. 
One simply cannot determine what would count as repeating an utterance in a 
language one is not conversant with.
In this way, integrationists emphasise the process-like nature, creativity 
and  context-boundedness  of  first-order  linguistic  activity.  This  creativity, 
however, is not limitless. For our linguistic abilities include that of giving meta­
linguistic accounts of our communicational behaviour (Pablé and Hutton 2015). 
We  can  describe  the  flow  of  linguistic  activity  in  terms  of  second-order 
constructs (words, sentences, understanding, meaning, &c) because of our meta­
13 This is akin to what  Cowley (2011b) calls  ‘taking a language stance’,  which amounts  to  
‘treating speech as if it consisted of verbal patterns’.
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linguistic  experience of  first-order  linguistic  activity as  consisting of  repeat­
ables.  These second-order  constructs  in  turn can  shape  or  inform first-order 
linguistic activity in as much as they are used prescriptively. They are therefore 
not merely descriptive, but carry normative force (I return to this in the section 
on linguistic knowledge). In our Western society, for instance, with its historic­
ally unprecedented grade of literacy, these second-order constructs are codified 
in dictionaries and grammar books and used as pedagogical tools (Love 1995), 
leading to explicit norms of linguistic correctness.14
Love (2007) takes second-order constructs to be constructs because they 
do not refer to objectively given first-order objects. The second-order constructs 
are therefore simply those a community agrees on. There can be no decontex­
tual authority (Pablé and Hutton 2015), no higher court of appeal (Harris 1998, 
p.  145),  and,  specifically,  no scientific discovery,  which objectively grounds 
second-order constructs. Note that this does not imply that anything goes. As 
described above, second-order constructs surely have normative force, but only 
when enforced. Think for instance of the recent rise of using ‘they’ as a singular 
pronoun.  Purists  might  dislike  this  novel  use  and  condemn  it  as  incorrect. 
However, as more and more people start using ‘they’ in this way, it might effect­
ively  become  a  singular  pronoun.  The  absence  of  a  decontextual  authority 
means  that  there  can  be  no  definite  answer  to  the  question  whether  ‘they’
actually is a singular pronoun.
2.3 Second-order practices: optional or constitutive?
From  the  discussion  so  far,  multiple  views  of  second-order  practices  are 
possible. In this section I distinguish between (i) second-order practices as an 
14 Harris (1996, Ch. 2 & Ch. 3) traces Western second-order constructs to the pedagogical needs 
of  the  ancient  Greek  grammarians’ main  task,  viz.  to  offer  an  education  in  writing  and 
literature.
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optional extension of first-order linguistic activity, and (ii) second-order prac­
tices  as  constituting first-order  linguistic  activity.  Call  these  the  optional  
extension view and the constitutive view. I shall argue for the constitutive view. 
Note that it is not my intention to attribute these views to any particular author 
(I rely on quotes from Love (1990) for both views) but, rather, to distinguish 
between  them for  conceptual  clarification,  thereby setting  the  stage  for  the 
section on linguistic knowledge. After discussing linguistic knowledge, I shall 
address the question whether we can – from the constitutive view – still make a  
sharp  distinction  between  second-order  practices  and  first-order  linguistic 
activity.
2.3.1 The optional extension view
Love (1990, p. 99) observes that the priority of language over languages – that 
is, the priority of first-order linguistic activity over the idea of a language as  
consisting of repeatables – depends on ‘a simple point of logic’. He argues that, 
both as regards the nascency of language as well as regards a child being initi­
ated  into  language,  there  must  be  a  primordial  act  of  understanding.  This 
primordial  act  of  understanding  first-order  linguistic  activity  must  precede 
metalinguistic experience of that activity. That is, there must be a primordial 
utterance which was understood by someone in spite of not ‘being able to relate 
it to antecedently given abstract units’ (Ibid., p. 107).
Love then claims that the capacity for reflecting on experience (not on 
linguistic activity) by abstracting from it is presupposed by any language use. 
For instance, to be able to talk about cats, ‘distinct individual organisms have to 
be seen as tokens of a type “cat”’ (Ibid., p. 97).15 As the capacity for reflecting 
on experience was thus necessarily present at the nascency of language, and 
15 Here we once more run the danger of overintellectualisation. Nothing seems to be lost if we 
would say that distinct individuals have to be recognised as cats, rather than that they have to 
be seen as tokens of a type cat.
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linguistic  activity  itself  is  experienced,  Love  concludes  that  ‘the  birth  of 
language as an object of contemplation follows hard on the heels of the birth of  
language itself’ (Ibid.).
On the optional  extension view, first-order linguistic  activity therefore 
has both temporal and logical priority over metalinguistic experience, and there­
fore,  over  metalinguistic  practices  that  depend on  metalinguistic  experience. 
This in turn entails that there was a period of pure first-order linguistic activity. 
Thus, so Love claims, ‘perceiving utterances as manifestations of underlying 
“sames” is not a necessary condition of any use of language whatever’ (Ibid., p. 
100, emphasis added). 
The optional extension view is based on a notion of understanding on 
which it makes sense to ascribe understanding of first-order linguistic activity to 
a person who cannot ascertain this themself – for declaring that one understood 
something relies on the use of the metalinguistic construct  understanding. On 
this view, it  is the act of understanding that makes metalinguistic experience 
possible:  ‘once  one  has  understood an utterance for  the  first  time,  one will 
entertain the possibility of repeating it’ (Ibid., p. 100). In the rest of this section 
I argue against this notion of understanding, thereby reaching the conclusion 
that  metalinguistic experience and practices are not  an optional  extension of 
first-order activity, but are instead constitutive of it.
2.3.2 The constitutive view
The logical and temporal priority of first-order linguistic activity over metalin­
guistic  experience  and  metalinguistic  practices  follows  from the  fact  that  a 
primordial act of understanding is presupposed by metalinguistic practices. But 
what  would this act  of  primordial  understanding amount to? Love (1990,  p. 
107) gives the following suggestion:
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It  means,  perhaps,  that  A’s  vocal  noise  elicited  from  B  behaviour  that 
suggested to both A and B that associations (images, memories, etc.) somehow 
evoked in B by A’s noise were similar to those associations of the noise for A.
But how similar would the associations of A and B have to be to consti­
tute understanding? The only way this suggestion could provide a criterion for 
understanding is for there to be an objective measure of the similarity of A’s and 
B’s associations as well as a cut-off point above which we could speak of under­
standing.  But  then  understanding  would  be  a  telementational  notion: 
understanding would be achieved when B’s associations are sufficiently similar 
to the ones A originally ‘had in mind’.
The  first  step  towards  a  non-telementational  interpretation  of  under­
standing is therefore to notice that in our normal usage of the term, we do not  
use  any mental  criteria  for  understanding.  Taylor  (1990,  p.  130)  gives  the 
example of asking someone to open the window. In normal circumstances, if the 
person we ask indeed opens the window,we conclude that they understood our 
request; no further knowledge of their mental state is required for this judge­
ment (cf. Love 2004, p. 532).16 We manifestly do not treat understanding as ‘an 
unobservable, private, mental event’ (Taylor 1986, p. 179). 
An alternative integrationist interpretation of understanding is available. 
Toolan (1996,  pp. 262–263) proposes that understanding – rather than being 
dichotomous in the sense of ‘an abrupt or sudden illumination’ – is ‘a gradual, 
incremental  grasping  of  things  and  their  uses,  or  “things  in  use”’.  Toolan’s 
alternative has important implications for Love’s distinction. If understanding 
consists  in  the  grasping  of  things  in  use,  then  understanding  requires  these 
things to be experienced by the participants. This in turn entails that, rather than 
following hard on the heels of the birth of language, metalinguistic experience 
16 Of course, we seldom make this explicit judgement. Moreover, this judgement is defeasible.  
Take the contrived example of a person who always opens the window, regardless of what is 
said.
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of vocal noises17 – that is, coming to treat them as ‘repeatables’ – is a require­
ment  for  first-order  linguistic  activity.  This  re-evaluation  of  metalinguistic 
experience as a necessary condition for the genesis of language does not require 
assuming  additional  capacities,  for  Love  already  assumed  the  necessity  of 
reflecting  on  experience  for  anything  that  we  would  call  language.  The 
constitutive  view  thus  controverts  the  optional  extension  view  merely  in 
negating  the  temporal  priority of  first-order  linguistic  activity over  metalin­
guistic  experience.  On  the  constitutive  view,  metalinguistic  experience  is 
constitutive of any behaviour that we would call linguistic, where I understand 
constitutive to mean that metalinguistic experience plays a crucial role in produ­
cing any behaviour that we would call linguistic. Only when a person starts to  
recognise vocal noises, that is, experiences them as repeatables, and starts using 
them in stable ways, can we call their behaviour linguistic.
But  even  if  metalinguistic  experience  is  constitutive  of  first-order 
linguistic activity, we might still suppose that explicit metalinguistic practices 
need not be. This would be feasible if there can be a period, either in sociocul ­
tural  or  ontogenetic  development,  in  which  first-order  linguistic  activity  is 
accompanied by metalinguistic experience without there being explicit metalin­
guistic practices. 
It is exactly this possibility that is investigated and rejected by means of a 
thought-experiment  by  Taylor  (2000).  He  asks  us  to  envision  humans  that 
engage in first-order linguistic activity without there being any metalinguistic 
practices.  Such  a  linguistic  community  would  not  employ  metalinguistic 
constructs  such  as  word,  sentence,  noun,  verb,  mean,  talk,  speak,  promise,  
answer, suggest, describe, refer, and therefore would not be able to talk about 
language at all, as we often do, when we for instance say things such as what 
did you say?,  do you understand?,  please stop talking!, and what’s the answer 
17 I follow Love in talking about vocal noises. The same argument applies to forms of linguistic 
communication that do not rely on vocalisations, such as gestural languages.
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to this question? As Taylor (2000, p. 489) argues, much depends in this thought-
experiment on ‘what we are willing to call  “language”’. Even if the humans 
were capable of using some sort of regularised signalling behaviour to influence 
each other’s behaviour, it would surely be much different from what we would 
normally call language.18 For this alleged behaviour would lack even the most 
basic properties that we attribute to language. For instance, Taylor describes, 
there would be no possibility of standardisation and error. Without the metalin­
guistic resources to call some behaviours ‘correct’ and others ‘incorrect’, there 
could not be criteria for correct linguistic behaviour.19
A similar  line  of  reasoning  holds  for  the  notion  of  understanding.  In 
discussing the two views of second-order practices so far, we tacitly assumed 
understanding to be a purely descriptive term. That is, we took the response of  
opening the window, after a request to do so was made, to demonstrate under­
standing in a straight-forward way. However, in the absence of a metalinguistic 
notion of understanding, ‘it is not clear how a hearer’s response to something 
said could have counted as a case of understanding or of not-understanding’ 
(Taylor 2000, p. 490). That is not to deny that we – who know how to wield the 
concept of understanding – could attribute understanding to the imagined meta­
linguistically impaired people. But in doing so, Taylor claims, we would fall  
prey to the ethnocentric fallacy in assuming ‘that the reflexive linguistic distinc­
tions  which  our  culture  applies  in  evaluating  and  characterizing 
communicational behaviour must also be applied – and if not explicitly, then 
implicitly – by the members of every culture’ (Ibid.). 
To conclude this section, metalinguistic practices constitute our practice 
of  understanding  (and,  mutatis  mutandis,  meaning,  talking,  promising, 
18 Taylor (2000, p. 493) discusses the example of vervet monkeys’ alarm calls. Although these 
calls surely have a  communicative function,  it  is  unclear  what  purpose it  would serve to 
attribute metalinguistic properties such as truth or reference to these calls, when the monkeys  
themselves are obviously unable to conceive of the calls in these terms.
19 Nor, incidentally, could a distinction be made between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour.
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describing, &c). Without these metalinguistic practices we would not be able to 
disagree as to whether someone understood someone else, which entails that the 
distinction would have no force in our first-order activities. It is therefore not  
only metalinguistic experience of linguistic activity as being repeatable, but the 
metalinguistic practices themselves that constitute first-order linguistic activity. 
Although people that lacked metalinguistic practices might develop some kind 
of signalling system, it would not be recognisable to us as linguistic. Reflexivity 
– understood as linguistic activity turning back on itself through metalinguistic 
practices  –  is  therefore  a  necessary  property  of  anything  we  would  call 
language.20 What  at  first  sight  might  be  conceived  of  as  pure  first-order 
linguistic  communication  –  talking  about something,  promising,  telling  the 
truth, claiming, describing, referring to something, &c – is thus shown to be 
constituted  by second-order  practices.  In  the  next  section,  I  show how this 
conclusion feeds into an account of linguistic knowledge.
2.4 Linguistic knowledge
Taylor (2011) claims that there is a surprising absence of discussion in the integ­
rationist  literature  on  language  acquisition  and  linguistic  knowledge.  This 
question is  especially pertinent  to integrationists  and proponents of a radical 
embodied approach to cognition, as we have seen in the introduction, because 
they cannot adopt the received view of linguistic knowledge. 
Taylor and Shanker (2003) distinguish between what the child acquires, 
and how the child acquires this. In this penultimate section, I focus on the what-
question – understood as the question ‘what constitutes linguistic knowledge?’ I 
particular, I argue that linguistic knowledge should be conceived of as practical 
20 This  necessity  of  reflective  practices  first  argued  for  by Taylor  (1990;  1992)  became an  
important  part  of  integrationism,  as  evidenced  for  instance  by  its  inclusion  in  Harris’ 
Introduction to integrationial linguistics (1998, pp. 25ff).
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knowledge – or knowing-how – rather than theoretical knowledge – or know­
ing-that. I first introduce the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-
that,  after  which I  show how linguistic  know-how is  dependent  on metalin­
guistic practices as congruent with the constitutive view. In particular I argue 
that  Taylor’s  (1990)  notion  of  criterial  relations is  crucial  to  understanding 
linguistic knowledge.
2.4.1 Knowing how and knowing that
Ryle (1946) argued for a distinction between knowing-that – theoretical know­
ledge, conceived of as considering propositions – and knowing-how – practical 
knowledge or a direct exercise of intelligence in practical performance. In exer­
cising know-how, Ryle maintains, intelligent performance is not the outcome of 
occult episodes of considering propositions, but is a manifest property of activ­
ities.  That is, the activities themselves are conducted intelligently or stupidly 
(Ryle  1949,  p.  27).  Ryle’s  master  argument  against  intellectualists  that  give 
priority to theoretical knowledge is that because the entertaining of propositions 
is itself an activity, conceiving of know-how in terms of prior theoretical know­
ledge leads to a regress. For if intelligent performance requires a temporal prior 
reflection on how to act, conducted by means of considering propositions, this 
reflection on how to act itself can only be intelligent if preceded by another 
instance of reflection: a reflection on how best to reflect on how to act (Ibid., p. 
31).21
Hanna (2006) builds on Ryle’s account of knowing-how. She starts from 
Dummett’s (1978) observation that the response I don’t know; I’ve never tried, 
is prima facie acceptable when asked if one can swim, whereas it would not be 
when  asked  if  one  can  speak  Spanish.  Dummett  intended  this  example  to 
21 Stanley and Williamson (2001) argued that this Rylean argument is mistaken, and that know-
how always  requires  knowing  that.  See  Simpson  (2010,  pp.  632ff)  and  Noë  (2005)  for  
rebuttals.
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demonstrate  that  qua rational  activity,  speaking  Spanish  cannot  be  a  skill. 
However, so continues Hanna, this is to misconstrue what is meant by practical  
knowledge. For the term ‘swim’ in the example has two possible interpretations: 
first, merely being able to hold one’s head above water, and, second, the skill of 
swimming as required to pass swimming classes, such as performing the breast­
stroke. Whereas one can genuinely be ignorant whether one would be able to 
stay  afloat,  performing  the  breaststroke  is  an  acquired  skill  that  admits  of 
criteria; when we interpret swimming in the latter way, the nescient response is  
unjustified. 
Accordingly,  if  we  conceive  of  the  distinction  between  practical  and 
theoretical knowledge as a distinction between the kind of ‘thrashing about’22 
one  undertakes  in  trying  to  stay afloat  on  the  one  hand,  and  obvious  rule-
following  activities  such  as  playing  chess  on  the  other  hand,  then  surely 
linguistic communication is more like the latter. However, setting up the debate 
in these terms excludes a third category, that of skills.23 For in contrast to merely 
staying afloat, performing the breaststroke is subject to evaluation and correc­
tion, and it is the possibility of correction that allows us to say that an action is 
performed skilfully. I therefore define skills as those activities we perform that 
are subject to correction by others.24
22 I borrow this term from Fodor (2008, p. 13), who explicitly opposes the Rylean conclusion of  
the priority of practical knowledge over theoretical knowledge. Note that Fodor’s (1975, p. 
58) rejection of the primacy of theoretical knowledge leads to the absurd conclusion that we  
cannot  acquire  a  first  language.  Interestingly,  this  conclusion  is  based  on  an  account  of 
language  learning  that  cannot  but  view  this  process  as  a  metalinguistic  endeavour  of 
hypothesis formation and confirmation, where the metalanguage is mentalese.
23 According to the Pablé and Hutton (2015, p. 68) ‘Knowledge is a matter of an individual’s  
integrational  –or  communicational  –  proficiency,  which  “comprises  the  whole  range  of 
knowledge, abilities and experience that [he/she] can bring to bear on the communication 
situation in question.” […] (Harris 2009, p. 70)’. A comparison between what I define here as  
skills and communicational proficiency lies outside the scope of this paper.
24 In (radical) embodied approaches to cognition, the notion of skill is often used in a much 
broader sense. Crucial here is whether there are sources of normativity that are non-social in  
nature. Chemero (2009, p. 145), for instance, sees affordances as relations between abilities 
and  features  of  the  environment,  while  maintaining  ‘that  there  is  something  inherently 
normative about abilities’. Enactivists such as Di Paolo (2005) explain non-social normativity 
in terms of the self-production of organisms. See Heras-Escribano et al. (2013) and Heras-
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This correction in turn is possible because there is a conventional way in 
which the activity is performed. In line with the reflection on experience Love 
identified as necessary for the genesis of language, a particular swimming beha­
viour is conceived of as an instance of performing the breaststroke,  and the 
perceived (dis)similarities with other instances of performing the breaststroke 
provide criteria for evaluating and correcting behaviour.
When we say that there is a conventional way of performing the breast­
stroke, we need not assume that there is a convention that guides performance. 
Instead,  this  is  merely to  point  towards  the  fact  that  when we perform the 
breaststroke, we are subject to correction by others only if they conceive of it as  
an attempt to perform the breaststroke.25 When we think of a convention as an 
entity,  we can come under the impression that it  is  the cause, or among the 
causes of, people behaving similarly. Instead, I propose, we should conceive of 
conventions as a  coming together (com-venire),  that  is,  as the emergence of 
relatively stable patterns of behaviour. Following Millikan (1998), I shall refer 
to these stable patterns as  natural conventions. Millikan (1998, p. 162) under­
stands natural conventions as ‘patterns that are “reproduced”’, where ‘the fact  
that these patterns proliferate is due partly to weight of precedent, rather than  
due, for example, to their intrinsically superior capacity to perform certain func­
tions’.  I  therefore  take  conventional  regularities to  be those regularities  that 
proliferate in part due to precedent.
According to Millikan,  the explicit  rules we can formulate to describe 
these natural conventions are just that: descriptions. The natural conventions by 
themselves therefore carry no prescriptive force. It is only when the behaviour 
of others is corrected based on an awareness of these conventional regularities, 
Escribano and De Pinedo (2015) for a Wittgensteinian critique of these notions of normativity.  
For the purposes of this paper, I do not address the question whether non-social forms of  
normativity exist, and therefore limit my discussion to social forms of normativity.
25 Note  that  in  consonance  with  earlier  discussion,  this  experience  of  something  as  being 
repeatable need not imply that it is named by participants. In general, an inability to formulate 
explicit rules does not negate skilfulness (cf. Noë 2012, pp. 118ff).
Linguistic know-how and the orders of language 63
that they acquire prescriptive force, though always by proxy of the corrector (cf. 
Wittgenstein 1983, VI §42).26 So we have to say that the conventional regular­
ities need not only be regularities, but also conceived of as being regularities 
and therefore repeatable in order for them to be counted as skilful behaviour. 
Note that none of this implies that the kind of rules under consideration here 
have to be effable for the rule-followers. In terms of the previous section, meta­
linguistic  awareness  of  ‘things’  in  use  does  not  imply  accompanying 
metalinguistic practices.
Before  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  role  criterial  relations  play  in 
linguistic knowledge,  I want to say a few words about explicitly formulated 
rules. Linguistic prescription based on explicit rules occurs abundantly in highly 
literate societies – based inter alia on codification in dictionaries and grammar 
books. In this process of codification, natural conventions are reified into what 
Millikan calls  stipulated conventions, which refers to explicitly stated rules.27 
This does not threaten an account of linguistic knowledge in terms of know-
how.  First  of  all,  this  process  of  reification  depends  on  practical  linguistic 
knowledge. Moreover, the reified rules are not occult (mental) entities, but are 
formulated in natural  language and therefore publicly available.  As such,  an 
explicitly stated rule is not an explanatory hypothesis but a guide for conduct 
and a standard of correctness (Hacker 2014). Finally, similar to natural conven­
tions, explicitly stated rules carry prescriptive force only in so far there are used 
to correct the behaviour of others, or, derivatively, of oneself.
26 Note that this observation does not negate the fact that  once someone mastered a particular 
practice, they can correct themself based on observed natural conventions. A discussion on 
this self-corrective process is, however, outside the scope of this paper.
27 Prescription  on  the  basis  of  explicit  rules  of  course  need  not  be  based  on  previous  
conventional regularities – think for instance of a person coming up with the rules of a new 
game.
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2.4.2 Criterial relations
Besides  conceiving  of  an  utterance  as  repeatable,  and  the  perception  of 
(dis)similarities  between  repetitions,  we  still  have  to  explain  how language 
users  can  correct  one  another  based  on  the  appropriateness  of  a  particular 
linguistic act in context. In the rest of this section, I argue that Taylor’s idea of 
criterial  relations provides  insight  in  the  constitution of  natural  conventions 
regarding the use of  linguistic  repeatables.  Central  to  this  notion is  that  we 
conceive of metalinguistic practices as normative practices in which the experi­
enced stability of language is forged (Taylor 1990).
According to  Taylor  (1990,  p.  136),  a  criterial  relation holds  between 
assertions. He introduces the notion as follows: ‘Part of knowing the meaning of 
the word understand is ordinarily taken to include knowing that the assertion of 
“he gave a correct explanation of E” provides criterial support for the justifiable 
assertion of “he understands E”.’ Understanding what a word means – under­
stood as grasping a repeatable in use – is thus constituted by knowing how to  
provide  criterial  support  for  its  application  and  recognising  when  criterial  
support is provided.28 These criterial relations can thus be conceived of as norms 
or rules (natural as opposed to stipulated conventions) specifying correct use of 
the word. However, whether or not an assertion provides criterial support for 
another is not determined in a decontextualised fashion. Criterial relations can 
only provide standards of correctness when recognised by linguistic communic­
ators.  This means that what  criterial relations apply is  always a contextually 
determined matter (Ibid., p. 144). Crucially, a community must place a weight 
on the maintenance of the criterial  relation,  and it  will  usually do so if  this 
maintenance is conducive to furthering its purposes. 
28 Once again, in line with Section 3.1, I understand constitutive to mean that knowing-how to  
provide  and  recognise  criterial  support  plays  a  crucial  role  in  any  behaviour  we  would 
attribute understanding to.
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A particular enlightening example of these criterial relations is given by 
Taylor (2000; 2010; cf. Shanker and Taylor 2001) in discussing the practice of 
naming.29 He starts from the observation that many parents hold that one of the 
first words their child learns is their own name. But, when the child is able to  
make vocal noises that are similar to the ones others make when they use the 
child’s name, and the child responds to hearing its name by directing its atten­
tion to the speaker that used it, these behaviours do not show that the child  
conceives of that repeatable as its name. Many animals can be conditioned to  
respond to and produce particular vocalisations, and this fact does not show an 
understanding of the practice of naming. That is, a ‘child’s name does not enter 
her verbal repertoire – either productively or receptively – as a name’ (Taylor 
2012,  p.  9).  For besides being able to produce a vocalisation that  admits of 
relevant similarities to her name, the child has to be ‘reflexively enculturated’ 
by knowing how to provide criterial support for utterances like  x is my name 
(Taylor 2000, p. 496). Recognising that another person saying  I’m Roy when 
you first meet them provides criterial support for saying His name is Roy is to 
go beyond the simple response to and production of a vocal noise. Whilst this 
example may seem trivial,  it  manifestly relies  on the metalinguistic practice 
wherein the metalinguistic construct  name is used. Note also, that in line with 
the  discussion about  understanding,  in  a culture  in  which the metalinguistic 
construct  name is absent people would not have names – at least not what we 
understand by names.
To understand what it is to have a name thus includes participating in 
reflexive practices like telling others your name when you meet them for the 
first  time,  responding appropriately to  questions  like  ‘who is  the  one called 
Roy?’, understanding that you can name your stuffed animals, &c. This shows 
29 These practices are of course culture-specific. Think for instance of cultures where your name 
changes once you reach adulthood, cultures in which a value is placed on avoiding the names  
of recently deceased, &c.
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that merely engaging in the right kind of first-order linguistic activity – where 
‘right kind’ is determinable from the perspective of other participants – is not  
enough: the child has to become conversant with the appropriate second-order 
practices in order to understand what it means to have a name. In other words: 
the  prima facie first-order practice of naming is  constituted by second-order 
practices of reflecting on naming, in the sense that second-order practices play a 
crucial role in first-order practices.
It is crucial to note that, in attuning to the criterial relations that constitute 
the practice of naming, there is no nonarbitrary point where the child can be 
said to have completely mastered the practice. Even adult speakers are – in line 
with Putnam’s (1975) idea of the division of linguistic labour – unaware of all 
metalinguistic practices that constitute the first-order practice of naming. Even 
in the everyday phenomenon of personal names we can imagine people who are 
unaware that one can change one’s name, adopt a nom de plume, call loved ones 
by a pet name, &c. Moreover, the criterial relations that constitute a particular 
practice are ever-changing, which makes any envisaged complete understanding 
a practical impossibility. A useful metaphor is provided by Ryle (1945/2009), 
who  compares  being  at  home  in  language  as  knowing  your  way around  a 
familiar village. Both are acquired through one’s daily walks and are ‘know­
ledge by wont and not knowledge by rules’ (Ibid., p. 211). And in both cases, 
complete knowledge is impossible. This entails that there is no stable state that a 
person can achieve such that it can be counted as having fully mastered a partic­
ular linguistic practice. 
Whilst  linguistic  knowledge,  understood  as  knowing-how to  give  and 
recognise  criterial  support,  is  necessary  for  the  participation  in  first-order 
linguistic  communication,  linguistic  knowledge  cannot  be  reduced  to  rigid 
application  of  criterial  relations.  Crucial  here  is  the  observation  that  what 
criterial relations apply is context dependent and subject to continuous change. 
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Moreover, although criterial relations are often made explicit in metalinguistic 
practices, this need not be the case. Finally, criterial relations do not hold only 
between assertions, as non-verbal behaviour can provide criterial support (e.g., 
a person’s nodding whilst you are talking to her provides criterial support for 
her understanding you).
2.4.3 Linguistic knowledge and novelty
An  interesting  phenomenon  that  shows  the  limitations  of  explanations  of 
linguistic behaviour in terms of criterial relations is that of novelty in linguistic 
activities. This deviance in the application of criterial relations can of course be 
affected through explicit  metalinguistic discourse.  Take the case of Humpty-
Dumpty, who claims that ‘When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to 
mean.’ This leads to the situation in which Alice does not understand his utter­
ance  There’s  glory  for  you,  which  does  not  surprise  Humpty  Dumpty:  ‘Of 
course you don’t – till I tell you’. Only by explicitly telling her that he means 
There’s a knock-down argument for you by There’s glory for you – that is, by 
relying  on  explicit  metalinguistic  discourse  –  can  Alice  understand  him. 
However, more interesting for our current purposes is people getting away with 
what Humpty Dumpty attempts to do without thereby relying on explicit meta­
linguistic discourse.
Davidson (1986)30 shows this possibility when discussing understanding 
of utterances in context. The phenomenon that interests Davidson is the fact that 
successful communication is rarely frustrated by novelty in linguistic activity, 
such as demonstrated by malapropisms, incomplete or garbled utterances, unfa­
30 Goldstein (2004) also notices the similarities between integrationist thought and the Davidson 
(1986) that wrote ‘A nice derangement of epitaphs’. However, Goldstein does not part with 
traditional  ways  of  conceiving  of  language  (Harris  2004).  Of  particular  interest  to 
integrationists should be Davidson’s (1986, p. 265) confutation of the language myth in his 
conclusion that ‘there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what 
many philosophers  and  linguists  have  supposed’,  which  he  defines  as  ‘a  clearly defined 
shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases’.
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miliar  words,  neologisms,  slips  of  the  tongue,&c.  In  these  cases  novelty is 
produced – knowingly or  not  –  either  through converting familiar  words or  
constructions ‘to a new use by an ingenious or ignorant speaker’ (Ibid., p. 259), 
or, through sheer invention. From this, Davidson concludes that our ability to 
understand one another cannot be explained in terms of what we bring to the 
table, since this cannot account for the specificity of the occasion (Simpso 2010, 
p.  639);  instead,  we  converge  on  a  mutual  understanding31 in  a  particular 
context. In other words: ‘a speaker may provide us with information relevant to 
interpreting an utterance in the course of making the utterance’ (Davidson 1986, 
p. 260).
This conclusion reached by Davidson thus shows how first-order utter­
ances  themselves get  to do some of the work that  we might  originally have 
thought to be reserved for explicit  metalinguistic discourse. By being under­
stood  and  accepted32 by  all  participants  any first-order  utterance  can  have 
second-order effects which can be transient (in the case of slips of the tongue) 
or longer lasting (as in the coinage of a neologism). That is, every first-order 
linguistic act has the potential to change the criteria by which we conceive of 
that  very act,  which  means  that  understanding should  be  conceived of  as  a 
context-dependent convergence on a mutual understanding, that is, not as the 
transference of some-thing from one person to another.
Note also that novelty in linguistic activity is – like second-order prac­
tices – not an optional extension. This is true of course from a sociocultural 
perspective, since language had to originate from somewhere, but also from an 
ontogenetic point  of  view.  For  understanding is  most  apparent  in a  person’s 
31 Davidson couches his discussion in terms of a convergence on a passing theory. However, by 
theory Davidson means what would amount to a satisfactory description of what a linguistic 
communicator can do, without implying that they actually know the theory in any sense of the  
word (Davidson 1986, p. 256).
32 course, novelty can be understood but not accepted, e.g., when corrected. Crucially, however, 
correcting another person relies on understanding to a degree what they wanted to say. If you 
simply do not understand at all what another person says you cannot correct what they said.
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ability to use a word in a novel context and in novel phrases. That is, merely 
being able to repeat verbatim shows no understanding at all. It is only when 
someone can say something ‘in their own words’ or apply a concept to a novel 
situation that we are convinced that they understood something.
2.4.4 Implications for linguistic knowledge
The idea of a context-dependent convergence on a mutual understanding has 
three important implications for linguistic knowledge. First, as criterial relations 
are  contextual,  and  language  admits  of  novelty,  there  can  be  no  rules  for 
arriving at a mutual understanding. Understanding happens in the unfolding of 
an episode of communication,  and cannot be explained solely by what  each 
participant brings to the table. Like perception in radical embodied approaches, 
understanding  is  something  that  we  do,  but,  crucially,  something  we  do 
together.33 The absence of rules for arriving at a mutual understanding is further 
corroborated by the fact that understanding is often dependent on knowledge 
that is not traditionally understood to be linguistic. In recognising the preval­
ence of novelty, Davidson (1986, p. 265) thus concludes that ‘we have erased 
the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the 
world generally’. This conclusion opposes the received view mentioned in the 
introduction  on  which  linguistic  knowledge  is  clearly delineated  from other 
kinds of knowledge, because it is theoretical knowledge of  a language. Note 
further that this conclusion is in agreement with the integrationist insight that it 
is impossible to distinguish in an absolute sense those aspects of a communica­
tional  episode  that  are  linguistic  from those  that  are  not.  It  is  therefore  in 
principle  impossible  to  delineate  sharply linguistic  knowledge from non-lin­
guistic knowledge.
33 Even in the prima facie example of solitary understanding, such as understanding a text one is 
reading,  one  can  only be  certain  one  has  understood  it  when  one  agrees  with  others  in 
discussing the text.
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Take knowledge of English spelling, a prima facie paradigm example of 
linguistic knowledge.  Knowing-how to spell  English words,  however,  means 
knowing  that  there  is  a  difference  between  American  English  and  British 
English,  and that,  depending on the context,  either  behavior  or  behaviour  is 
correct.  Knowing how to spell  correctly thus includes knowing when to use 
which  form,  and  this  in  turn  relies  on  knowledge  that  is  not  prima  facie  
linguistic.
Second, criterial relations hold not only between assertions. In producing 
linguistic behaviour, we rely on a host of resources in making ourselves under­
stood. Criterial relations therefore hold not only between utterances, but also 
between  prima facie  non-linguistic actions and utterances. In the example we 
looked at earlier, opening the window at request showed an understanding of 
that request. The fact that the addressee starts acting without requests for elucid­
ation thus provides criterial support – in this particular context – for her having 
understood it. In realising that the distinction between linguistic knowledge and 
non-linguistic knowledge is not clear-cut,  we thus also have to acknowledge 
that criterial relations hold not only between utterances, but between any aspect  
of our behaviour and utterances. 
Finally,  in  highlighting  the  context-dependency  of  converging  on  a 
mutual  understanding,  what  it  is  that  we understand cannot be the utterance 
itself – for there is no such thing as the utterance itself without theoretically 
misbegotten decontextualisation. Instead, what we understand is a person trying 
to  get  a  point  across  by  means  of  language.  So,  instead  of  understanding 
language,  we understand  others  (Simpson 2010).  This further underlines the 
blurring of the distinction between linguistic knowledge and knowing our way 
around in the world generally.
Summarising this section, I argued that linguistic behaviour is grounded 
in skilful  use of linguistic repeatables;  this  behaviour is skilful  because it  is  
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subject to correction. This correction is based in the (dis)similarities perceived 
between occurrent and previous utterances based on metalinguistic experience, 
as well as criterial relations to which people attune through metalinguistic prac­
tices.  What criterial  relations apply is  not  decontextually determined.  In any 
linguistic episode, criterial relations can be changed and constituted without the 
need for explicit metalinguistic discourse. This shows a blurring of the distinc­
tion  between  linguistic  and  non-linguistic  knowledge,  as  well  as  a  wider 
application of the notion of criterial relations. In the concluding section I revisit  
Love’s distinction from the perspective of this account of linguistic knowledge.
2.5 Love’s distinction revisited
In this paper I proposed an account of linguistic knowledge in terms of know­
ing-how, which firmly places linguistic knowledge within the reach of theories 
that propose a radically embodied account of cognition. In this final section, I 
revisit Love’s distinction from the perspective of the account of linguistic know­
ledge developed in this paper. 
I start with the relatively trivial observation made by Wittgenstein (1953,  
§97) that metalinguistic constructs, such as  language, cannot be but ‘humble’ 
words like any other. This entails that all second-order practices are necessarily 
also first-order  practices.  In  other  words,  although arising out  of  reflexivity,  
metalinguistic  practices  are  not  outside  language  in  the  way  that  a  tennis 
commentator  is  outside  the  match  he  talks  about  (Harris  1998,  p.  25).  As 
opposed to tennis, ‘language, being language, is on its own. It is interpretatively 
terminal.’ (Love 2003, p. 88; 2007).
As mentioned in the introduction,  Pablé and Hutton (2015) claim that 
‘first and second-order practices are inextricably intertwined’. We are now in a 
position to elucidate this claim. It is crucial to realise that the ability to parti ­
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cipate  in  metalinguistic  practices  does  not  leave  the  first-order  activities 
untouched. Think for instance of learning English grammar. To be competent in 
English grammar is  not  merely to take a metalinguistic perspective on first-
order linguistic activity or linguistic inscriptions every once in a while; one’s 
own first-order linguistic activity has to be in accordance with English grammar 
to count as being competent. To say that metalinguistic practices are normative 
with regards to first-order linguistic activity is to take account of the shaping 
force that they have – subject of course to participants’ recognition of the pertin­
ence of the particular metalinguistic practice.34
This point is also made by Noë35 (2012, p. 3), who describes the relation 
between first-order  linguistic  activity and second-order  practices  as  follows: 
‘The  first-order  practice  contains  within  it  the  second-order  practice.  For 
thinking about language and language-use is one of the basic and unavoidable 
things we use language to do. There is no such thing as the naïve, unreflective, 
theoretically unbiased user of language.’ The impossibility of an unreflective 
user of language is also the conclusion reached in this paper: to be able to parti­
cipate  in  linguistic  practices  at  all,  one  has  to  be  able  to  participate  in 
metalinguistic practices. If we conceive of linguistic knowledge as including 
knowing-how  to  provide  and  recognise  criterial  support,  this  means  that  a 
competent linguistic communicator has to talk and write in such away that she 
can provide this criterial support.  This in turn requires an ongoing reflective 
attitude towards one’s own and others’ first-order linguistic activity. Being able 
to  participate  in  metalinguistic  practices  is  therefore  not  properly described 
merely as being able to switch rapidly between unreflective first-order linguistic 
activity  and  detached  metalinguistic  reflection  on  that  activity.  To  be  a 
34 To  be  competent  in  English  grammar  does  not  entail,  for  instance,  that  one’s  linguistic  
behaviour is  always in accordance with it. Everybody that has transcribed spoken language 
verbatim knows that spoken language often does not consist of well-formed sentences.
35 Noë (2009, p. 198) acknowledges the influence of Roy Harris on his own thinking about 
language.
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competent language user is perforce to be a competent critic of language (Noë 
2012), and one can only be critical when one recognises when one needs to be. 
Claiming that metalinguistic practices are constitutive of linguistic knowledge, 
in the end, boils down to claiming that to be a competent linguistic communic­
ator, one has to have a reflective – or metalinguistic – attitude towards what one 
is doing  whilst being engaged in linguistic activities. It is to perceive directly 
when a person uses a word incorrectly, to see the spelling error as one reads the 
text, to understand that someone unfamiliar introduces themself when they utter 
a name, to notice when you don’t understand what is being said, &c. To be a 
competent linguistic communicator one has to be sensitive to the criterial rela­
tions  that  originate  from metalinguistic  practices  in  the  course  of  first-order 
linguistic  activity.  All  first-order  linguistic  activity  thus  has  a  second-order 
dimension to it, in the sense that it is directly perceived in terms of the metalin­
guistic practices that constitute it.
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3 Attentional actions – An ecological-enactive 
account of utterances of concrete words
The cognitive  sciences are  currently making a  pragmatic  turn (Engel  et  al., 
2013). The dominant  representational theory of cognition, where cognition is 
conceived of as computation over mental representations, is gradually giving 
way to the ecological-enactive approach, which foregrounds the action-oriented, 
embodied, and situated nature of cognition (see §3.1.3 for a short introduction). 
This pragmatic turn has implications for understanding linguistic behaviour. In 
this paper, I reconceive the cognitive function of utterances of concrete words,  
words  that  concern  observable  situations,  events,  objects,  or  characteristics. 
There are two reasons for starting with concrete words. First, concrete words 
are a paradigmatic example in the dominant code-view in the representational 
theory of  cognition,  according to which words function as  codes  for mental 
representations  (see  §3.1.1).  Second,  the  empirical  research  on  the  relation 
between language and cognition on which this paper draws often relies on these 
concrete words, in particular colour words (see §3.2). 
In this paper, I propose a way to understand utterances of concrete words 
from the ecological-enactive approach by starting from the constraint view. On 
this view, language is reconceptualised as a mode of action that functions as 
enabling  constraints  on  cognitive  and interactive  dynamics.  Building  on  the 
ecological-enactive conception of attention, I define an attentional action as a 
repeatable form of behaviour performed by a person to indicate a particular  
aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. I argue 
that a concrete word, whether performed as a single-word utterance or in the 
context of a grammatically structured utterance, has to be understood in terms 
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of its constraining effect on ecological-enactive attention. In other words, utter­
ances of concrete words are attentional actions. 
This paper serves two purposes: first, it undermines the familiar scope 
objection against the ecological-enactive approach, according to which it  can 
only explain  basic  cognition  and  cannot  explain  ‘higher’ cognition  such  as 
linguistic cognition. Second, it provides a novel explanation for recent empirical 
evidence with respect to the role of language in categorical colour perception.
This paper is structured as follows: first, I introduce the code view and 
the ecological-enactive approach. I propose an account of a child’s first utter­
ances of concrete words as attentional actions based on the constraint view of 
language and a discussion of learning language in line with the education of 
attention model of learning (§3.1). Then I discuss some recent empirical find­
ings that show verbal colour categories to have an effect  on putatively non-
linguistic  colour  perception  (§3.2).  In  line  with  this  evidence,  I  propose  an 
account of the cognitive effects of attentional actions in terms of constraints on 
the  phenotypic  reorganisation  of  task-specific  devices  (§3.3).  In  the  final 
section,  I  situate  the  account  of  attentional  actions  in  a  larger  theoretical 
perspective on language by means of remarks on the context-dependency and 
reflexivity of language, grammatical structure, and written language (§3.4). 
3.1 Words: from codes to constraints
3.1.1 The code view
Entrenched in our thinking is a picture of language as a carrier of thought. We 
find articulations of this picture in everyday English expressions such as putting 
a concept into words, or a text containing new ideas.1 In theoretical reflections 
on language, this picture manifests in the idea that words encode mental mean­
1 Reddy (1993) lists a great number of examples from everyday English.
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ings. This has been dubbed the code view (Harris 1990; Linell 2005; Love 2004; 
Kravchenko 2007). On this view, communication consists in the encoding of 
mental meanings in public symbols and the subsequent decoding of these public 
symbols back into mental meanings.
The code view lies at  the root  of  many theories of language.  Notable 
historical  proponents  of  the  code view include Aristotle  (1975,  p.  43),  who 
claimed ‘spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul’, and John Locke 
(1690/2004, p. 363), who took words to be ‘sensible marks of ideas’. De Saus­
sure (1922/2011, p. 66) defined the linguistic sign as a connection between a 
concept  and  a  representation  of  a  linguistic  sound.  He  described  linguistic 
communication in terms of the speaking circuit:  a concept ‘unlocks’ a sound 
representation,  which is  transmitted to the organs used in producing speech,  
where  they  are  transfused  into  actual  sound  patterns  which  then  travel  to 
another person in order to undergo the reverse operation (Ibid., pp. 11–12). The 
second half of the 20th century witnessed the rise of the representational theory  
of cognition, which enabled the formulation of new versions of the code view. 
According to  one version of  this  theory,  thought  itself  is  language-like,  and 
understanding  public  language  is  essentially  a  code-like  translation  to  a 
language of thought, called mentalese (Devitt 2006; Fodor 1975; 2007; Pinker 
1994;  2007).  Other  versions of  the  representational  theory of  cognition rely 
instead on the broader notion of semantic or conceptual representations. For 
example, Cairns and Cairns (1976, pp. 17–18) claim that ‘The listener, B, must 
decode A's message by converting the sounds into a semantic representation’.  
Nowadays, the idea that words encode semantic representations is a staple in 
linguistics textbooks. In  The Blackwell Handbook of Linguistics, for example, 
Cruse (2017, p. 253) states:
Each of us has in our cognitive system some kind of inventory of all the words 
that we know, together with all the information – semantic, grammatical, and 
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phonetic /  graphic  – necessary for  their  correct use.  […] The inventory is 
accessed via written or spoken forms every time we hear or read something in 
a language we know, and via some kind of semantic representation every time 
we produce language.
In  The  Lexicon:  An  Introduction,  part  of  the  Oxford  Textbooks  in  
Linguistics series, Ježek (2016, p. 5) claims that the ‘existence of a word’ is the 
result of ‘the direct association of a concept with a lexical form’. Proponents of 
the code view thus differ in what they take words to be encoding: concepts, 
ideas, semantic representations, etc. For the purposes of this paper I shall use  
mental  representation as an umbrella term to denote  this  panoply of  mental 
meanings. The code view can then be defined as follows: A word is a code for  
(a set of) mental representations. Note that due to synonymy and polysemy, the 
mapping between words and (sets of) mental representations cannot be a one-to-
one mapping, but instead is a many-to-many mapping (Cruse 2017, p. 252).
I introduce the code view in order to use it as a foil. The reason for this 
use is that the code view has had a deep influence on Western theoretical reflec­
tions on language and remains the dominant view, although there are of course 
alternative views.2 The purpose of this paper is neither to determine how wide-
spread the code view is, nor to provide arguments to criticise it, but instead to 
use  it  as  a  contrast.  This  enables  bringing  out  the  defining  features  of  the 
constraint view to which this paper aims to contribute.
3.1.2 Mental representations: can’t have, don’t need
Proponents of the pragmatic turn in the cognitive sciences claim that cognition 
is embodied. Yet, there is substantial disagreement about what this claim means 
(Anderson 2003; Kiverstein & Clark 2009; Wilson 2002; Wilson & Golonka 
2 Examples of alternatives include Ryle, who does not believe that there are mental meanings  
(Tanney  2015),  the  later  Wittgenstein  (1953/2009),  Voloshinov’s  (1930/1973)  Marxist 
philosophy of language, Maturana’s (1978) biological approach to language, Bakhtin’s (1982) 
dialogism, integrational linguistics (Davis & Taylor 1990; 2003) and the distributed language 
perspective (Cowley 2011a).
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2013). In its weakest interpretation, an ‘embodied concept is a neural structure 
that is part of, or makes use of the sensorimotor system of our brains’ (Lakoff & 
Johnson 1999, p. 104). As opposed to classical cognitivism, mental representa­
tions are no longer amodal. But cognition is still a computational process over 
discrete mental representations on this weak interpretation. The strongest inter­
pretation, known as  radical embodied cognition, aims to provide a thoroughly 
non-representational  approach.3 Note  that  a  non-representational  approach 
forswears  mental representations.  This  does  not  entail  forswearing  public 
representations such as maps, assertions, diagrams, charts, or flatpack furniture 
assembly instructions.
The account in this paper is based primarily on two research programmes 
that  espouse  a  form  of  radical  embodied  cognition:  ecological  psychology 
(Chemero 2009; J.J. Gibson 1979; Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014; Turvey, Shaw, 
Reed,  &  Mace  1981)  and  enactivism  (Hurley  1998;  Hutto  &  Myin  2013; 
O’Regan & Noë 2001; Stewart 2010; Noë 2012; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 
1991). I  therefore speak of the  ecological-enactive approach.  Note that  both 
enactivism and ecological psychology are research programmes within which 
different  theories  are  espoused,  of  which  I  will  not  provide  an  exhaustive 
taxonomy here.
A proponent of the ecological-enactive approach to cognition can employ 
two lines of argument with respect to the representational theory of cognition:  
can’t-have and  don’t-need arguments (Hutto & Myin 2013). Can’t-have argu­
3 Named as such by Clark (1997, p. 148), who defines it as follows: ‘Structured, symbolic, 
representational, and computational views of cognition are mistaken. Embodied cognition is  
best studied by means of noncomputational and nonrepresentational ideas and explanatory 
schemes.’ Proponents  that  fly  under  the  banner  of  radical  embodied  cognition  include 
Chemero (2009) and Hutto and Myin (2013; 2017).  The word radical here should not be 
understood as  a  radicalisation of  embodied cognitive science,  but  instead in  the sense of  
having different roots. These theoretical roots include American pragmatism (Peirce, James, 
Dewey,  and  Rorty),  behaviourism (Ryle  and  Skinner),  ecological  psychology (James  and 
Eleanor Gibson), theoretical biology (Maturana and Varela), dynamic systems theory (Thelen 
& Smith,  1994; Van Gelder, 1998), biophilosophy (Jonas),  and existential phenomenology 
(Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty).
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ments are negative. They aim to show that there are currently no naturalistically 
credible theoretical  resources available for accounting for mental  representa­
tions. Hutto and Myin (2013), for instance, argue that there is no satisfactory 
account of how mental representations get their representational contents. If a 
can’t have argument is successful, representational approaches to cognition are 
off the table. However, as Chemero (2013, p. 3) points out, can’t have argu­
ments are likely to be met with a ‘collective shrug’. That is, these arguments 
against the representational theory of cognition tend not to convince proponents 
of that theory. Don’t-need arguments, on the other hand, are positive. They aim 
to show that mental representations need not be invoked in order to explain a  
particular cognitive phenomenon. If a don’t need argument is successful, this 
does not imply that the non-representational explanation should automatically 
be preferred over an alternative representational explanation. However, meta-
theoretical  considerations  –  such  as  ontological  parsimony  and  explanatory 
power – can then be used to mount arguments in favour of either explanation.
Note that the two strategies can be employed independently. It is possible 
to argue that we can’t have mental representations without supplying a non-rep­
resentational  alternative  explanation,  and  it  is  possible  to  propose  a  non-
representational  explanation  without  arguing  that  that  we  can’t  have  mental 
representations.  The intended contribution of this  paper is  only to provide a 
don’t need argument. This is done by showing a possible account of utterances 
of concrete words that does not invoke mental representations, and show how it 
can account for recent empirical evidence.
3.1.3 The ecological-enactive approach in a nutshell
The guiding idea of  the enactive approach is  that  perception and action are  
intimately intertwined. In the dynamic coupling between organism and environ­
ment, a feedback loop is set up (see Figure 2). This is called a  sensorimotor  
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loop (Stewart 2010). Cognition is defined as perceptually guided action (Varela 
et al. 1991, p. 173), and thus becomes something the organism does in interac­
tion with its environment (Myin 2016; Noë 2012). Cognitive processes do not 
take place inside the head of the organism, but are relational in nature. 
Ecological psychologists  similarly stress the intertwining of perception 
and action in the concept of affordance (J.J. Gibson 1977). Organisms perceive 
what  the  environment  affords doing,  that  is,  possibilities  for  action.  For 
example, a flight of stairs is perceived as climbable and a cup is perceived as 
graspable.4 The perceived affordances depend inter alia on aspects of the envir­
onment, the skills of the organism (not everything that is liftable for a world 
champion weightlifter is liftable for me), as well as the material possibility we 
have  in  exercising  these  skills,  for  instance  the  availability  of  artefacts.  As 
Stewart (2010, p. 29) remarks, ‘a snow-covered mountain becomes an entirely 
different place if you have skis on your feet (and if you know how to ski!)’.
Figure 3. The sensorimotor loop: a feedback loop consisting of sensory (S) 
and motor (M) processes (based on Stewart (2010, Figure 1.1)).
4 A good example of this is the explanation Zhu & Bingham (2010) give for the the size-weight  
illusion. This illusion consists in the fact that a smaller object that has the same mass as a 
larger one is incorrectly judged to be heavier. However, the illusion disappears if we take  
people to perceive the ‘throw-ability’ of the objects. A larger object has to have a greater mass  
to be just as suitable to throwing as a smaller object. Zhu and Bingham found that the larger 
object is indeed perceived to be just as heavy as the smaller object when it is equally ‘throw-
able’.
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We never perceive only one affordance. An individual always perceives a 
field of affordances, that consists of a myriad of possibilities for action afforded 
by the environment (Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014). Not all of these affordances 
will invite behaviour equally. Which affordances are more inviting will depend 
on a host of factors. Whether something is perceived as liftable will for example 
depend on social setting (a statue in a museum does not afford lifting) and the  
degree to which a person feels fatigued. Even things such as mental health, for  
example, have an important role to play: for a depressed person, much less of 
the environment will be perceived as liftable (De Haan, Rietveld, Stokhof, & 
Denys 2013).
3.1.4 Ecological-enactive learning as the education of attention
On the  ecological-enactive  approach,  the  goal  of  cognitive  processes  is  not 
truthful or accurate representation, but perceptually guided action. The notion of 
representation is replaced with attunement (J.J. Gibson 1966). How does a child 
attune to its environment? The ecological answer is through the  education of  
attention (Adolph & Kretch 2015;  E.J.  Gibson 1953; E.J.  Gibson 1963;  J.J. 
Gibson 1966).  Attention is  understood as  selective openness5 to  the  field of 
affordances in relation to a task or goal (E.J. Gibson & Rader 1979; Rietveld & 
Kiverstein 2014). Attention can only be evaluated with respect to a particular  
task or  goal.  In  line  with the  definition of  cognition as  perceptually guided 
action, goal-directed behaviour is enabled by a person’s sensorimotor skills for 
acting on relevant affordances. The education of attention thus consists in the 
development of skills that allow for the context-dependent perceptual guidance 
of goal-directed behaviour. In other words, as a person is attuned to her environ­
ment, she thereby learns how to act on those affordances that are relevant.
5 See Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) for an ecological-enactive account of the neural dynamics 
underlying this selective openness.
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In the case of humans, the education of attention mostly takes place in 
social  interaction  through  processes  of  guided  rediscovery (Ingold  2001; 
Zukow-Goldring & Ferko 1994). This means that a master of a practice shows 
or makes present affordances to a beginner in such a way that the beginner can 
learn a particular skill or activity. Note that this process need not be explicitly 
didactic, but can simply consist in doing something together (Reed 1995). In 
child development, the education of attention highlights the active role of both 
caregiver  and child.  The caregiver is  responsible  for setting up the physical  
conditions that allow the child to learn.6 Crucial here is the Vygotskian idea of 
the zone of proximal development, which comprises activities that the child can 
engage in only with the help of the caregiver (Reed 1995). Besides physical 
structuring, the education of attention also relies on normative and cognitive 
structuring of the situation by the caregiver (Williams 2010b). That is, the care­
giver’s competence in her community’s practices allow her to determine what 
the child is, could, or should be doing, and encourage and discourage the child’s 
behaviour on this basis.7
These  conditions  also  hold  for  the  development  of  more  intellectual 
skills. In learning to talk, a child’s utterances do not start out as complete speech 
acts. Instead, the caregiver treats the child as if she is already competent and on 
this basis encourages and discourages the child’s behaviour.8 For example, a 
6 For example, Zukow-Goldring and Ferko (1994, pp. 172–173) describe a caregiver teaching a 
child how to roll a ball.  The caregiver sits the child down with legs apart,  a posture that  
provides a guide for the trajectory of the ball  whilst  at  the same time allowing the child  
freedom of  movement  from a  stable  position.  The  caregiver  then  begins  the  activity  by 
gathering attention through verbal means (Look!),  accompanied by moving the ball in the 
child’s line of sight. After the child’s attention has been attracted, the caregiver rolls the ball  
over to the child, and helps the child to roll the ball back, for instance by placing the infants  
hands on the ball and guiding the return. In this way, the child can gradually learn the activity 
of rolling a ball.
7 For  example,  Rączaszek-Leonardi,  Nomi,  and Rohlfing  (2013) describe  how a  six-month 
infant  that  is  being  changed  accidentally  touches  a  diaper.  The  mother  responds  to  this 
contingency by placing the diaper in the child’s hand while saying ‘yes you can start  by 
holding the diaper’. In this way, the infant’s essentially random arm movement is incorporated 
in the goal directed activity.
8 Goldstein, King & West (2003) show that 8 month old children are already highly sensitive to 
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child uttering something vaguely like /ˈteɪbəl/ in the presence of a table can be 
encouraged by a caregiver by saying Very good! That is indeed a table!, even 
though nothing in the behaviour of the child shows that she intended to say of is 
thing that it  is a table. Treating the child  as if she is making an assertion is 
crucial here. If we were to take the child to be engaged in mere meaningless 
babbling,  there would be no point  at  all  in encouraging or discouraging her 
behaviour.
In line with the intimate intertwining of perception and action, success­
fully participating in her community’s practices requires the child to see her 
world in the correct way (Gallagher 2005). She has to be able to pick up on  
those affordances that are salient with regard to the practices of her community. 
Through the education of attention, the teacher gradually introduces the child in 
the  practices  of  her  community.  Educated  attention  is  manifest  in  altered 
selective openness:  a person is  now able to pick up on and skilfully act  on  
affordances of her environment that earlier did not show up for her.
3.1.5 What a child learns as she learns to speak
On the code view, language learning consists in forming the correct associations 
between words and mental  representations.9 Ryle  (1945a) made a distinction 
between  knowing-that  and  knowing-how,  roughly  the  distinction  between 
knowing a proposition and having a skill.  The code-view assumes linguistic 
knowledge to be a species of knowing-that: knowing a word is knowing that it 
stands for (a set of) mental representations. This does not entail that the code 
view implies that learning language can have no effect on how the world is 
positive responses to their vocalisations, a sensitivity that goes beyond mere imitation.
9 Papafragou (2005, p. 357), for example, states that ‘the main task of the [language] learner is  
to  figure  out  which  aspects  of  the  input  language  correspond  to  which  nonlinguistic 
conceptual primitive notions – or combinations thereof’. Another example, that shows clearly 
the idea that meanings come before words, is given by Clark (2009, p. 8): ‘One issue for  
language acquisition is how children find out which meanings there are words for; another is 
just how they map each meaning to the right word.’
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represented.  It  does entail  that the child has to mentally represent the world 
before she learns language. On an ecological-enactive approach, this need not 
be the case. Emphasising the normative structure of the education of attention 
means that we do not have to assume that the child can already perceive in a  
categorical way. Instead, by means of the education of attention, the child learns 
how to ‘use words’ and thereby learns to perceive categorically. In keeping with 
the  relational  perspective  of  the  ecological-enactive  approach,  categorical 
perception  does  not  rely  on  mentally  representing  categories,  but  consists 
instead in having the skills for making distinctions between things in the world 
in line with a community’s standards. 
This is in line with the observation that a child learns to communicate in 
‘the midst of “doing”’ (Bruner 1990, p. 70). A child is not a passive observer,  
but participates  in activities and it  is in these activities that she starts ‘doing 
things  with  words’ (Rączaszek-Leonardi  2009,  p.  170).  Viewed  from  this 
perspective,  the  language  learner  does  not  acquire  knowledge-that  about 
language (Taylor 2013, p. 317).  She does not  need to learn that  a particular  
words stands for particular things in the world. Instead she comes to know-how 
to do things by talking (Van den Herik 2017 [Chapter 2]). The question of the 
acquisition of a language is substituted for asking ‘how the child comes to enter 
the linguistic community’ (Reed 1995, p. 2) which she does by learning a reper­
toire of social skills (Reed 1996; Verbrugge 1985).
This reconceptualisation of language learning has two important implica­
tions. First, it shows that linguistic behaviour is always time-bound and context-
bound (Love 1990). According to what Harris (1998, p. 81) calls the principle 
of  co-temporality,  what  is  being  said  is  immediately relevant  to  the  current 
context, and makes sense or fails to make sense within that particular context. In 
other words, successful linguistic communication consists in the ability of two 
speakers to converge on a shared understanding (Cuffari, Di Paolo, De Jaegher 
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2015;  Davidson  1986),  an  achievement  that  relies  on  bringing  all  kinds  of 
knowledge to bear (Van den Herik 2017 [Chapter 2]). Second, language ‘must 
be based on social coordination’ (Cowley 2011b, p. 11). This is evident in onto­
genetic development of linguistic abilities: children learn language in a triadic 
relation, with a caregiver jointly attending to things, in which the focus is on 
what  one can do with language. Language is therefore essentially  dialogical 
(Cowley 2011a). For example, prior to learning its first words, infants already 
participate in interactions that involve turn-taking behaviours under the guid­
ance of a caregiver (Rączaszek-Leonardi 2016).
3.1.6 Utterances of concrete words as attentional actions
To recapitulate, according to the ecological-enactive approach, cognition is a 
loopy,  dynamic,  and relational  affair.  Through the education of attention the 
developing  child  gradually attunes  to  her  environment,  a  process  that  relies 
constitutively on both physical and normative structuring of the learning situ­
ation by a caregiver that  is  already competent  in the community’s practices. 
However, this leaves open the question what we do with words.
The fact that the ecological-enactive approach eschews mental represent­
ations means that the code-view will not do. I start from a different picture of  
language:  the  constraint  view (Rączaszek-Leonardi  2011;  2016;  Rączaszek-
Leonardi & Kelso 2008; Verbrugge 1985). On the constraint view, language is 
viewed as a system of social actions that function by constraining unfolding 
cognitive  and  interactive  dynamics.  Because  of  this  reliance  on  unfolding 
dynamics,  linguistic  actions  neither  have  to  stand  for  the  processes  they 
constrain, nor do they have to map like a code to the results of their constraining 
action. In line with the action-oriented nature of cognition, language is recon­
ceptualised as a mode of action. Conceiving of language in terms of constraints 
brings  together  the  two  implications  just  discussed:  ongoing  processes  are 
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constrained by utterances  in  real  time  (language is  time-bound and context­
bound),  and constraints  presuppose a communication situation on which the 
constraining action can take place (the social and dialogical nature of language). 
The education of attention model of learning can explain how language 
gets to have these constraining effects. Language can fulfil the constraining role 
because it consists of recognisable and repeatable forms of behaviour, which I 
refer to as repeatables (Van den Herik 2017 [Chapter 2]). Within the education 
of attention, the repeatables we construe as words ‘anchor’ attention10: by being 
easily recognisable, they provide a fixed point that allows for the stabilisation, 
or sedimentation, of the education of attention. 
Different kinds of linguistic actions have different kinds of constraining 
effect. For the purposes of this paper, I further look into the constraining effects 
of concrete words from the perspective of ontogenetic development. I start from 
concrete words because they are a paradigmatic example for proponents of the 
code-view, and empirical research on the relation between language and cogni­
tion, which I will consider in the next section, usually involves only concrete 
words.
The  ecological-enactive  alternative  I  propose,  however,  does  not  start 
from ‘concrete words’ in the sense that code views do. It starts from linguistic 
actions, or  utterances.  From the perspective of the child there are no words, 
there are only repeatables: forms of behaviour that can be recognised from one 
instance to another, and that can be reenacted. In linguistic behaviour, concrete 
words usually do not occur in isolation, but rather in the context of a grammat­
ically structured utterance. Notable exceptions are the naming games caregivers 
play with children, where they point to an object and utter the word for that  
object, and the child’s first utterances. A child’s production of language starts 
10 I  take  this  image  picture  of  words  anchoring  attention  from Clark’s  (1996)  reference  to 
Jackendoff (1996). Given the ecological definition of attention in play in this paper I put it to 
different use.
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out with single-word utterances before she starts combining words into struc­
tured sequences (Clark 2009, p. 115; Fenson et al. 1994).
For the purposes of this paper I start by looking at a child’s single word 
utterances of concrete words. The hypothesis I propose is that a child’s first 
utterances  of concrete words are attentional  actions.  An attentional  action is 
defined as a repeatable performed by a person to indicate a particular aspect of 
the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. In this paper, I 
only claim that  we  can  understand  a  particular  kind  of  linguistic  utterance, 
namely those featuring concrete words, as attentional actions. I do not mean to 
say that only those utterances are attentional actions, or even that only utter­
ances can be explained as attentional actions. It seems defendable to say, for  
example, that ostensive gestures are also attentional actions. For the purposes of 
this  paper,  however,  I  will  not  pursue  the  question  how  generalisable  the 
account of attentional actions is.
Let  us  unpack  this  definition.  It  builds  on  the  notion  of  indication 
developed by Reed (1995). The child’s utterance is not a label, or a name, but a 
skilful way of directing ecological attention. In other words, we can understand 
an attentional action as a constraint on attention. While Reed limits the indica­
tional phase to roughly the second year of a child’s development, I argue that  
this  account  of  concrete  words  as  attentional  actions  can  be  generalised  to 
adults’ grammatically structured utterances. I return to this issue in §3.4.2. In 
first instance, indication is a second-personal skill. We direct somebody else’s 
attention, and whether the attentional action will succeed depends as much on 
the person that performs it as the person to which it is addressed. Derived from 
the primordial second-personal action, the person that produces the attentional 
action can coincide with the addressee, as when we talk to ourselves to direct  
our own attention.
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Note that the definition states that only aspects of the current situation 
can  be  indicated.  Crucially,  the  current  situation  is  not  limited  to  what  is 
currently perceivable. A toy that is put away in the closet can be indicated in the 
same way as a toy that is in view. For the ecological-enactive approach ‘there is  
no sharp line to be drawn between that which is and that which is not perceptu­
ally  present’  (Noë  2012,  pp.  25–29).  In  general,  non-representational 
approaches such as the ecological-enactive approach often face the objection 
that they cannot deal with ‘representation-hungry’ phenomena, such as cogni­
tion involving  absentia or  abstracta (Clark and Toribio 1994). See Kiverstein 
and Rietveld  (2018)  and Degenaar  and Myin  (2014)  for  ecological-enactive 
solutions to this objection. It is outside the scope of this paper to go into these 
solutions. For now it is important to see that whereas a code-view conceives of 
language learning in terms of learning the meaning of a decontextualised word, 
from an ecological-enactive perspective the situated nature of linguistic actions 
is foregrounded.
There are four elements involved in an attentional action: the person that 
performs the action, the person that is addressed, the indicated aspect of the 
situation, and the goal of the attentional action. Attentional actions can be meta­
phorically ‘anchored’ to certain aspects of the situation in the unfolding of the 
education of the attention. In §3.3 I look at the cognitive mechanism that enable 
this ‘anchoring’ in more detail. For now, it is important to note that attention is 
understood in ecological terms, that is, as the selective openness to the field of 
affordances in relation to a task or goal.  To direct  attention by means of an  
attentional action is thus to foreground an affordance of the current situation, 
some possibility for action. By thus promoting the salience of certain afford­
ances present in the current situation, the chance that they will be acted upon in 
the  unfolding  of  the  situation  is  increased.  These  skills,  required  for 
constraining attention and having one’s  attention constrained,  are  brought  to 
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fruition in the education of attention, which occurs in the context of caregiver  
and child doing something together.
Realising that attentional actions stem from, and are performed as part of 
recurrent  and structured  social  situations  is  crucial  for  dealing with Quine’s 
question (Reed 1995): how does a child learn to refer to the same things that 
their caregivers refer to? Quine (1960) identified the fundamental problem of 
the indeterminacy of reference. This indeterminacy of reference spells problems 
for a code-view account of language learning. The argument is as follows. The 
code  view assumes  that  a  child  has  to  learn  what  words  refer  to,  which  is 
accomplished by associating the word with the correct mental representation. 
Adults teach a child a word by pointing out an object and saying the word. This  
ostensive gesture, however, is not enough to specify what is referred to. The 
reason for this is that pointing out a dog is indistinguishable from pointing out 
this  particular  dog,  or  a standing-rather-than-a-sitting dog,  or  all  and sundry 
undetached parts of a dog, or any other fanciful fictions. There is thus a referen­
tial  ambiguity inherent  in  ostensive  gestures.  This  means  that  the  child  has 
insufficient evidence for determining what the referent of the ostensive gesture 
is, and therefore cannot decide on the basis of the ostensive gesture alone what 
mental representation needs to be associated with the word ‘dog’.
In  order  to  be  able  to  answer  Quine’s  question,  code-view  theorists 
usually assume that there are a priori constraints on the hypotheses that children 
entertain with respect  to  word-meanings (Clark 2009,  p.  124).  For example, 
children are thought to assume that words refer to a whole objects ( the whole-
object  assumption)  and  taxonomic  kinds,  rather  than  thematically  related 
objects  (the  taxonomic  assumption;  Clark  1981,  p.  40;  Markman 1981).  By 
means of these a priori constraints, the referential ambiguity is dissolved and a 
child is able to arrive at the correct hypothesis, for example that ‘dog’ refers to  
dogs.
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If we, however, assume that utterances of concrete words are attentional 
actions, Quine’s question can be evaded. To understand why this is the case, we 
have  to  realise  that  the  environment  of  the  child  is  highly  structured,  and 
consists of recurring situations, routines, and activities. It is in these activities 
that a child starts responding to and performing attentional actions. The task that  
the child is faced with is becoming an active participant in the activities she 
engages in with her caregivers.  Unsurprisingly,  the first  twenty words that a 
child produces typically pertain to salient aspects of recurrent situations that are 
highly  relevant  to  the  infant,  such  as  people  (daddy,  mommy),  games  and 
routines  (bye,  night-night),  animals  (dog,  kitty),  and  toys  (book,  balloon) 
(Fenson et al. 1994). Of these twenty first words, fourteen are concrete words.11
An interesting observation is made by Clark (2009, p. 88), who notes that 
when children start using language, they use a lot of deictic terms like that and 
general purpose verbs like do. As she points out, ‘without contextual details … 
it is usually impossible to interpret such utterances’, whereas, in ‘context, with 
the aid of joint attention, it is normally quite clear what children are talking 
about when they do this.’ The crucial insight is that this line of reasoning holds 
for all of the child’s initial linguistic behaviour, and continues to hold, although 
to a lesser degree, even for fully competent adult linguistic behaviour.12 This is 
because attentional actions function similar to ostensive pointing gestures: they 
are performed in a context in order to foreground a particular aspect of the situ­
11 The concrete words are daddy, mommy, dog, ball, baby, book, shoe, kitty, bird, eye, balloon,  
bottle, banana, and juice, the other words are bye, hi, uh oh, no, woof, and night night (Fenson 
et al. 1994, Table 15, p. 93).
12 For an extension to competent adult language use, we can remind ourselves of Ryle’s (1945b, 
p.  215)  claim that  all  words  incorporate  a  systematic  ambiguity:  ‘A given  word  will,  in 
different sorts of context, express ideas of an indefinite range of differing logical types and, 
therefore, with different logical powers.’ The example he gives is that of punctual, which ‘can  
be used to characterize a person’s arrival at a place, the person who arrives there, his character 
and even the average character of a class of persons’. Comparing these different kinds of  
punctuality would be absurd, according to Ryle, and thus he concludes, ‘where precision is 
wanted, it is wrong to speak of “the idea” of punctuality’ (Ibid., p. 216). This conclusion is in 
line with our rejection of the code-view.
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ation,  and  without  contextual  details,  they  too  are  impossible  to  interpret. 
Quine’s question spells trouble only if we take the ostensive gesture as it is used 
in the education of attention as evidence or determining the reference. If we 
instead understand the attentional action to, as it were, take the place of the 
ostensive gesture, we do not have to answer Quine’s question.
In other words, the attentional action inherits the referential ambiguity of 
the ostensive gesture by means of which the education of attention is initially 
achieved. This is possible because an attentional action is a species of ostensive 
gesture. As Baggs (2015, p. 260) puts it, speaking is ‘a technique for pointing’. 
The referential ambiguity only emerges from an observer-perspective, once an 
observer asks himself what the reference of this word is. Learning to perform an 
attentional  action does  not  require  taking a  stand on what  a  word refers to. 
Determining the extension of an attentional action (that which can be indicated 
by performing the attentional action) would be like determining the extension of 
the pointing gesture abstracted from the context in which the pointing gesture 
occurs: a pointless exercise.
Crucially,  the  referential  ambiguity usually  does  not  show up from a 
participant’s perspective, that is, from the perspective of the child or the care­
giver in the education of attention, and is not detrimental to communicational 
success.  The  reason  is  that  the  object  of  indication  is  individuated,  not  by 
decontextualised referential knowledge (of the form ‘dog’ refers to dogs), but by 
the unfolding of the (recurrent) situation, in which only certain affordances are 
relevant, and thus can become more salient as a result of the attentional action.
At the same time, to highlight the situatedness and ostensive nature of 
indication by means of attentional actions is not to say that there is no potential  
for misunderstanding or conflict. It is crucial to note here that indicate is used as 
a ‘verb of success’ (Ryle 1949/2009, p. 114). As mentioned, whether someone 
succeeds in indicating something to someone is not only dependent on her beha­
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viour,  but  lies  in  the  successful  coordination  of  behaviour.  In  other  words, 
‘indication of a single object, place, or event, is an achievement of a dyad, not a 
given.’ (Reed 1995, p. 11). In order to play her part in this achievement, a child 
needs to be able to successfully coordinate her behaviour with others by means 
of attentional actions. This means that the success conditions are not specified 
by the attentional action, but emerge in the unfolding of the situation and are to 
be decided upon by the interacting dyad.
To summarise, on the constraint view, concrete words do not stand for 
anything.  Learning  to  use  these  words  does  not  consist  in  acquiring  know­
ledge-that about their meaning. Instead, learning to talk is learning a repertoire 
of social skills. A child’s first utterances of concrete words are used to indicate 
aspects of the current situation to others in order to achieve something, and are 
therefore  understood  as  attentional  actions.  An  attentional  action  is  like  an 
ostensive gesture: it points out something. Learning takes place by means of the 
education of attention, where attentional actions are ‘anchored’ to aspects of the 
environment. In order to understand better how this ‘anchoring’ functions, we 
now turn to empirical research into the effect of colour words on categorical  
colour perception.
3.2 The case of colour
Categorical colour perception has been the preferential paradigm for studying 
the influence of language on putatively non-linguistic processes, because it is a 
prime  example  of  categorical  perception  that  allows  for  easy  cross-cultural 
comparison. In particular, research has focussed on category effects, which can  
broadly be understood as any effect of verbal categorisation on colour cogni­
tion; for example, an effect of verbal categorisation on speed or accuracy in 
discriminating or remembering colours. In this section, I report the  category  
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effects  found in this research, in order to draw some implications for under­
standing utterances of concrete words as attentional actions in the next section.
3.2.1 Basic colour words and cultural differences
Research into categorical colour research relies on the notion of basic colour 
words.  Colour  words  are  basic  when  they are  monolexemic,  not  subsumed 
under  other  colour  words  (such  as  navy),  applicable  to  all  objects  (which 
excludes  blonde  for  example),  and  psychologically salient  for  a  community 
(Berlin & Kay 1969). In English, these criteria are met by the words  white,  
black,  red, green,  yellow, blue,  brown, purple, pink,  orange,  and  grey.  Other 
languages, however, employ different colour words that categorise colour space 
in different ways.13 For example, the Dani from New Guinea employ just two 
basic  colour  words,  mili  and  mola  (Rosch-Heider  & Olivier  1972),  and  the 
Berinmo  have  five  basic  colour  words  including  nol which  spans  colours 
ranging from yellow to purple (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff 2000).
3.2.2 Russian blues
To investigate category effects, Winawer et al. (2007) devised a speeded colour 
discrimination  task  that  relies  on  the  fact  that  Russian  speakers  have  basic 
colour  words for lighter  blues  (goluboy)  and darker  blues  (siniy),  where the 
English basic colour word  blue spans these two categories. Participants were 
shown a triad of blue colour squares and had to indicate as quickly and as accur­
ately as possible which of the bottom two squares was the same colour as the  
top square (see Figure 3). In so-called cross-category trials, the distractor square 
13 There is a debate whether the development of colour terms across linguistic communities is 
universal.  Berlin  and  Kay (1969)  for  instance,  argued  that  all  linguistic  communities  go 
through the same seven stages,  starting out by making a dark-cool/light-warm distinction, 
then adding red, and so forth until they finally make it to the universal end-point which is 
expressed  in  the  eleven  English  basic  colour  words.  There  however,  seem to  be  counter 
examples to this alleged universality (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff 2000). Moreover, the 
alleged universal order is not found in language learning (Andrick & Tager-Flusberg 1986; 
Pitchford & Mullen 2002).
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was  across  the  siniy/goluboy category  border,  as  determined  for  that  each 
Russian speaker individually by means of an elicitation procedure, whereas in 
within-category trials the distractor square was in the same verbal category as 
the target square. Of course, for English speakers all squares always belonged to 
the same basic verbal colour category, blue.
Figure 4. Example of a cross-category trial in Winawer et al. (2007).
The  results  of  this  speeded  discrimination  task  were  that  Russian 
speakers’ performance showed a category effect: their reaction times were signi­
ficantly shorter in cross-category trials than in within-category trials, an effect  
that  was  absent  for  English  speakers.  In  other  words,  when  the  target  and 
distractor square fall on different sides of the siniy-goluboy category boundary, 
Russian speakers are able to identify the target square faster than when both the 
target and and the distractor square fall in the same category. Interestingly, when 
asked to  differentiate between  light  blue and  dark blue,  English participants 
drew almost the same border as Russians did between goluboy and siniy. This 
shows that English participants can visually distinguish light and dark blues in 
similar ways to Russian participants.
This experiment evaded the critique levelled against earlier research. For 
example, Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, and Shapiro (2005) asked participants to 
categorise  a  collection  of  colour  swatches,  and found that  people  tended to 
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categorise the colour chips in accordance with verbal categories. They inter­
preted the results as showing a category effect: they claimed that it showed that 
to the participants,  colours from the same verbal category looked more alike 
than colours from a different verbal category. However, this effect can also be  
explained in terms of a deliberate linguistic strategy: participants could simply 
put together those colours for which they use the same colour word (Pinker 
1994).  In  the  experiment  of  Winawer  et  al.  (2007),  this  strategy  was  not 
possible: the task did not involve subjective judgements of colour similarity, but 
consisted  in  finding  the  correct  answer  to  a  simple  discrimination  task. 
Moreover,  the  effect  was  measured  in  the  reaction  time  of  participants,  a 
measure that is taken not to be under the participants’ control.
Further  evidence  that  category  effects  are  not  due  to  a  deliberate 
linguistic strategy is given by Thierry et al. (2009). They devised an experiment 
that showed that the category boundary in Greek between basic colour words 
for light and dark blue has a category effect on implicit colour discrimination in 
a colour oddball detection task. In this experiment, participants were shown a 
sequence of stimuli differing in colour and shape and were instructed to press a 
button when they saw a particular shape. This means that changes in colour 
were irrelevant to the task. However, Thierry et al. were able to find a category 
effect  using  an  electrophysiological  measure:  the  Greek  distinction  between 
light and dark blues led to a larger visual mismatch negativity (‘an index of 
automatic and preattentive change detection’ (p. 4567)) in the case of a deviant 
colour  stimulus  as  compared  to  English  participants  for  whom the  deviant 
stimuli fell in the same verbal category (cf. Athanasopoulos et al. 2009).
The category effects just discussed could be explained in two different 
ways. First, the effect might be due to ‘warping’ of perceptual space on longer 
timescales. On this explanation, development in a culture with specific verbal 
colour categories leads to lasting effects on colour perception. Second, the effect 
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might  unfold  on  much  shorter  time-scales.  On  this  explanation,  linguistic 
processes have an online modulatory effect on cognitive processes. A way to 
decide between these two competing explanations is to compare the interference 
of  verbal  dual  tasks  and  other  cognitively  demanding  duals  tasks  on  the 
category effects.  If  the  category effects  obtain due to  warping of perceptual 
space on longer timescales, a verbal dual task should not lead to more interfer­
ence when compared to a equally demanding non-verbal dual task. If, however, 
the effect is due to online modulation a verbal dual task should lead to interfer ­
ence over and above that of non-verbal dual tasks.
Earlier  studies  found that  the  category effects  were  indeed  subject  to 
verbal interference in this way.  For example,  Roberson and Davidoff (2000) 
found that the category effect that obtained in a two-alternative forced-choice 
recognition  experiment14 could  be  eliminated  if  participants  were  asked  to 
recognise the colour swatch they had just seen after reading aloud for five to ten 
seconds (cf. Pilling & Davies 2004). This result only shows verbal interference 
in  the  case  of  colour  memory.  Winawer  et  al.  (2007)  also  found  that  their 
observed  category  effect  was  eliminated  by  a  verbal-interference  dual  task 
(silent  rehearsal  of  digit  strings),  but  not  by a  spatial-interference  dual  task 
(memorising a spatial pattern). The elimination of the category effect is thus not 
due to  some general  cognitive  load  limitation.  However,  verbal  interference 
does  not  eliminate  all  category  effects  (Pilling,  Wiggett,  Özgen,  &  Davies 
2003),  a  finding  that  suggests  that  category effects  also  play out  on  longer 
timescales.
The linguistic origins of the category effects are further corroborated by 
findings showing that  they are strongest in the right  visual hemifield,  which 
projects  contralaterally  to  the  putative  language-dominant  left  hemisphere 
14 This means that participants were shown a colour swatch, and after a delay of five or ten 
seconds were shown a target and distractor square, and had to indicate which of these was the 
same as the initial colour swatch.
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(Drivonikou  et  al.  2007;  Franklin,  Drivonikou,  Bevis  et  al.  2008;  Franklin, 
Drivonikou, Clifford et al. 2008; Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry 2006; Regier & 
Kay 2009; but see Suegami, Aminihajibashi, & Laeng 2014).
3.2.3 Categorising and anomic aphasia
Further evidence of the transient effect of language on perception comes from 
studying individuals with anomic aphasia, that is, who have difficulty naming, 
among  other  things,  colours.  Here  the  influence  of  linguistic  categories  on 
putatively non-linguistic tasks is shown to be more dramatic: without an active 
command  of  colour  words  the  task  of  colour  categorisation  is  impossible 
(Davidoff  & Luzzatti  2005;  Dummett  1975).  Davidoff  and Roberson (2004) 
describe  the  problems  that  patient  LEW has  with  sorting  colour  chips  into 
categories.  Instead  of  relying  on  categorical  perception,  he  had  to  rely  on 
discrimination:
if colour samples were presented for which the within-group similarity was 
much greater than the between-group similarity (i.e., narrow ranges of reds, 
greens,  yellows,  and blues),  he sorted them into four groups without error. 
Nevertheless, his performance was abnormal because he used a slow pairwise  
comparison for each stimulus; the colour groups did not ‘pop-out’. His abject 
failure was for tasks where within-group colours had a wide range of lightness  
and  saturation;  in  those  situations,  assessing visual  similarity  is  extremely 
difficult. (Davidoff & Roberson 2004, p. 139). 
In  the  first  task,  the  greater  within-group  similarity  allowed  LEW to 
arrive  at  the  grouping  using  only  the  ability  to  perceptually  discriminate 
between two colour samples when they were present at the same time. When the 
within group similarity was lower, LEW was presented with a problem that is  
unsolvable through discrimination abilities  alone.  This closely resembles  the 
sorites paradox (Davidoff & Roberson 2004): we can make a row of colour 
chips  ranging  from  red  to  blue,  and  make  sure  that  the  difference  in  hue 
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between all the chips is equal. By relying only on colour discrimination, there is 
no point discernible where the category boundary should be. And indeed, when 
LEW was confronted with such a task, he drew the conclusion that all colour 
chips belonged to the same colour category. He arrived at this conclusion by 
looking for colour chips that appeared identical to him, and then moving them 
to a group, and then repeating this procedure until all the colour chips were in  
the same group.
3.2.4 Categorical perception beyond colour
Categorical colour perception is usually taken as a paradigm for studying the 
effects that verbal categories have on putatively non-verbal cognitive processes. 
However,  if  the  category  effects  were  only  obtained  in  categorical  colour 
perception, they would at best provide a cognitive curiosity. Fortunately, there is 
a growing literature which aims to extend the findings from the research on 
categorical colour perception to categorical perception in general (see Lupyan 
2012 for  an  overview).  Gilbert,  Regier,  Kay,  and  Ivry (2008),  for  example, 
found that the the lateralisation of the category effect also occurs for the percep­
tion of animal figures (cats and dogs). This asymmetry between hemifields was, 
like the category effect in colour perception, subject to interference in the case 
of verbal dual task, but not a spatial dual task. A second example is the category 
effect that Boutonnet, Dering, Viñas-Guasch, and Thierry (2013) found using 
electrophysiological measures for the categorical distinction English speakers 
draw between cups and mugs, a distinction that Spanish speakers do not make. 
A final  example is  an experiment  performed by Lupyan and Spivey (2010), 
where participants had to attend selectively to four fives presented together with 
four 2s while fixating their gaze on the cross (see Figure 4). As soon as a small  
dot  appears  next  to  one of  the  5s,  the  subjects  have to  press  a  button.  The 
subjects were found to perform faster  on trials  where they heard a recorded 
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voice  saying  ‘attend  to  the  five’ as  compared  to  trials  where  they heard  a 
recorded voice saying ‘attend to the category’. As the task of attending to the 5s  
remained the same for a 45-minute period of time, hearing the word ‘five’ was 
completely redundant. This result seems to suggest that hearing the word ‘five’ 
directed the participants’ attention to the 5s.
Figure 5. Display used by Lupyan and Spivey (2010, based on their figure 1).
3.3 Attentional actions as constraints on phenotypic 
reorganisation
In this section, I combine the account of utterances of concrete words as atten­
tional actions based on the constraint view with the empirical results discussed 
in  the  previous section.  In  line  with the  don’t-need strategy as  discussed in 
§3.1.2, I provide an account that can potentially explain the effects suggested by 
the empirical research without invoking representations. 
The empirical  results  suggest  that  there are indeed category effects of 
verbal categories on colour perception. At the same time, the fragility of these 
category effects,  as  manifested  in  their  being  subject  to  verbal  interference, 
suggests  that  these category effects  are  the  result  of  a  complex interplay of 
different timescales. The empirical evidence also shows that the category effects 
based in verbal categorisation are found in the absence of overt language use. A 
potential  way of  understanding  the mechanism behind  this  is  the  ecological 
notion  of  a  task-specific  device  (Bingham 1988;  Runeson  1977;  Wilson  & 
Attentional Actions 101
Golonka 2013). The guiding idea is that for the purposes of a particular task, an 
organism  self-organises  into  a  task-specific  device  which  is  assembled  of 
resources distributed over body, brain, and environment.15
One way of understanding the assembly of task-specific devices is by 
means of phenotypic reorganisation. On this view, ‘people turn themselves into 
walkers, throwers, graspers, and so on, and in so doing, they perceive the world 
in relation to what they have become.’ (Proffitt & Linkenauger 2013, p. 172). As 
can be seen in this quote, Proffitt and Linkenauger focus on basic sensorimotor 
interactions with the environment. Their claim is that visual ecological informa­
tion for affordances16 is scaled based on morphology,  physiology, and target-
directed action. For example, whether something is graspable for a particular  
person depends, amongst other variables, on the size of their hand. Therefore, 
when a person is engaged in grasping something, the information for graspable 
is scaled based on hand size, among other things. In this way, the purposes of 
the organism, in the sense of the activities the organism is currently engaged in,  
‘mandate a goal-directed phenotypic reorganization’ (Ibid., p. 180). Note that 
the ongoing phenotypic  reorganisation is envisaged as a dynamic process of 
self-organisation. 
For our present concerns, we can extend the notion of becoming a task-
specific  device  by means  of  phenotypic  reorganisation  to  categorical  colour 
perception by taking the social context into account. Information then is scaled 
15 For a discussion of the role the brain may play in this process of self-organisation and how 
neuroscience might develop methods to study this, see Anderson (2014, pp. 272–280) and Van 
Elk,  Slors,  and Bekkering (2010).  See Bruineberg,  Kiverstein,  and Rietveld (2016) for  an 
ecological-enactive interpretation of the free energy principle that similarly describes the self-
organisation of the brain-organism-environment system.
16 Ecological information is information without content, that is non-semantic information, that  
enables an organism to pick up on affordances. The basic idea is that structures in ambient  
energy arrays  are  informative  to  an organism because they specify certain aspects  of the 
environment.  In  other  words,  ecological  information  is  information  for affordances,  not 
information about the world. Ecological information is not transmitted, nor is it processed or 
stored by a cognitive system (J.J. Gibson 1979). For a discussion see Van Dijk, Withagen, and 
Bongers (2015).
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based not  on characteristics  of  the  individual,  such as  hand size,  or  actions 
performed  individually,  but  rather  based  on  community  level  patterns  of 
categorisation as inculcated through the education of attention and the (atten­
tional) actions of others. As we noticed earlier, the normative structuring of the 
education of attention entails that the child need not already be able to perceive  
categorically in order to be taught to do so.17 What task a child is engaged in is 
determined initially by means of the normative and physical structuring of the 
learning situation by someone who has already mastered the relevant practice. If 
a caregiver introduces the child to colour words, she educates the child’s atten­
tion by structuring the learning situation. For example, by drawing the child’s 
attention to coloured objects, by showing the sorting of coloured objects, and so 
on.  The  caregiver  also  provides  feedback  on  the  child’s  behaviour.  In  this 
process, the child attunes to the culturally determined colour categories. The use 
of colour words as attentional actions is crucial here, for they provide the care­
giver with the means to ‘calibrate’ the child. Hearing the word ‘red’ thereby 
comes to acts as a constraint on ongoing phenotypic reorganisation, making the 
child into a better red detector. 
J.J. Gibson (1966, p. 52) defined the education of attention as ‘a greater  
noticing of the critical  differences with less noticing of irrelevancies’ and ‘a 
progressive  focussing  or  centering  of  the  perceptual  system’.  The  current 
account suggests that  this progressive focussing needs to be understood in a 
dynamic  way:  as  a  person interacts  with  his  or  her  environment,  there  is  a 
continuous phenotypic self-reorganisation into task specific devices. This phen­
otypic reorganisation is constrained by the current situation, which in the human 
case often includes attentional actions. But on this account, attentional actions 
are not the only constraints that shape phenotypic reorganisation in culturally 
17 This of course does not entail that the child requires no abilities whatsoever. For example, 
learning colour words requires that the child is able to discriminate between different coloured 
objects. But colour discrimination does not necessarily rely on categorical colour perception, 
as the example of LEW discussed in §2.3 shows.
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specific  ways.  The  example  of  categorical  colour  perception  suggests  that 
attending to something that has a particular colour can act as a constraint on the 
ongoing  phenotypic  reorganisation.  Attending  to  something  red  can  have  a 
similar constraining effect as hearing the colour word ‘red’, where both lead to 
phenotypic reorganisation as a red detector. In other words, and in line with the 
loopy nature of cognition, the ongoing phenotypic reorganisation is perceptually 
guided. On the level of neural dynamics, the effect of verbal interference can be 
explained by adopting a neural reuse perspective. Anderson (2016, p. 1) defines 
neural reuse as a form of neuroplasticity that entails that a ‘diverse behavioral 
repertoire is achieved by means of the creation of multiple, nested, and overlap­
ping neural coalitions, in which each neural element is a member of multiple 
different coalitions and cooperates with a different set of partners at different 
times.’ A verbal  interference task might  rely on neural  resources that  would 
otherwise  be  used  in  the  phenotypic  reorganisation  as  a  categorical  colour 
perceiver. As Lupyan (2012, p. 4) remarks, once we have acquired categorical 
perception, much of our experience might best be described as ‘hybrid visuo-
linguistic experience.’ 
The current account has no direct implications for phenomenal experi­
ence.  One  possibility is  given  by Anderson (2014,  p.  271),  who states  that 
‘Language probably does not make the world look different, but it can make 
some things easier to see’. Another possibility is that language does make the 
world  look different,  and  thereby makes  some things  easier  to  see.  For  the 
purposes  of  this  paper  I  will  not  explore  the  different  ways  of  drawing the 
phenomenological implications of the current account. 
In line with the idea that organisms are always selectively open to a field 
of affordances (Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014), any organism self-organises into 
many different task specific devices at any given time. In line with the neural  
reuse perspective, we should be careful not to conceive of these task specific 
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devices as neural modules, but rather as dynamically self-organising assemblies 
of  resources  distributed  over  body,  brain,  and  environment.  For  example,  a 
person is never only a grasper, although the anticipation of the act of grasping 
will lead to a shift in attention, which can be understood as a phenotypic reor­
ganisation that enables an enhanced selective openness to those aspects of the 
environment that are relevant for grasping. The phenotypic reorganisation into 
task-specific devices is thus not an all or nothing affair. It is not the case that  
hearing the word ‘red’ either results in the phenotypic reorganisation into a red-
detector, or fails to do so. Instead, we can think of attentional actions as transi­
ently modulating phenotypic reorganisation. This modulation can then be up-
regulated, for example by means of attentional actions, or down-regulated, for 
example by means of a verbal interference task (cf. Lupyan 2012). 
This account of task specific devices, when combined with neural reuse, 
shows how perception can be constrained by processes at multiple time scales. 
The resulting picture is the following: by means of the education of attention,  
individuals  learn  to  perceive  categorically  as  expressed  in  structures  in  the 
dynamic unfolding of phenotypic reorganisation.  This phenotypic reorganisa­
tion is perceptually guided and constrained by the actions of oneself as well of 
those of  others.  One example  of  these constraining actions  are  what  I  have 
called attentional  actions.  Although I  have taken colour as a case study,  the  
results  for  other  forms  of  categorical  perception  discussed  in  the  previous 
section suggests that this account might be applicable to categorical perception 
at large. For example, hearing the word ‘chair’ makes the person into a better 
‘chair detector’ (Lupyan & Swingley 2012). 
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3.4 Language beyond attentional actions 
So far,  I  have argued that  utterances of concrete words are best  taken to be  
attentional actions (§3.1). I then discussed research on the effect of community 
colour categories on individual colour cognition (§3.2), and proposed an ecolo­
gical  mechanism  based  on  the  idea  that  attentional  actions  function  as 
constraints on the dynamic unfolding of phenotypic reorganisation (§3.3).  In 
this final section, I situate the account of utterances of concrete words as atten­
tional actions in a larger theoretical perspective on language by means of three 
remarks  on  (1)  the  context-dependency and  reflexivity  of  language,  (2)  an 
extension of the current account to grammatically structured language, and (3)  
written language. 
3.4.1 Context-dependency and reflexivity 
It is important to stress that the current account highlights the context-depend­
ency of linguistic actions. Attentional actions are not  stored and  retrieved, but 
produced to constrain processes that are unfolding now. In other words, we do 
not use language, understood as the tokening of culturally determined types, we 
make language in line with a history of learning (Harris 1980). Although it is 
certainly the case that we can use words in many different contexts, this only 
shows our ability to recontextualise. And this ability to recontextualise does not 
entail  a  decontextualised  meaning.  To  be  able  to  walk  on  many  different 
surfaces does not entail an ability to walk in abstracto; similarly, being able to 
use a word in different or novel contexts does not entail an ability to use that 
word in abstracto, that is, it does not require knowledge of a decontextualised 
‘meaning’. This point is captured by Voloshinov (1930/1973, p. 68) when he 
says that ‘the task of understanding does not basically amount to recognizing 
the form used, but rather to understanding it in a particular, concrete context’ 
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(cf.  Davidson 1986).  Recognising  the  context-dependent  nature  of  linguistic 
actions also does not negate the fact that we have normative practices that aim 
to regularise and standardise linguistic actions across contexts. As we have seen, 
the normative structuring of the initiate learning situation by the caregiver is  
critical  for  the  child’s  education  of  attention.  Other  paradigmatic  examples 
include  extensive  institutionalised  language  education  and  the  writing  of 
dictionaries  and grammar  books and the  prescriptive  use  made  out  of  these 
codifications.  These  latter  examples  are  an  expression  of  the  reflexivity  of 
language, that is, our ability to talk about talking (Harris 1998; Taylor 1992; 
2000; 2010; 2013). I do not object to taking this reflexivity and the normative 
enforcing of linguistic behaviour it affords seriously. What I do object to is to 
take ‘products of these [reflexive] processes as realia, and to retroject them on 
to languagers as the basis for their languaging activities’ (Love 2017, p. 113). To 
understand this,  take for  example the practice  of  promise making.  This is  a 
reflexive  practice  because  it  consists  in  taking  some  linguistic  act  to  be  a 
promise.  This is  to say,  if  we were unable to say of some act  that  it  was a 
promise,  and  we  were  unable  to  determine  whether  a  promise  was  kept  or 
broken, etc., we could not have the practice of promise making. At the same 
time, making promises does not have to be grounded in the existence of mental 
promises:  the normative import of making a promise is not guaranteed by a 
mental state, but instead, by actually making the promise. Similarly, our prac­
tices that stabilise and normatively enforce the meanings of words do not have 
to be grounded in mental meanings. To reify promises or meanings is a prime 
example of the  fallacy of  misplaced concreteness  (Whitehead 1929).  In  line 
with this  focus on context-dependency,  the  constraining effect  of  attentional 
actions will also be context dependent. So, for example, the constraining effects  
of being asked the reflexive question how do you spell the word ‘green’ will be 
very different  from a person telling you to  look at  that  green one.  For  the 
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purposes of this paper, I have only explored situations which are like the latter, 
in the sense that they involve what we might call, in line with the notion of 
indication in the definition of attentional actions, the indicative use of a concrete 
word.  The question whether the reflexivity of language can be explained in 
terms of constraints I leave for a future occasion.
3.4.2 Grammatical structure and attentional actions
In  my discussion  on  attentional  actions,  I  have  mainly considered  a  child’s 
single-word utterances of concrete words. This leaves open the question how we 
should make sense of concrete words as they are used in grammatically struc­
tured utterances. A tentative proposal is to see such utterances as enabling more 
fine-tuned  attentional  actions.  As  we  have  seen,  attentional  actions  are 
performed by someone to indicate an aspect of the situation to someone else in 
order to achieve something. A child’s attentional action ball is used to indicate a 
ball in order, for instance, to request a ball that is already the focus of attention, 
to initiate a game that child and caregiver regularly play together, to inquire as 
to the whereabouts of a particular ball that the child lost, to mark the sudden 
unexpected appearance of a ball, and so forth. In this single word attentional 
action, only the object of indication is thus explicated. 
The tentative proposal is that in structured attentional actions, concrete 
words still serve this indicative role. This means that the discussion on atten­
tional  actions  as  constraints  on  phenotypic  reorganisation  also  applies  to 
structured attentional actions. For example, an utterance of the form could you 
give me the ball is akin to a child’s single-word utterance ‘ball’ in the sense that 
it  is  an attentional  action by means of which a ball  is  indicated in order to  
achieve something (in this case the other person handing me the ball). However,  
whereas only the structured environment reduces potential ambiguity in the case 
of the child’s single word attentional action, this potential ambiguity is reduced 
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by linguistic means in the case of the structured attentional action. If I’m asking 
another person Could you give me the ball, this is more constraining than if I 
simply say ball; but both are attentional actions that indicate the ball in order to 
achieve something. 
In  terms  of  constraints,  a  structured  attentional  action  is  thus  more 
constraining than a single-word attentional action, but the same basic structure 
is  preserved  when  the  child  makes  the  transition  to  structured  attentional  
actions.  That  is,  structured attentional  actions still  function akin to ostensive 
gestures.18 Of course, not all structured linguistic actions are attentional actions. 
However, providing criteria for delineating which structured linguistic actions 
are attentional actions and which are not falls outside the scope of this paper. 
One might object that an extension to structured attentional actions fails 
the criterion of providing a don’t-need account, as linguistic structure requires 
mental representation. And indeed, the received view of the epistemology of 
language qua linguistic structure is that it requires an explicit representation of 
the rules that together can be said to constitute the grammar of a language.19 
However,  non-representational  alternatives  have also been proposed.  Christi­
ansen and Chater (2015, p. 17), for example, suggest that linguistic structure 
can be understood in terms of a history of processing operations that constrain 
current  processing.  They use a metaphor also used by enactivists  of  ‘laying 
18 Kukla (2017) goes as far as saying that speech acts that make highly theoretical claims still  
have  an  ostensive  dimension.  She  bases  her  account  on  Heidegger  and  Haugeland’s 
interpretation (2013, p. 67), who claims that in ‘making an assertion a speaker lets what is  
being talked about show itself from itself,  by pointing it out—putting it on exhibit,  so to 
speak. If, for instance, I discreetly mention that your shoelace is untied, I draw the shoelace to 
your attention so that you can see, “from” the shoelace itself, that it is untied. By pointing out  
the untied shoelace (something I could also do without words), I let it be seen— let it show 
itself from itself.’
19 Matthews  (2003,  pp.  188–189)  defines  the  ‘Received  View’ of  linguistic  knowledge  as 
follows: ‘knowing a language is a matter of knowing the system of rules and principles that is  
the  grammar  for  that  language.  To  have  such  knowledge  is  to  have  an  explicit  internal  
representation of these rules and principles.’ Devitt (2006), similarly, claims that ‘the received 
view’ is that ‘language processing involves metalinguistic representations of the syntactic and 
semantic properties of linguistic expressions’.
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down a path in walking’ (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991). According to this 
metaphor,  we  conceive  of  the  unfolding  of  current  processes  as  being 
constrained by the traces left by earlier processes. An example is a desire path: 
when a person walks on the grass, she leaves a visible trail that can guide the 
next person’s walking behaviour. By many people thus walking in each other’s 
footsteps,  the  path  becomes  more  visible  and  thus  constrains  subsequent 
walking behaviour more strongly. Based on this history of processing account of 
linguistic structure, we can conceive of linguistic structure as providing further 
constraints. The resulting image is thus that when a child learns to employ struc­
tured utterances, her attentional actions become more strongly constraining. I  
realise that what I have said here with respect to linguistic structure is very 
brief,  but  it  is  merely intended  to  provide  a  direction  in  which  the  current 
account can be extended. 
3.4.3 Written language
The third remark situating the account of attentional actions concerns the exten­
sion  to  written  language.  First  note  that  written  language  contributes 
considerably to the normative reflexive enforcing of linguistic behaviour. For 
example,  without  written  language  we  could  not  write  dictionaries,  and  we 
would thus be unable to ‘look up’ the meaning of a particular word (Ong 1982). 
Moreover,  for  us,  hyper-literate  human  beings,  our  experience  of  spoken 
language is shaped profoundly by our facility with written language (Harvey 
2015).  On  the  code  view,  a  spoken  utterance  can  encode  the  same mental 
meaning as a written sentence. The constraint view, however, highlights the fact 
that the production of spatio-temporal patterns in spoken or sign language and 
the production of spatial patterns in written language belong to different ontolo­
gical  categories,  are  used  to  do  different  things,  and  constitute  different 
cognitive domains with different cognitive dynamics (Kravchenko 2007; 2009; 
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Linell 2005; Love 2007). Perhaps the most conspicuous difference is that for 
writing and reading the principle of co-temporality, as discussed in §1.5, does 
not  hold.  Understanding written concrete  words from a constraint-view thus 
requires an additional account, that is outside the scope of the current paper.
3.5 Conclusion
I argued that on an ecological-enactive approach, utterances of concrete words 
are best seen as attentional actions that are used to indicate situations, events, 
objects, or characteristics thereof in order to coordinate behaviour. The results 
from empirical  research  show that  the  attention-directing  effects  of  socially 
constituted  categories  affect  cognitive  processes  in  the  absence  of  overt 
language  use.  This  can  be  understood  by  relying  on  the  idea  that  humans 
continuously self-organise  into  task  specifics  devices,  a  form of  phenotypic 
reorganisation.  The  unfolding  of  this  process  is  constrained  by a  history of 
learning, the actions of oneself, others, as well as aspects of the environment. In 
this way this paper proposed a novel explanation for the empirical phenomenon 
of category effects. Finally, I situated the account of concrete words as atten­
tional action in a larger theoretical perspective on language. Although a small  
step, the account of spoken concrete words as attentional actions shows how the 
ecological-enactive approach to cognition can be extended to explain linguistic 
behaviour. 
6 Conclusion and directions for future research
As philosophers, we are in the business of promoting possibilities.
– Hutto & Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism
The relevant sense of ‘knowing the meaning of words’ (which is a form of 
what  Ryle  has  called  knowing  how)  must  be  carefully  distinguished  from 
knowing the meaning of words in the sense of being able to talk about them as 
the  lexicographer  might  –  thus,  defining  them.  Mastery  of  the  language 
involves the latter as well as the former ability. Indeed, they are both forms of 
know how, but at different levels – the one at the ‘object language’ level, the 
other at the ‘metalanguage’ level.
– Wilfred Sellars, The Structure of Knowledge
In this thesis, I have developed an ecological-enactive perspective on language.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the two functions of this perspective are to 
contribute to extending the reach of the ecological-enactive approach to typical 
human forms of cognition, and to throw new light on philosophical problems 
regarding language. In order to achieve the first goal, I have chosen to discuss 
aspects of language that are most straightforwardly described in representational 
terms: linguistic knowledge, concrete words, and content. If the ecological-en­
active  perspective  on  these  aspects  of  language  developed  in  this  thesis  is 
viable,  this  shows that  the  ecological-enactive approach  can be  extended to 
include typical human forms of cognition.
 With respect to the second goal, the perspective developed in this thesis 
conceives  of  language  in  line  with  the  pragmatic  turn  in  cognitive  science. 
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Language is conceived in action-oriented terms, as the context-bound and time-
bound  exercise  of  skills,  rather  than  in  terms  of  knowledge  of  an  abstract 
system. In exercising these skills, we continuously make and remake language 
in line with a history of learning. In an important sense, language is thus what 
we make of it – how could it be otherwise? 
In this  thesis,  I  have provided metalinguistic  rather  than metaphysical 
solutions to philosophical problems. The ecological-enactive approach opposes 
the reifying tendencies of representational approaches that locate metalinguistic 
abstractions such as  meanings and words as  representations in the cognitive 
system of individuals.  But  in opposing these reifying tendencies,  I  have not 
turned a blind eye to these metalinguistic abstractions, opting instead to treat 
them as standing in need of explanation. As I have argued in this thesis, metalin­
guistic  reflexivity  is  crucial  for  explaining  the  origins  of  phenomena  like 
linguistic knowledge,  semantic content,  and linguistic normativity.  By taking 
the normative structuring of metalinguistic practices seriously, these phenomena 
can be explained without reifying them.
Rather  than  understand language  and cognition  as  reified  abstractions 
with  determinate  properties,  both  the  ecological-enactive  approach  and  the 
metalinguistic approach put possibilities centre stage. For example, as discussed 
in  Chapter  4,  what  separates  the  contentful  linguistic  behaviour  of  the 
competent  adult  from the  contentless  speech acts  of  the  young child  is  the 
possibilities the adult has to engage in metalinguistic activities such as justi­
fying, defending, and explaining what she said, when the need arises. In doing 
so, she does not describe the properties of her behaviour, but suggests a way of 
understanding them. And although an individual’s history constrains the possib­
ilities  that  are  available  to  her,  it  does  not  determine  what  will  happen.  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, rules are not explanatory hypotheses, but resources that 
people can employ in order to normatively regulate social activities. According 
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to the perspective developed in this thesis, one of the defining characteristics of 
linguistic behaviour is therefore its open-endedness: the possibility for (re)nego­
tiating its properties in the moment.
As  I  said,  any  perspective  on  language  will  be  limited.  Much  work 
remains to be done. In the final paragraphs of this thesis, I identify two direc­
tions for future research.
The  first  direction  for  future  research  concerns  the  relation  between 
linguistic  and  non-linguistic  forms  of  cognition.  How  should  we  view  the 
impact  of  language on  non-linguistic  or  pre-linguistic  cognitive  abilities?  In 
thinking about this question, I think it is important to remind ourselves that the 
distinction between the linguistic and the non-linguistic is not easy to draw on 
the current perspective. One reason for this is that learning language has effects 
that outstrip verbal behaviour. Think for example of the categorical perception 
discussed in Chapter 3. Here we saw that linguistic categories have category 
effects on putatively non-linguistic processes, in particular categorical percep­
tion. Once we have learned colour categories that are grounded in the linguistic 
distinction  we  make,  these  categories  influence  our  perception  even  in  the 
absence of verbal behaviour.
Of particular interest here is the idea defended in this thesis that a partic­
ular speech act is contentful if the person who performed that action is sensitive 
to the conditions under which that speech act would be correct, a sensitivity that 
is expressed in the person’s possibilities for engaging in metalinguistic activities 
such  as  justifying  her  speech act  when the need  arises.  I  see  no principled 
reason why this analysis cannot be extended to non-verbal acts as well. In this  
way,  our practical  dealings in everyday situations can also be subject  to the 
same assessment. For example, a person that tries to lift an object that turns out  
to be heavier than she expected, can give a reason for her behaviour by saying ‘I  
thought I could lift that’. This reason-giving behaviour could be construed as 
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post-hoc rationalisation, where the contentful attitude of taking this thing to be 
liftable  is  only attributed after  the  fact.  Alternatively,  we could say that  the  
action of trying to lift the object is an expression of the fact that the person took 
the object to be liftable. I think that the perspective developed in this thesis 
aligns more closely with the second option, in particular if we think of percep­
tion  in  terms  of  the  task-specific  devices  as  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  but  of  
course much more needs to be said in order to substantiate this claim.
The second direction for future research concerns an ecological-enactive 
account  of  abstraction.  In  a  sense,  the  problem faced  by  radical  embodied 
approaches to cognition is the opposite of the symbol grounding problem faced 
by classical cognitivism (Harnad 1990). The symbol grounding problem is to 
account for the link between amodal and abstract symbols and the world. The 
ecological-enactive account, however, faces an ‘ungrounding’ problem (Rącza­
szek-Leonardi,  Nomikou,  Rohlfing, & Deacon 2018): how do embodied and 
situated communicative actions get symbolic properties that seem to be context-
invariant? Here I shall not attempt to provide a solution to this problem, but  
instead propose a way of understanding it such that an ecological-enactive solu­
tion is not in principle impossible.
First  of  all,  it  is  important  to realise  that,  no matter  how abstract  our 
language becomes, it is never totally independent of any context. As I say in 
§3.4.1 (p. 105):
Although it  is  certainly the case that  we  can use words  in  many  different 
contexts,  this only shows our ability to recontextualise.  And this ability to 
recontextualise does not entail a decontextualised meaning. To be able to walk 
on many different  surfaces does not entail  an ability to walk  in abstracto; 
similarly,  being able to use a word in different or novel contexts does not 
entail an ability to use that word in abstracto, that is, it does not require know­
ledge of a decontextualised ‘meaning’.
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Viewed in this way, the problem is not to account for genuine context-invariant  
symbols, but rather for our ability to transcend contexts. In other words, what 
we need is an account of the skills of abstraction and generalization, rather than 
of the constitution of abstract objects. This comes to the fore in my discussion 
of content in Chapter 4. Traditionally, contents are seen as abstract objects, not  
bound  by  time  or  place.  In  contradistinction  to  this  idea,  I  stress  that  our 
content-involving practices should be understood in terms of the context-de­
pendent negotiation of correctness conditions.
In  Chapter  1,  I  argued  that  there  is  no  fact  of  the  matter  whether  a 
linguistic unit is a repetition of an earlier unit, for no two events will ever be 
exactly the same. In an important sense, whether something counts as a repeti­
tion is up to the participants in a conversation to determine. This also holds in 
the problem of context-transcendence we are faced with here. Whether a given 
term can be applied to a novel context, and counts as being the same from the 
first context to another, must be determined by participants themselves. Viewed 
in this way, context-invariance cannot be decided by empirical means, but must 
rather be instituted in normative practices (see also Lance 2017, §6). 
In relation to repetition and context-inpendence, written language plays 
an important role. It has a profound infuence on our understanding and experi­
ence of language. Love (2004, p. 542) explains: 
the very fact that what is said can be written down and, conversely, that what  
is written can be read aloud, fosters the idea that spoken and written counter­
parts instantiate some third thing, more abstract than either of them—i.e. the 
item(s) in the medium-neutral code itself.
Whereas spoken language consists in transient spatiotemporal patterns, written 
language consists of spatial patterns that remain the same from one moment to 
the next. It therefore stands to reason that this aspect of our sociomaterial prac­
tices proves to be an important explanatory factor in our practices that aim to  
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transcend  context-dependence.  For  example,  written  language  enabled  the 
production  of  dictionaries.  This  in  turn  meant  that  the  meaning  of  a  word 
became something that could be ‘looked up’, and therefore was easily conceptu­
alised  as  existing  independently  of  the  actual  use  of  a  word  (Ong  1982). 
Although I have mentioned and briefly discussed the important role of written 
language in this thesis, much more can be said about this.
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift ontwikkelt een perspectief op taal en haar ontwikkeling door 
voort te bouwen op twee benaderingen. De eerste is de  ecologisch-enactieve  
benadering  van  cognitie.  In  tegenstelling  tot  het  wijdverspreide  idee  dat 
cognitie bestaat uit informatieverwerking in het brein, verklaart de ecologisch-
enactieve  benadering  menselijke  cognitie  in  relationele  termen,  als  vaardige 
interacties met een sociomateriële omgeving die is gevormd door praktijken. De 
tweede is de metatalige benadering van taal. Volgens deze aanpak is metatalig 
taalgebruik – praten over  praten – cruciaal  om taal  en haar ontwikkeling te  
begrijpen. Ik verdedig twee thesen:
1. Het eerste communicatiegedrag van kinderen kan verklaard worden in 
termen  van  aandachtrichtende  handelingen:  sociale  handelingen  die 
werken door het richten van iemand anders aandacht.
2. Om  een  sensitiviteit  voor  belangrijke  eigenschappen  van  taal  te 
ontwikkelen, zoals semantische inhoud en normativiteit, moet een kind 
metatalige vaardigheden leren.
Het in dit proefschrift ontwikkelde ecologisch-enactief perspectief op taal 
dient twee functies. Allereerst is de ecologisch-enactieve benadering begonnen 
met het verklaren van basaal gedrag, zoals bewegen en grijpen. Een benadering 
in  de  cognitieve  wetenschappen  moet  echter  het  volledige  spectrum  van 
menselijke cognitie kunnen verklaren. Als het perspectief dat in dit proefschrift 
is  ontwikkeld houdbaar is,  vormt dit  een bijdrage aan de uitbreiding van de 
ecologisch-enactieve benadering naar typische menselijke vormen van cognitie. 
Ten tweede werpt  dit  perspectief  nieuw licht  op filosofische problemen met 
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betrekking tot taal. In de verschillende hoofdstukken behandel ik vragen met 
betrekking  tot  de  aard  van  talige  kennis,  verklaringen  van  communicatief 
gedrag, en de oorsprong van semantische inhoud en talige normativiteit.
Dit  proefschrift  bestaat  uit  een  inleiding,  vier  hoofdstukken  die  zijn 
geschreven  als  onafhankelijke  onderzoeksartikelen,  en  derhalve  afzonderlijk 
gelezen  kunnen  worden,  en  een  algemene  conclusie  waarin  richtingen  voor 
toekomstig onderzoek worden beschreven.
In  de  inleiding  wordt  het  perspectief  dat  in  dit  proefschrift  wordt 
ontwikkeld gecontextualiseerd. In het eerste deel van de inleiding introduceer ik 
de  pragmatische wende in  de studie  van  cognitie.  Deze  wende markeert  de 
hedendaagse  verschuiving  van  het  klassiek  cognitivisme,  dat  stelt  dat  alle 
cognitie bestaat  uit  breingebonden berekeningen over  mentale  representaties, 
naar  een  handelingsgeoriënteerd  paradigma,  dat  cognitie  definieert  als 
perceptueel geleide handelingen. In het tweede deel van de inleiding introduceer 
ik  een breed gedeelde aanname die  ten grondslag  ligt  aan veel  theoretische 
reflecties  over  taal,  namelijk  dat  taal  gezien  moet  worden  als  een  abstract  
systeem van codes.  Volgens deze aanname is  taal  een code voor gedachten, 
zodat door het uitwisselen van deze codes gedachten van de ene persoon naar de 
andere kunnen worden overgedragen. Ik laat zien waarom deze aanname hand 
in hand gaat  het  klassiek cognitivisme.  Daarna  introduceer  ik  de metatalige 
benadering,  die  belangrijke  eigenschappen  van  taal  verklaart  in  termen  van 
normatieve metatalige praktijken.
In hoofdstuk twee stel ik een verklaring van talige kennis als Ryleaanse 
praktische  vaardigheden  voor.  Ik  behandel  Nigel  Loves  invloedrijke 
onderscheid  tussen  eerste  orde  talig  gedrag  en  tweede  orde  metatalige 
constructen die we gebruiken om dit eerste orde talige gedrag te beschrijven, 
zoals  woord,  zin,  betekenis,  en  begrip.  Gebaseerd  op  Taylor’s  idee  van 
criteriumsrelaties,  definieer  ik  talige  kennis  als  de  praktische  vaardigheid 
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criteria te geven en te herkennen. Om talig te kunnen communiceren moet men 
een  gevoeligheid  hebben  voor  de  criteriumsrelaties  die  voortkomen  uit 
metatalige  praktijken.  Ik  concludeer  dat  alle  eerste  orde  talige  activiteit  een 
tweede orde dimensie heeft, in de zin dat wij talige activiteit direct waarnemen 
in termen van metatalige praktijken.
In hoofdstuk drie ontwikkel ik een ecologisch-enactieve verklaring van 
het  gebruik  van  concrete  woorden  –  woorden  die  worden  gebruikt  om 
observeerbare situaties, gebeurtenissen, objecten of kenmerken aan te duiden. 
Voortbouwend op het scholing van aandachtsmodel van leren, definieer ik het 
gebruik van concrete woorden als aandachtsrichtende handelingen (attentional  
actions): een  herhaalbare  vorm  van  gedrag  die  door  een  persoon  wordt 
uitgevoerd om een aspect  van de huidige situatie aan te  wijzen aan iemand 
anders  om  iets  te  bereiken.  Recent  empirisch  onderzoek  laat  zien  dat  de 
aandachtsrichtende  categorie-effecten  van  talige  categorieën  cognitieve 
processen beïnvloeden in de afwezigheid van verbaal gedrag. Ik betoog dat dit  
begrepen kan worden op basis van het idee dat mensen continue zelforganiseren 
in taak-specifieke manieren. Dit is een vorm van fenotypische herorganisatie. 
Dit  proces  van  continue  zelforganisatie  wordt  begrensd  door  de 
leergeschiedenis, de handelingen van de persoon zelf en van anderen, en door 
aspecten  van  de  omgeving.  Op  deze  manier  stelt  dit  hoofdstuk  een  nieuwe 
verklaring voor voor het fenomeen van categorie-effecten die voortkomen uit 
talige categorieën.
In  hoofdstuk  vier  stel  ik  een  manier  voor  om  het  probleem  van  de 
oorsprong van semantische inhoud op te lossen door te laten zien hoe kinderen 
leren deel te nemen in praktijken waarin inhoud een rol speelt. Ik beschrijf de 
vaardigheden die een kind nodig heeft om een gevoeligheid te ontwikkelen voor 
de semantische inhoud van taalhandelingen. In het bijzonder betoog ik dat een 
kind ‘gecalibreerd’ moet worden om haar wereld te ‘meten’ in termen van de 
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normatieve  gelijkheidsoordelen  van  haar  gemeenschap.  Dit  proces  kan 
verklaard  worden middels  het  scholing  van  aandachtsmodel  voor  leren.  Het 
gecalibreerde  kind  moet  haar  ‘metingen’  nog  leren  te  gebruiken  in  het 
produceren en begrijpen van inhoudsvolle taalhandelingen. Het kind leert dit 
door reflexieve talige vaardigheden te verwerven die haar in staat stellen deel te 
nemen aan het bepalen van correctheidsvoorwaarden.
In  hoofdstuk  vijf  verdedig  ik  de  these  dat  metatalige  reflexiviteit 
constitutief  is  voor  talige  normativiteit.  Een  potentieel  vernietigend 
tegenargument  tegen  de  constitutiviteit  van  metatalige  reflexiviteit  is  het 
regressieargument. Middels een bespreking van het werk van Searle laat ik zien 
dat dit regressieargument voortkomt uit een visie op taalverwerving als het leren 
volgen van de constitutieve regels van talige praktijken. Volgens deze visie is 
taal  leren vergelijkbaar  met  leren schaken:  we leren  eerst de  regels,  om die 
vervolgens toe te passen. Ik stel een ecologisch-enactief alternatief voor, waarin 
taalverwerving  begrepen  wordt  als  het  eerst  aanleren  van  regelmatig 
communicatiegedrag,  dat  verklaard  kan  worden  in  termen  van 
aandachtsrichtende handelingen. Volgens deze alternatieve visie moet een kind 
eerst regelmatig gedrag vertonen, zodat ze dit regelmatige gedrag retrospectief 
in  normatieve  metatalige  termen  kan  interpreteren.  Metatalige  reflexiviteit 
maakt  het  mogelijk  om  communicatiegedrag  te  reguleren,  en  is  derhalve 
noodzakelijk voor talige normativiteit. Ik betoog dat talige regels beschikbaar 
zijn voor mensen als middelen om de eigenschappen van taal en talig gedrag in  
onderling  overleg  te  bepalen.  De  benadering  in  dit  hoofdstuk  maakt  het 
mogelijk  de constitutieve rol  van metatalige  reflexiviteit  te  begrijpen zonder 
hierbij ten prooi te vallen aan het regressieargument.
Summary
This thesis proposes a perspective on language and its development by starting 
from two approaches. The first is the ecological-enactive approach to cognition. 
In opposition to the widespread idea that cognition is information-processing in 
the brain, the ecological-enactive approach explains human cognition in rela­
tional terms, as skilful interactions with a sociomaterial environment shaped by 
practices. The second is the metalinguistic approach to language, which holds 
that reflexive or metalinguistic language use – talking about talking – is crucial 
for  understanding language and its  development.  In  particular,  I  defend two 
theses:
1. A child’s initial communicative behaviour can be explained in terms of 
attentional  actions:  social  actions that  function by directing someone 
else’s attention.
2. In order for the child’s communicative behaviour to be sensitive to key 
properties of language, such as semantic content and normativity, she 
needs to learn metalinguistic skills.
The  development  of  this  ecological-enactive  perspective  on  language 
serves two functions. First, the ecological-enactive approach started by consid­
ering basic behaviour, such as locomotion and grasping. An approach in the 
cognitive sciences, however, should be able to account for the full  gamut of 
human cognition. If the perspective developed in this thesis is viable, this is a 
contribution to extending the ecological-enactive approach to typically human 
forms of cognition. Second, this perspective throws new light on philosophical 
problems concerning language. In the different chapters, I deal with questions 
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concerning the nature of linguistic knowledge, explanations of communicative 
behaviour, and the origins of semantic content and linguistic normativity.
This thesis consists of an introduction, four chapters that are written as 
independent  research papers,  and thus  can be read separately,  and a  general 
conclusion that identifies directions for future research.
The introduction serves to contextualise the perspective developed in this 
thesis. In the first part of this introduction, I introduce the pragmatic turn in the 
study of cognition. This turn marks the current shift from classical cognitivism, 
according to which all cognition consists essentially in brain-bound computa­
tions of mental  representations,  to an action-oriented paradigm,  according to 
which cognition is redefined as perceptually guided action. In the second part of 
the  introduction,  I  introduce  a  dominant  thread  in  theoretical  reflections  on 
language that  conceive of  language as  an abstract  system of  codes.  On this 
code-view, a language encodes thought and thereby allows for the transference 
of thoughts from one person to another. I show why this view of language goes 
hand in hand with a classical cognitivist account of cognition. I then introduce 
the  metalinguistic  approach,  according  to  which  key properties  of  language 
should be explained in terms of normative metalinguistic practices.
In Chapter 2, I propose an account of linguistic knowledge in terms of 
Rylean  know-how.  I  discuss  Nigel  Love’s  seminal  distinction between first-
order linguistic behaviour and second-order or metalinguistic constructs that we 
use to  describe  this  first-order  linguistic  behaviour,  such  as  word,  sentence,  
meaning,  and  understanding.  Based on Taylor’s  notion of  criterial  relations, 
linguistic  knowledge  is  defined  as  knowing-how  to  provide  and  recognise 
criterial support. To be a competent linguistic communicator one has to be sens­
itive  to  the  criterial  relations  that  originate  in  metalinguistic  practices.  I 
conclude that all first-order linguistic activity has a second-order dimension to 
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it, in the sense that it is directly perceived in terms of the metalinguistic prac­
tices that constitute it.
In Chapter 3, I develop an ecological-enactive account of utterances of 
concrete words – words used to indicate observable situations, events, objects,  
or  characteristics.  Building  on the education of  attention model  of  learning, 
utterances of concrete words are defined as  attentional  actions:  a  repeatable 
form of behaviour performed by a person to indicate (i.e. point out) a particular 
aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. Recent 
empirical  studies  show  that  the  attention-directing  effects  of  linguistically 
constituted  categories  affect  cognitive  processes  in  the  absence  of  overt 
language use. I argue that this can be understood by relying on the idea that 
humans continuously self-organise into task specific devices, a form of pheno­
typic reorganisation. The unfolding of this process is constrained by a history of 
learning, the actions of oneself, others, as well as aspects of the environment. In 
this  way  this  chapter  proposes  a  novel  explanation  for  the  empirical 
phenomenon of category effects. 
In Chapter 4, I propose a way of solving the hard problem of content by 
showing how children can become competent participants in content-involving 
practices.  I develop an account of the  skills  a child has to learn in order to 
develop a sensitivity to the contents of speech acts. In particular, I argue that a  
child has  to  be ‘calibrated’ to  measure her  world in terms  of the  normative 
similarity judgments of her community, a process that can be explained in terms 
of the education of attention. The calibrated child still has to learn to put her  
‘measurements’ to use in producing and understanding contentful speech acts. 
The child learns to do so by acquiring reflexive linguistic skills that enable her 
to participate in the negotiation of correctness conditions.
In  Chapter  5,  I  defend  the  thesis  that  metalinguistic  reflexivity  is 
constitutive  of  linguistic  normativity.  A potential  defeating  counterargument 
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against the constitutivity of metalinguistic reflexivity is the regress objection. 
By discussing the work of Searle, I show that this regress objection originates in 
the idea that learning language requires learning to follow the constitutive rules 
of linguistic practices. On this view, learning language is like learning chess: we 
first  learn the rules and then put them in practice. I propose an ecological-en­
active alternative, according to which learning language can be understood as 
first  learning  regular  communication  behaviour,  which  can  be  explained  in 
terms of attentional actions. On this view, it is only because a child first behaves 
in regular ways, that she can then retrospectively interpret her own behaviour in 
normative metalinguistic terms, that is, as being guided by rules. Metalinguistic 
reflexivity thus  enables  regulation of  communicative  behaviour,  and  thereby 
constitutes linguistic normativity. I argue that linguistic rules are resources: they 
are available to participants in order to (re)negotiate properties of language and 
linguistic behaviour. The account developed in this chapter thus enables us to 
understand the constitutive role of metalinguistic reflexivity for linguistic norm­
ativity without falling prey to the regress objection.
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